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Preface
This report is a completely revised edition of a study originally written as
a thesis for the Cand. PhiloL. Degree at the Department of History,
University of Bergen. At that time, it was mainly based on UN documents.
In order to broaden the perspective and shed light over other parts of the
history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I have conducted
archival research in the records of the British Foreign Office in Public
Record Office (PRO), London and in the records of the US State
Department in National Archives in Washington D.C. Some information has
also been found in the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
I would like to thank the following people for commenting on drafts of
the study and/or for practical help: Bård-Anders Andreassen, Inger A.
Nygaard, Helge Pharo, Lise Rakner, Tor Skålnes, Astri Suhrke and Ame
T ostensen.
I am grateful to the Norwegian Research Council for Humanities (NAVF)
and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financial support.
Bergen, June 1993
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1. Introduction
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United
Nations (UN) on 10 December 1948. For the first time in history a global
organization adopted a document consisting of norms which claimed to
have universal authority and validity . The following decades have shown
the importance of this document as a fundamental frame of reference in
international legal and political discourse. Human rights - as defined, or
not defined, in the Declaration - have also become a repository of slogans
and verbal ammunition in the political and ideological struggles among
nations. But the Declaration has not only been a political weapon. It has
been a source of inspiration for peoples in their struggle for better
conditions and to attain more civilized politics.
This study examines the historical origins of the Declaration. It focuses
on the decision-making process and the historical-political context in which
it unfolded. This is an important subject of research because of the
Declarations' s uniqueness at the time of adoption as well as its later
position. The United Nations had fifty-eight members at the time the
Declaration was framed, most parts of the world were represented, although
not equally.l Most of the participating nations supported the final text of
the Declaration and none of them voted against it. The fifty -eight
governments represented different political systems, ideologies, religions,
cultures and various patterns of social and economic development. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was concerned with all these
matters. The question then arises how the adoption of the Declaration was
possible in spite of all these differences? Why was the drafting process
successful?
This study will attempt to answer these questions by examining the
decision-making process involved in the drafting in a historical perspective.
Procedural factors such as time schedule, changing participants, the agenda
and the terms of reference all greatly influenced the finaloutcome and
contributed in an essential way to the adoption of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. The decisive underlying factor was, however, the
historical timing. The creation of the United Nations as well as the
Major parts of Africa and Asia were stil colonized and the losers of World War Il were
excluded from membership in the United Nations.
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organization' s activity in the field of human rights were products of the
tragic experiences of World War IL. The early post-war political climate
also promoted the successful drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
The theme of Chapter 2 is the political struggle to secure human rights
a central position on the UN agenda and also the value of World War Il as
a precondition. Once it was decided to draft an international human rights
document, other decisions had a powerful impact on the selection of main
actors in the drafting process. This competition for influence is examined
in Chapter 3. The binding character of the planned human rights document,
i.e. whether to prepare a legally "strong" convention or a legally "weak"
declaration, caused lengthy discussion and also affected substantial matters.
Chapter 4 deals with this debate and shows how the participants interpreted
the decisions in different ways. Five facilitating strategies for the
deliberations on substance are presented in Chapter 5, which also describes
the common ground for negotiations. These strategies and the common
point of departure were important to overcome the obstacles represented by
different ideologies, religions and cultures. Chapter 6 focuses on the
significance of a speedy drafting process and the importance of its historical
timing. The final and concluding chapter sketches the aftermath of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and discusses its
importance.
N ote on literature and sources
The broad interest in and acceptance of the concept of human rights is
reflected in the numerous works published on this topic. Many volumes
deal with different aspects of human rights and the Declaration itself. Thus,
they include issues in philosophy, law and social science. Virtually lacking
in this literature, however, is a distinct historical approach, separate from
philosophical history or history of law. 2
Some historical material is covered in various, mainly unpublished
dissertations in the United States. None of them has a coherent historical
approach such as the present study employs. Some parts of this literature
are relevant though. Most of these dissertations deal with the entire Bill of
Human Rights, also with different aspects of the Declaration. They tend to
concentrate on the legal aspects of the covenants. Among these dissertations
- all unpublished - the study of Bernard Patrick Meighen represents an
2 Stokke, "Bibliografisk essay."
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exception. The purpose of his analysis, a Ph.D. dissertation written in 1953,
was "to learn as much as possible of the deliberative, interpersuasive
process of discussion in terms of which a significant agreement on the
Declaration was reached. The hope has been that anything so observed
might have important bearing more generally upon the conduct of
interpersuasive discussion and might serve to extend man' s controlover this
means of building needed community." Meighen's study is based on a
thorough and useful examination of the primary sources, although the
complete absence of the historical perspective reduces the value.3
A number of published studies dealing with aspects of the Declaration
has been consulted and they vary greatly both in scope and approach. In
addition many reports on the history of the Declaration are available. Their
summary character and superficiality makes it difficult to label these reports
as research. The many studies of human rights that use a legal approach
tend to give priority to the covenants and undervalue the Declaration. There
is a tendency within internationallaw, however, to lay more emphasis on
the Declaration.4
3 Meighen, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Democratic Representative,
1. The other unpublished dissertations are Funston, Definition of International Bil of
Human Rights; Grammatico, United Nations and Development of Human Rights; Moser,
Human Rights Program of United Nations; Lee, Legislative Development of Economic
and Social Rights in United Nations; Fareed, United Nations Commission on Human
Rights. Among the broad literature on the covenants, see e.g. Henkin, Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
4 See e.g. PraU, Influence of Domestic Controversy on American Participation in the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, a study which are based on a wide range
of primary sources. Albert Verdoodt has given a chronological account of the drafting
of each article from the first outline via the discussions to the adoption and includes his
own interpretation of the final text in Naissance et signijication de la Déclaration
universelle des droits de lhomme. Tolley Jr presents a thematic history of the first fort Y
years of the Commission on Human Rights in The u.N. Commission on Human Rights.
The main objective of Robinson's Universal Declaration on Human Rights: Its Origin,
Signifcance and Interpretation, seems to be to make the Declaration "a powerful
weapon in the service of human rights" (p. 6), and most of the study is devoted to the
aspects of significance and interpretation of the Declaration. The approach of Kanger in
Human Rights in the u.N. Declaration is to compare the final text with Its earlier
versions with the intention to "discern what sort of rights the drafters had in mInd when
drawing up the articles" (p. 21).
In The United Nations and Human Rights by James Frederick Green, thirteen pages are
dedicated to the history of the Declaration. Of course, this allows a very general review
only. The United Nations itself has also published the history of the Declaration in
several editions. One of them is These Rights and Freedoms, which gives a brief report
of the drafting process and presents the chronological development of each article,
3
Although valuable information on the Declaration is included in the
literature noted above, the extensive historical material from the United
Nations and different archives are used only a little. Due to its scope and
historical approach, this study draws heavily on these primary sources, of
which United Nations documents have be en most important. These
documents have been complemented by material from American and British
diplomatic archives, in particular dealing with the human rights work in the
United Nations. Some Norwegian archive material has also been analysed.5
The detailed nature of the United Nations' summary records can be
illustrated by the fact that a two hours meeting produced on average
minutes of twelve to thirteen type-written pages. These records also include
information about the attending participants at the actual meeting, and
identify every speaker as well as give the opening time and the closing time
of the meetings. The summary records have high standards of accuracy and
reliability. The verbatim records from the drafting process of the declaration
exist mainly from the first session of the Coinssion on Human Rights.
Bernard P. Meighen has compared the verbatim and summary records and
found the summary records to be accurate. There usually was on every
cover page of the summary records an instruction to submit possible
corrections to the Record Office within twenty-four hours. When such a
correction was made, it was enclosed in the relevant minutes. In addition,
the entire record of a session also had to be approved at the end of the
session. 6
though not much in detaiL. It is mainly a compilation of the different drafts at the
different stages in the proeess.
The voluminous study of Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, is
an exemplify the tendency to undervalue the Declaration. The mere publication of The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A Commentary, edited by Asbjørn Eide et.al.
(1992) may be an indication on a new tendency. However, the book clearly shows the
author' s ambivalence about the legal status of the Declaration.
5 The UN documentation relevant for this study mainly consists of four parts: summary
records, official records, annexes and working papers. Summary and official records are
very detaIled mInutes of the deliberations of the different organs. Summary records have
been available from the meetings of the Commssion on Human Rights, its Drafting
Commttee and its Working Groups. Official records of the plenary General Assembly,
the Third Commttee (in the General Assembly) and the EconomIc and Social Council
were also consulted. The Annexes contain different background material, e.g. reports
from commttees and Sub-Commissions.
6 The General Assembly laid restrictions on the use of verbatim records. See
E/CNA/ AC.1/SR.20: 5-6. The reason of this decision has most likely been the expenses.
Meighen, Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Democratie Representative, 41.
See e.g. E/CNA/AC.1/SR.25, 1; E/CNA/AC.1/SR.43/Corr.1; E/CNAI2/Corr.1;
4
The United Nations documentation and the archive material have been
supplemented by several autobiographical and biographical sources. Several
of the participants in the drafting process of the Declaration have given
their own versions of events. The most important one is the autobiography
of John Humphrey, the Director of the United Nations' Division of Human
Rights. He was the first director and held that position from 1 August 1946
until he retired twenty years later. He began to keep a diary in July or
'August of 1948, so his memoirs are probably more detailed and exact from
that point of time. He also based his memoirs on UN documentation, which
the many quotations in his book clearly show. His autobiography, even
though filled with descriptions of a great many cocktail-parties and gossip
of leading personalities, is highly informative about the drafting the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its adoption by the General
Assembly in 1948, so Philip Alston, the noted internationallawyer, noticed
when reviewing it. 7
Other autobiographical sources concerning the drafting process are three
important members of the Commission of Human Rights, Eleanor
Roosevelt, Charles Malik and René Cassin. The essay written in 1949 by
O. Frederick Nolde, Freedom's Charter, deserves also to be mentioned.
Nolde was one of the observers from the non-governmental organizations
during the drafting process, and, according to Mrs. Roosevelt, he attended
as regularly as the delegates did. Nolde represented the Coinssion of the
Churches on International Affairs, and he also attended the San Francisco
Conference as one of the consultants to the United States delegation. He
gives a vivid description of the drafting process of the Declaration.8
A/C.3/232/Corr. i; A/C.3/266/Corr. i; E/CNA/SR.80, 10- i 1.
7 Humphrey, Great Adventure. Alston, Review of GreatAdventure, 224-25. Humphrey has
also contributed with numerous essays on the history of the Declaration, see "Human
Rights," "Magna Charta of Manknd," "Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History,
Impact and Juridical Character," "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and "United
Nations Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
8 Roosevelt, Eleanor: "The Struggle for Human Rights;" "General Assembly Adopts the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;" "The PromIse of Human Rights;" "Human
Rights" and The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt.
Malik, Charles: "EconomIc and SocIal Council;" "International Bil of Human Rights;"
"Human Rights in the United Nations;" and Human Rights in United Nations.
Cassin, René: "La Déclaration universelle et la mIse en oeuvre des droIts de l'homme;"
"Twenty Y ears After the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Freedom and
Equality" and "Hvorledes verdens erklæringen om menneskerettighetene ble tiL"
Nolde, Freedoms Charter. See also E/600; E/800 and Roosevelt, "Introduction," 3.
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The historical predecessors to the Declaration
When adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was unique in
its scope and in its universality. The document had, however, its
predecessors. The frequent use of the concept "the international bill of
human rights" in the Declaration' s drafting process, clearly shows the
inspiration by the eighteenth century declarations.
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), the
American Declaration on Independence (1776) and the Bill of Rights (1789
and 1791) all represented constitutional victories for human rights on a
nationalleveL. The ideas of all these documents became normative
standards in modern civilization. Several of the constitutions made in the
following years also included lIsts of rights after the American and French
modeL. The protection of human rights continued to be an issue governed
by domestic legislation.
There had been before efforts for international measures to protect human
rights. At the end of the eighteenth century, slavery was generally
recognized as legal all over the world. Slavery was first abolished in
England in 1772 and later it became internationally suppressed. The
International Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Slave Trade was
concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1926. Its
objective was the complete suppression of slavery and slave trade
everywhere.
The evolution of humanitarian law is mainly linked to the history of the
International Red Cross. The founder of this organization, Henri Dunant,
took the initiative to transform into positive law the growing support of
humanitarian treatment of wounded enemy troops. The Geneva Convention
of 1864 laid down a permanent system of humanitarian relief whenever and
wherever its services might be required. The Convention also took care of
prisoners of war. After the terrible experiences of World War I, the system
was improved by a new Geneva Convention of 1929. In the framework of
the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907, a similar system of
protection of the sick and the wounded in naval warfare was established.
A more recent and relevant experience for the drafters of the
International Bill of Human Rights, was the international protection of
minorities as a result of the new borders drawn up after World War i.
Treaties concerning minorities were forced on the new and partly new
states in Eastern Europe. There was also included in the peace treaties of
the former enemy-states clauses concerning minorities. Certain states made
declarations on the protection of minorities a condition for the admission
of the new states to the League of Nations. This form of minority
protection had one particularly bad outcome. Protection of minorities served
6
as a legal pretext for Hitler and Nazi Germany to invade and fight wars.
During the human rights discussion in the early years of the United
Nations, several states had as their clear policy that this kind of protection
should not be repeated. Only selected groups of minorities were given this
limited international protection, which suggested that the protection of
minorities had little value.9
Other elements of international law also indicate an emerging
international concern for human rights. The concept of humanitarian
intervention covered a limited number of cases when intervention in the
internal affairs of a state was permitted because of inhuman treatment of its
own subjects, (although the actual reason for such interventions might have
been mixed). Such a (self-proclaimed) humanitarian intervention was
exercised, e.g. in 1827 by the United Kingdom, France and Russia on
behalf of the Greeks against the Turkish supremacy. The diplomatic
protection of citizens abroad was also a kind of international protection of
human rights. The Hague Codification Conference in 1930 tried to
safeguard the rights of aliens, and drew attention to forty-seven different
types of "denials of justice". However, these safeguards were not
particularly effective, and it dep ende d strongly on the ability of the
different states to enforce the rights of their nationals abroad. Another
element which might have had an effect on the protection of human rights,
the mandate system, begun after 1919. Mandates were used primarily to
settle rival political claims.lO
The breakdown of the League of Nations and its disability to protect
minorities created scepticism about the international protection of human
rights. The atrocities of World War Il led to its renaissance. The
Nuremberg Trials represented this increased emphasis on the international
protection of human rights when former Nazi-Ieaders were indicted and
9 Robertson, Human Rights in the World, 20. "Possible Modes of Dealing with
Minorities," 14 October 1943, Box 3, Alger Hiss Files, National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA); Working Party on Human Rights, 15 May 1947, Public Record
Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/67 604/UE 414.
10 See Borchard, "Historical Background of International Protection of Human Rights,"
1 13. A thorough analysis of the concept, and some cases, of humanitarian intervention
wil be found in Sohn and Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, 137-
21 1. Rappard, director of the Mandates Section of the League of Nations 1920-25 and
member of the permanent Mandates Commission 1925-45, argued that this system also
had an effect on the protection of human rights. His problems with finding facts to
support his view indicates that the mandate system had no considerable effect on the
protection of human rights. See Rappard, "Human Rights in Mandated Territories," 1 18-
23.
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tried as war criminals by the International Military Tribunal organised by
the victorious allied powers. Eyewitnesses, escaped from Auschwitz in
1944, set off the chain of events that led to these trials, and the Americans
were particularly active in the preparatory process. The offenses of the
accused had no particular geographicallocation, but can be subdivided into
three categories: violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and
crimes against humanity (exterminations, deportations and genocide). The
main principle of these trials was that crimes of international law were
cointted by individual men. Therefore, the only way to enforce the
provisions of international law was to punish individuals who cointted
such crimes.ll
While the last part of the nineteenth century saw an increasing
codification ofinternationallaw, the two world wars were in a sense steps
back. An international law professor represented such a view when right
after World War Il he declared that international law had been
immeasurably weakened by the two world wars, and that the legal
limitations on warfare by several hundre d years of practice seemed
abolished. At the same time, these wars caused renewed interest in the field
of international law, manifested by the creation of global multipurpose
organisations; the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively.
These organisations can be considered as organised superstructures of
international customary law. As a result of this rapid growth of
international organisation and of the renewed interest of internationallaw,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948. Its
adoption implied that for the first time the individual could became a
subject to internationallaw. This was perhaps the greatest novelty in the
1948 adoption of the Declaration.12
11 Conot, Justiee at Nuremberg, 3.
12 Borchard, "International Protection of Human Rights," 115.
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2. Human rights on the UN agenda: The
impact of the war
The predecessor of the United Nations (UN), i.e. the League of Nations, did
not have any special provisions for the protection of human rights. During
the drafting of the UN Charter, made during the Dumbarton Oaks
conversations of the Great Powers in the auturn of 1944, only a vague
reference to human rights was included. Yet, the final Charter contained
seven references to human rights. Promotion of human rights was made as
one of the main tasks of the organization, and the establishment of a
commission on human rights was explicitly mentioned in the Charter. This
was in fact one of the most significant differences between these two
documents. Why and how were the human rights placed on the United
N ations agenda? Who supported and who opposed it? What had happened
between October 1944 and June 1945 to make such a difference between
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the UN Charter?l
By the end of World War I, the President of the United States, Woodrow
Wilson, took the initiative to create a world organization designed to
prevent another destructive world conflict. The League of Nations was
established in 1919 as a part of the Versailles treaty. While the League was
weakened by the absence of the USSR and more importantly, by the United
States, the organization had some success in the twenties. After the world
economic crisis in the early thirties, its decline was obvious. The Japanese
conquest of Manchuria (1931), the Italian attack on Ethiopia (1935-36) and
Hitler' s repudiation of the Versailles treaty (1935) represented crucial
challenges to the collective securitymechanism which the League failed to
meet. The League was unable or unwilling to resist aggression by a
powerful and well-armed state. The requirement of unanimity paralysed the
organization. By the outbreak of World War Il the League was moribund.
Soon there was another initiative.
Already by the end of 1939, even before the US was formally involved
in the war, the United States had established a cointtee to consider post-
war problems. Work quickened and increased after Pearl Harbour. One of
the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations had been the absence
1 All the references to human rights in the UN Charter wil be found in Appendix 2.
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of the United States. This mistake, it was now argued, should not be
repeated. During 1943, under the support of public opinion in the United
States to participate in an international security organization, the United
States government to ok the initiative in creating the United Nations, as it
had in establishing the League of Nations.2
The Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941) as well as the Declaration by the
United Nations (1 January 1942) explicitly referred to some kind of post-
war peace and security organization. The Charter focused on "a peace
which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their
own boundaries" and for the "establishment of a wider and permanent
system of general security."3
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union met in Moscow (1943) and proclaimed the decision to
continue after the war their close cooperation, and work together for the
creation of an international peace and security organization. In spite of its
absence, China was also a party to this declaration, which was further
confirmed and strengthened later that auturn in Cairo and Teheran. The
four Great Powers then proceeded to prep are concrete proposals and by
midsummer 1944 they exchanged drafts. These documents constituted the
basis of the conversations in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, from 21
August to 7 October 1944. The resulting Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
became the basis of the United Nations founding conference during the
early summer of 1945.4
The creation of this new international organization was not only
dependent on the agreement of the Great Powers, the approval by the US
Senate was just as important (as the history of the League of Nations
showed). The veto of the Great Powers in the Security Council helped quiet
concerns in the Senate. It was also a precondition for Soviet participation
in the United Nations.
2 Public opinion polls during the war show an increasing and overwhelming public support
for the participation of the United States in an organization similar to the League of
Nations after the war. Scott and Withey, United States and United Nations. Public View,
9-15. Russell, History of United Nations Charter, 323-29.
3 On 14 August 1941, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great
Britain gave a joint declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter. On 1 January 1942, this
declaration was endorsed by the Alles, the twenty-six countries then at war with the
Axis. The document - known as the Declaration by United Nations - was later
adhered to by forty-seven nations in total. United States Department of State, Report to
the President, 21.
4 The official name of the conference, which took place in San Francisco from 25 April
to 26 June 1945, was "The United Nations Conference on International Organization."
10
"Complete victory . . . to preserve human rights"
From the very beginning, W orld War Il was described as a war over ideas
and ideals, in particular by the leaders of the United States. Of course the
reality was more complex, but ideas were an extremely important part of
the American governments' justification for the war. In January 1941 the
President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, gave his famous address to the
Congress:
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon four essential freedoms.
The first is the freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the
world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want which, translated into world terms, means
econonic understandings which wil secure to every nation a healthy
peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear - which, translated into world terms,
means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such
a thorough fashion that no nation wil be in a position to commit an act
of physical aggression against any neighbour - anywhere in the world.
. . . Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our
support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them. Our
strength is our unit y of purpose.
To that high concept there can be no end save victory.5
The emphasis on freedom was repeated on 14 August 1941 in the Atlantic
Charter. The joint declaration by the President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of Great Britain expressed that "after the final destruction
of the Nazi Tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford
to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries,
and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live
5 In 1943 Senator Joseph H. Ball declared that for "the overwhelming majority of the
Americans . . . this is a war between democracy and tyranny , between freedom and
slavery for the individual," Ball, Collective Security, 9. Roosevelt, "Four Human
Freedoms," 384-85.
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out their lives in freedom from fear and want." The human rights aspect
was even clearer when the Allies endorsed the Atlantic Charter. On 1
January 1942, in the Declaration by United Nations, the signatory
Governments stated "that complete victory over their enemies is essential
to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve
human rights and justice in their own lands as weii as in other lands. . . ,,6
The conviction was constantly spreading. There could be no peace
without human rights. It could be said that the war was caried on with the
intention of creating a political and economic order which permitted
protection of human rights. The special character of World War Il as a war
about ideas was not mere rhetoric. The experiences of the war and in
particular the behaviour of the N azis gave new force to the ide as and ideals
of human rights. It was generally believed that the war was a struggle for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The acts of the Nazis were very
important reasons for the growing interest in human rights during the war
and throughout the post-war period.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals contained a reference to human rights. In the section dealing with
arrangements for international economic and social cooperation, one of the
tasks of the planned organization was to "promote respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms." The task was linked to the principal aim of the
organization: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations. . . ." Having in mind the many human rights references made by
President Roosevelt during the war, it is not surprising that the issue was
raised by the American negotiator, the Under Secretary of State, Edward R.
Stettinius. But even this vague reference to human rights caused some
dispute among the Great Powers. The strongest opposition to a reference
to human rights and fundamental freedom was expressed by the British
delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan. He argued that "such a provision would
give rise to the possibility that the organization might eng age in criticism
of the internal organization of member states." The British reluctance was
obviously related to the colonial issue. They were exceedingly vulnerable
to criticism on this point. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Andrej
Gromyko, seemed more indifferent, but voiced his "personal" opinion that
human rights were not relevant to the main task of the planned security
organization. The Soviet group turned later out to be willing to accept the
human rights reference, "provided it was coupled with a provision that
6 Pharo and Nordahl, Internasjonal politikk 1941-1955, 13. United 
Nations, United Nations
Action in Field of Human Rights, 5.
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Fascist or fascist-type states could not be members of the organization."
Both the British and the Soviet representatives agreed, however, to raise the
issue with their governments.7
The original demand of the United States was to incorporate human
rights as one of the principles of the future organization. In order to reach
a compromise with the other big powers, the Americans lowered their
demands and requested the Soviet and British to inform their government
about the hope of the United States "that this point (human rightsJ can be
included briefly somewhere in the document." (Italics added.J When the
Under Secretary of State, Stettinius, met with the President the next day,
the Under Secretary said he "mentioned to the President how disappointed
we were that we had not yet succeeded in getting the human rights and
fundamental freedoms statement in the document but that we had and
would continue to press the matter as hard as we know how." Stettinius
also maintained that the President was gratified by the fact that the Soviet
and British representatives had promised to raise the human rights matter
with their governments.8
Some days later, Ambassador Gromyko received his final instructions
from Moscow and could inform the British and American delegations "that
his Government had . . . agreed to the insertion of the provision relating to
the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the end of the
first sentence under Chapter IX which concerns economic and social
aITangements." This proposal became the final decision at Dumbarton Oaks.
When this agreement was refeITed to President Roosevelt, he "seemed
gratified . . . and felt the inc1usion of the human rights sentence was
extremely vital."g
The President' s remarks, not made public at the time, indicate a deep
concern about human rights. His many references to human rights and
7 Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 117. Eighteenth day of the conversations.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the State, Edward R. Stettinius, to the Secretary
of State, 9 September 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): 1944, I,
789. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the State, Stettinius, to the Secretary of
State, 19 September 1944, FRUS: 1944, I, 825.
8 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the State, Stettinius, to the Secretary of State,
20 September 1944, FRUS: 1944, I, 829. Extract from the Personal Diary of the Under
Secretary of State, Stettinius, twenty-ninth day of the Conversations, 21 September 1944,
FRUS: 1944, I, 834.
g Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, Stettinius, to President Roosevelt,
Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, 27 September 1944, FRUS: 1944,
I, 838. Extract from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State, Stettinius, 27
September 1944, FRUS: 1944,1,842.
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freedoms during the war may have contained an element of rhetoric, but
Roosevelt seems to have had a sincere interest in the issue and pushed it
through the American delegation. His "ghost writer", Samuel i. Rosenman,
testifies to this, claiming that the 1941 declaration was a result of a
Presidential initiative and dictation. At the same time, Roosevelt also
represented the interests of American human rights activists. The reference
may have been a concession to them.lO
In the period between the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and the San
Francisco Conference, the proposals of the Great Powers were open to
scrutiny and criticism by public opinion. Recalling the fate of the League
of Nations, the US State Department started a formidable campaign to sell
the plan to the Congress and the public and distributed about 1.9 million
copies of the text. The impressive public response is illustrated by the fact
that letters to the US State Department relating to the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals reached a weekly peak of about 20.000 by April 1945, some of
them were also dealing with human rights issues. As a result of this
response, forty-two non-governmental American organizations were invited
to send representatives to the San Francisco Conference to serve as
consultants to the US delegation. The participation of these consultants
seems to have had some impact on the UN Charter, as will be shown later.
Some non-American NGOs also attende d the Conference, but their
contribution to the process is uncertain.11
Despite the fact that the preparatory work at Dumbarton Oaks was done
only by the Great Powers, their clear assumption was that the planned
international organization should be open to "all peace-Ioving states",
irrespective of size. Although the Big Four played a major role in preparing
the new organization, many states and non-governmental organizations were
actively engaged as well. First and foremost, this applied to the Allied
Powers, which were invited to the San Francisco Conference. A great many
10 Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, 262-263.
11 Campbell and Herrng, ed., The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, 153-154. United States
Department of State, Report to the President, 27. See also Riggs, "Oversellng the UN
Charter." A great number of private organizations had requested the State Department
to be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The opinion of the Department was
somewhat ambiguous; on the one hand "there were good reasons why many of them
should be there," on the other hand "it was felt to be unfortunate to overload the official
Delegation with such representatives." As a compromise, forty-two organizations got
consultative status, which implied that "a full system of liaison would be set up to keep
them closely in touch with the progress of the work" and they "would be consulted from
time to time as appropriate." See Minutes of the Second Session of the United States
Delegation, 23 March 1945, FRUS: 1945, I, 149.
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of them presented their ownamendments to the text produced by the Great
Powers, and not a few concerned human rights. The strongest of these
human rights campaigns was led by the Latin Americans.12
Latin American activism for a bill of human rights
The creation of the new world organization was one of the issues discussed
by the Latin American states at the Inter American Conference on War and
Peace Problems in Chapultepec, Mexico, during the spring of 1945. In one
of the resolutions, the Conference declared that the responsibility of the
United Nations to provide international protection of the basic rights of man
had to be put into practice by means of a catalogue of the rights and the
duties of every individual in a declaration adopted by states in the form of
a convention. This was an indication of the coming International Bill of
Human Rights. The idea of making an international human rights document
was not new. The novelty of the Latin American proposal was its broad
governmental support combined with its connection to the creation of the
United Nations. The Chapultepec resolution showed that the making of
such a document within the framework of the United Nations had some
political support at that point in time. A drafting work on a regional human
rights document was also initiated at this conference, and this work went
on to paralleI the coming drafting work on the UN Declaration.13
The Latin American initiative for a "catalogue of rights" parallelled a
shelved American plan. Among the tentative proposals for the coming
United Nations set forth by the United States administration, an
international bill of rights was sugge sted as part of the basic constitutional
12 "All peace-Ioving states" meant primarily all those fighting on the Allied side during the
war. "Amendments to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals," United States Delegation
Undistributed Numbered Documents (US Doc Und) 5b 1/1 (San Francisco Conf.), US
Mission to the United Nations, Box 10, 84, NARA.
13 Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 22-23. The resolution was approved on 7 March
1945. There existed already several draft international bil of human rights. When the
Commssion of Human Rights started its drafting work early in 1947, seven of the texts
which were brought to Its knowledge, were produced before 1945, the oldest one was
from 1917. They were mainly produced by individuals. (See E/CNA/W.16, p. 9-11.) The
attempt closest to be an official launching of the idea of an international bil of human
rights was made by the Czechoslovakian President Eduard Benes in November 1941.
(See Holborn, War and Peace Aims of United Nations, 420.) This regional declaration
was adopted in March 1948 by the Ninth International Conference of American States
in Bogotá - and therefore of ten named "the Bogotá declaration". E/CNA/122. See
forthcoming discussions in Chapters 3 and 5.
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provisions of the new organization. The US intention with such a bill seems
to have been to avoid demands for minority treaties similar to those
adopted after World War i. However, the inclusion of any bill of rights was
not part of the US recommendations to the Dumbarton Oaks meetings. The
Americans felt perhaps that such a bill was too unrealistic. Ameeting
between a Mexican delegation and a representative of the American
delegation just before the San Francisco Conference indicates such a
feeling. The Mexican proposal was to incorporate in the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals a statement of basic rights and obligations of individuals and
nations. The US representative tried to dampen the enthusiasm, arguing that
it would be extremely difficult to do this. In the end, the Mexicans replied
that they would be satisfied with a limited statement. It was a
foreshadowing of what later occurred in San Francisco. The United States
represented the "realist" support for human rights, the Latin Americans
represented the "idealist" view. 14
The Latin American activism moved to new grounds in San Francisco
where several states proposed amendments designed to strengthen the
safeguards of human rights. The most far-reaching proposals were set forth
by Panama, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Cuba. Three of them wanted to
include some kind of declaration of human rights in the UN Charter, and
the others attempted to coint the General Assembly to adopt such a
document shortly after the San Francisco Conference.15
Panama introduced the "Declaration of EssentialHuman Rights,"
proposing that the document became a part of the UN Charter, and declared
that one of the goals of the organization was to maintain and observe these
standards. This declaration was prepared by jurists from twenty-four
countries between 1942 and 1944 under the auspice of the American Law
Institute. One of them was Ricardo J. Alfaro, Panamanian jurist and later
President of Panama. He was a delegate to the San Francisco Conference
and on his initiative Panama introduced this draft to the conference. Later,
14 Proposals for an international bil of rights," August 1944; "The Legal Sub-Commttee,"
22 September 1944 and "Bil of Rights," draft approved 3 December 1942, box 2,
Human Rights, Alger Hiss Files, 1940-46, NARA. Russell, History of United Nations
Charter, 323-29. The sugge sted content of this bil of rights included also economIc and
socIal freedoms. (Compare Chapter 5.) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leo
Pasvolsky, 21 April 1945, FRUS: 1945, I, 355-360.
15 It is remarkable that in spite of this conference, the Latin Americans had no joint
proposal. A joint amendment suggested by Brazil, the DomInican Republic and Mexico
was the only exception.
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Alfaro particIpated in the drafting process of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.16
The Chilean delegation proposed that the Charter should include the
following paragraph: "(E)very state must guarantee to the individual full
and complete protection of his freedom, and the right to live and to work;
also the free exercise of religion, profession, science and art, . . . (and) that
governments be bound to guarantee their people freedom of press and
information." Mexico also wanted to incorporate essential human rights in
a "Declaration of International Rights and Duties of Man" in an annex to
the United Nations Charter, but that delegation had no draft.17
Uruguay demanded that it be the dec1ared purpose of the Organization
"to promote the recognition of and guarantee respect for the essential
human liberties and rights without distinction as to race, sex, belief or
socIal status. Those liberties and rights are to be defined in a special
charter." This document, which was named "Charter of Mankind," was to
be submitted to the consideration of the General Assembly within six
months. The Cuban proposal had some similarities with the Uruguayan one.
The delegation of Cuba required that "the States which are members of the
Organization shall conform their acts to the principles contained in . . . the
"Declaration of the International Duties and Rights of the Individual" which
the General Assembly shall adopt within the shortest possible time after it
is constituted." The delegation also presented a draft for such a Declaration,
and this draft contained civIl and political rights as well as socIal and
economic rights.18
Despite their efforts, the flurry of proposals from the Latin American
states concerning a bill of human rights were not accepted. There was
insufficient time, others argued, to consider the proposals fully. Of course,
it would have been impossible to draft any human rights document during
a few weeks at an international conference which had so many difficult
tasks to deal with and which had fifty states as participants. Bearing in
mind the later discussions about the status of the human rights dec1aration,
16 Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 23-24. E/CNA/57, p. 3; Lewis and Ellingston,
"Introduction" and CommIttee appointed by American Law Institute, "Statement of
Essential Human Rights." The cultures or countries represented were the American,
Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese, French, pre-Nazi German, Italian, Indian, Latin
American, Polish, Soviet Russian and Spanish. American Law Institute was a judicial
organization specialized on codification of law. It was not represented among the
consultants to the US delegation in San Francisco. Houston, Latin America in the United
Nations, foreword by Ricardo J. Alfaro. See also Table 2.
17 Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 23-24.
18 Ibid., 24-25 and 154-161.
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it is reasonable to assume that a great number of the participating states in
San Francisco feared the possible binding nature of such a document.
Human rights activists at the Conference were fully aware of the
opposition, especially from the Great Powers, to accept any proposal which
might justify interference in their intern al affairs. The idea of Uruguay and
Cuba to bind the signatory parties to a human rights declaration that was
not yet drafted, was even more unrealistic. Another expressed argument for
postponing the drafting of the bill was that the organization which was
going to be formed, could "through a special coinssion, or by some other
methods" deal more effectively with a possible bill of rights than the San
Francisco Conference. The idea of a forthcoming drafting of a bill of
human rights was received with sympathy at the San Francisco
Conference.19
In addition to the proposals regarding a bill of human rights, many
delegations suggested amendments designed to strengthen the safeguards of
human rights. Haiti sought to include the protection of human rights in the
requirements for membership in the new organization by an amendment
stating that the basis of the organization was "the sovereign equality of all
States that love peace and exclude from their relations any racIal or
religious discrimination." This initiative led nowhere, nor did the French
proposal for including human rights in the activities of the Security
CounciL. 20
It is remarkable that except for the Great Powers the most ardent and
numerous human rights proposals came from Latin America. Some of their
engagement may have reflected a personal interest of individual
representatives, as in the case of Panama's Ricardo J. Alfaro. Even more
important the Latin American political tradition is very legaL. It is deeply
influenced by the Catholic ideas of naturallaw. The right to asylum is for
example deeply respected in the region. This legal and religious tendency
of politics is shown in some speeches held by Latin American presidents
during World War Il as well as by the later Latin American arguments in
the drafting process of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their
19 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 26 April 1945, quoted in American Jewish Committee,
World Charter for Human Rights, 5. Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 38 and 89.
(Doc. 944, 1/1/34 (1), 13 June 1945.)20 Latin-American states which proposed stronger human rights provisions in the Charter:
Panama, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, Mexico, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and
Haiti. The following states also suggested stronger or weaker amendments which referred
to human rights, most of them only one single reference: The Union of South Africa,
Egypt, India, France, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. Robinson, Human
Rights in the Charter, 19-30.
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constitutions, moreover, were inspired by the ideas of the French
revolution. In this light, human rights activism was an understandable
reaction to the war despite the fact that Latin America had hardly been
directly involved in the war.21
A British delegate took a cynical view. In a confidential report to his
foreign office, he characterized the Latin American proposals as "pious
platitudes which seem to place them in the vanguard of progress and yet
involve no enforcement of inconvenient standards in their home towns."
This British description touches a crucial issue: It is obviously easier to
support general statements on human rights than concrete measures of its
implementation. For example, very few of the Latin American states could
be called as "democracies" at the time.22
The Great Powers and human rights
The four Great Powers which sponsored the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had
also agreed to consult with each other in San Francisco concerning
amendments and changes in the original text. As aresult, their joint
amendments caried more weight than the others. How these powers
decided to deal with the human rights issue was crucial therefore. 23
The United States delegation repeated the original American proposal to
include a reference to the development of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms among the principles and purposes of the
Organization. Human rights would thus be established as one of the main
purposes of the organization. At Dumbarton Oaks, this proposed clause had
been moved to a less prominent place, to the chapter dealing with social
and economic issues. Now in San Francisco, the United States made
another attempt to move it up. The delegation also suggested that to "foster
the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms" should be
21 Having in mind the strong Latin American activity for human rights, it is an irony of
history that these countries more than others were refuges for Nazi criminals. On the
legal and religious tendency of politics, compare the philosophy of Francisco Suárez, see
Stoetzer, Scholastic Roots of Spanish American Revolution. See also Houston, 254-55
and 286 and Jenks, "Human Rights in a World of Diverse Cultures in Lights of Spanish
Tradition." Speeches by the Mexican and Peruvian presidents in Holborn, War and
Peace Aims of United Nations, 593 and 608. For the Latin American views with respect
to issues such as God, family, marrage, abortion etc., see Chapter 5.
22 Hadow to Foreign Office, 17 May 1945, PRO: FO 371/50716/U 4218.
23 Minutes of the First Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter Proposals, 2 May
1945, FRUS: 1945, I, 548.
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specified among the purposes of the General Assembly. Even within the
San Francisco delegation there appeared to be ambivalence towards the
inc1usion of human rights references. American "realism" in estimating the
political support of human rights resurfaced. It was argued that it was
"important to avoid giving the impression that the Organization would deal
with individuals." Another delegate pointed out that the human rights issue
had caused a great deal of difficulty at Dumbarton Oaks. A third
emphasized that the main purpose of the San Francisco Conference was
security - there were "enough problems involved in that without injecting
other matters." The socIal and economic field should be left to subsequent
conferences. This ambivalence within the American delegation was known
publicly at the time. A contemporary observer saw it as an expression of
fear of human rights activity involving what was then called "the Negro
problem". This was a very sensitive issue in the US and also caused
international criticism. It later directly influenced the American human
rights policy.24
In light of the subsequent history of the UN and human rights, the fact
that the Sovietamendments to the UN Charter included three references to
human rights is far more surprising than the American support. Under the
general purpose of the United Nations, the Soviets suggested that the
organization should "achieve . . . encouragement of respect for human
rights," the General Assembly should "assist in the realization of human
rights and basic freedoms" and, as a part of its arrangement for
international economic and socIal cooperation, the United Nations should
"pro mote respect for human rights." In all three human rights references,
the Soviet amendments also inc1uded a non-discrimination clause in the
form of the statement "without distinction as to race, language, religion or
sex."25
24 Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, 9 April 1945, FRUS:
1945, l, 220 and 223. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation,
11 April 1945, FRUS: 1945, l, 251-52. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to
President Truman, 19 April 1945. FRUS: 1945, l, 354. Minutes of the Eighth Meetings
of the US Delegation, 11 April 1945, FRUS: 1945, l, 262. Jewish Telegraphic Agency,
26 April 1945, quoted in American Jewish Commttee, World Charter for Human Rights,
5. The Jewish Daily Forward, 20 May 1945, quoted in American Jewish Commttee,
World Charter for Human Rights, 10. Rose, America Divided, 307-315.
25 "Amendments to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as sugge sted by the Soviet delegation," US
Gen 39, 2 May 1945, US Mission to the United Nations, Box 6, RG 84, NARA. The
non-discrimination categories were identical to those in the Soviet Constitution, Art. 122-
124. See John N. Hazard, "The Soviet Union and a World Bil of Rights," 1102.
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It is surprising and has often been forgotten since that the US and the
Soviet delegations combined their human rights proposals. These became
the joint amendments of the Great Powers. The Americans accepted the
Soviet clause of non-discrimination. These are the most explicit Soviet
contribution to the human rights provisions in the Charter. The Soviets too
had to make a concession in order to reach an agreement. Their human
rights clauses mentioned in particular the right to work and the right to
education. These provisions were not acceptable to the US delegations. The
Soviets had no strong objection to the deletion of these references. It has
been argued that at the San Francisco Conference there was aremarkable
willingness from both the Soviet Union and the United States to make
concessions to get agreement on the new organization. Their human rights
cooperation can be seen in this light. 26
Because of Soviet-American cooperation on human rights, the British
even though reluctant to include human rights issues in the Charter, were
overpowered. Human rights thus secured a rather strong position in the
United Nations Charter. The human rights references were expressed in a
generallanguage. During the coming drafting process of the human rights
bill, the same powers intensely resisted a binding document.
26 Minutes of the First, Second and Third Four-Power Consultative Meetings on Charter
Proposals, 2 and 3 May 1945, FRUS: 1945, l, 551-552, 569-570 and 584. "Consultation
of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China on their amendments to
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals" and "Amendments proposed by the governments of the
United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China," 3 and 4 May 1945, US Gen
58 and 70, The US Mission to the United Nations, box 6, RG 84, NARA. Minutes of
the Second Four-Power Consultative Meeting on the Charter Proposals, 3 May 1945,
FRUS: 1945, l, 570.
The explicit enumeration of rights caused much debate, particularly within the United
States delegation. The American argument against the Soviet enumeration was that there
existed so many other fundamental rights, e.g. the freedom of religion and the freedom
of the press. (Their different "choIce" of rights ilustrates a real differenee of opinion
between the two states.) However, the Soviet delegate, Molotov, surprised the Americans
by declaring that he had no objection against further enumeration. Then the US
delegation promoted as their first choice that there should not be any enumeration at all.
It this motion was rejected, they then would press for a reference to freedom of
information. This strategy seems to have been chosen because they feared that the right
to work, proposed by the USSR, was more likely to be accepted by the Conference than
their counter-proposal. See Minutes of the First and Second Four-Power Consultative
Meetings on Charter Proposals, 2 and 3 May 1945, FRUS: 1945, l, 551-552 and 570.
Forty-second and Forty-third Meetings of the US Delegation, 16 and 17 May 1945,
FRUS: 1945, l, 766, 774, 777-778. See also Russell, History of United Nations Charter,
782; about the "international devotion" to right to workJfull employment. Fisher, America
and Russia in World Community, 128.
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The United Kingdom delegation had proposed inserting the word
"international" before every reference to "human rights", "otherwise there
might be interference with intern al affairs. They did not repeat this proposal
later, perhaps because they were satisfied that the general non-interference
clause of the Charter had been mo ved to a more prominent position in the
document. The British objection to an inclusion of human rights provisions
in the Charter rested on the principle of non-interference in internal matters.
It is identical to the Soviet position in subsequent debates on human rights
issues. At the time, British fear of interference was linked to the colonial
question. Strong international criticism had made it a very sensitive issue.
Concern for that issue was clear in the Foreign Office papers about the
International Bill of Human Rights. Washington's criticism, in particular,
strained the relations between the two states.27
The striking difference between the British and the American attitude
towards human rights may seem surprising in light of their common
cultural and ideological heritage. The two states, however, represented
different traditions of foreign policy. The foreign policy of the United
States has been described as alternating between isolationism and
intervention/ globalism/idealism. The American involvement in World War
Il and even more so the engagement in the establishment of the United
Nations represented a powerful globalism. The American talk of freedom
and human rights illustrates the idealist dimension. Thirty years later, in the
Carter Administration, support for human rights rose again. On the other
hand, British foreign policy has stereotypically been marked by pragmatism
and an absence of ideology. The impact of public opinion upon the conduct
of foreign policy has been even more important in the United States than
in Britain. These differences became clearer as the relative strength of the
two states changed during the war. The globalism of the United States was
growing at the same time the nation grew stronger. The United Kingdom
was a declining empire, with reduced and decreasing capabIlity as well as
weakened political will to preserve its former greatness in foreign policy.28
27 Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the US Delegation, 2 May 1945, FRUS: 1945,
I, 523. "Amendments proposed by the governments of the United States, United
Kingdom, Soviet Union and China," US Gen 70, US Mission to the United Nations, Box
6, RG 84, NARA. The non-interference clause was moved from Chapter VIII,
Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and SecUfity Including
Prevention and Suppression of Aggression, to Chapter Il, Principles. Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership. Britain and America, 124 and 135.
28 Hartz, Liberal Tradition in America, 286 ff., Morgenthau, New Foreign Policy for United
States, 15-16 and Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 39.
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The rather positive Soviet attitude towards human rights at thisstage is
interesting, particularly in light of the later Soviet position. Part of the
explanation may be that the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations occurred
before the emergence of the Cold War. Anti-Fascism seems to have been
Moscow's most important objective (as it remained for years). It may also
be argued that constitutions had a weak position in the Soviet during the
Stalin-era. The Moscow processes occurred and the Gulag grew in spite of
provisions in the Soviet constitution. It was no problem for Stalin to accept
human rights provisions as long as they were not binding. It has also been
argued that the Soviet Union only recognized those parts of international
law which suited its interests. The proposed Soviet enumeration of rights,
for example the right to work and the right to education, also sugge st that
the Soviets may have seen the human rights references as a potential
instrument to criticize others.29
Successful lobbying for a commission on human rights
Probably the most interesting change about human rights in the period from
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to the San Francisco Conference was the
inclusion of an explicit reference to a coinssion on human rights. This
is the only commission expressly mentioned in the Charter. In preparing for
a new world organization, initially the American administration was
sceptical about the establishment of a human rights coinssion. A
commission was created in spite of such scepticism.30
The role of the American non-governmental organizations was very
significant. Forty-two such organizations had status as consultants to the
American delegation. They were leading national organizations in the fields
of labour, law, agriculture, business and education together with principal
women's associations, church groups, veterans' associations and civic
organizations in general. Within this group, the American J ewish
Committee and also the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
(FCCCA) in particular took the leadership.31
29 Dallin, Soviet Union at United Nations, 8-9 and 11. See also Fisher, America and Russia
in World Community, 122-131.
30 Russell, History of the United Nations Charter, 328.
31 See American Jewish Committee, World Charter for Human Rights. This is a collection
of the day-to-day reports of numerous representatives of the American press and radio
present at the San Francisco Conference. The leaders of American Jewish Commttee
and the FCCCA were Judge Proskauer and Dr. O. Frederick Nolde respectively. They
are paid tribute from all quarters for their role under the San Francisco Conference.
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These organizations had been working on human rights for years. The
American Jewish Committee had their own Cointtee on Peace Problems.
In December 1944 this cointtee launched the idea of an International Bill
of Rights in a Declaration and was supported by 1326 distinguished
Americans. Several newspapers supported the ideai They also got approval
from President Roosevelt shortly before his death. The Cointtee greatly
influenced public opinion in the United States on this issue. This influence
had an impact in San Francisco. The Cointtee on Peace Problems also
distributed their views (translated into various languages) to every one of
the delegates - from all fifty nations in San Francisco. One of their
recommendations was that "a permanent coinssion should be set up at
the earliest possible time by the United Nations Conference to formulate an
International Bill of Rights . . . .,,32
As soon as the San Francisco Conference opened, the American Jewish
Cointtee intensified its campaign for an international bill of rights and
urged that a coinssion on human rights should be established. Because
they had realistic ide a about the problems of the adoption of such a
document in San Francisco, they directed their efforts towards establishing
a coinssion on human rights. The explicit aim was to give this
coinssion the task of making the international bill of rights as soon as
possible. The delegates of the American Jewish Committee, Joseph M.
Proskauer, the President of the American Jewish Cointtee and a former
FCCCA had - together with the Foreign Mission Conference of North America -
established a Joint Committee on Religious Liberty, and this commttee sent a letter to
every member of the US delegation to the San Francisco conference urging for a special
commission on human rights and fundamental freedoms to be provided for under the UN
Charter. The initiative got the approval and support from the Executive Secretary C.
Easton Rothwell in the US Department of State. (Letter from Mr. Nolde to Mr.
Rothwell, 7 March 1945 and letter from Mr. Rothwell to Mr. Nolde, 16 March 1945,
box 18, Alger Hiss Files, 1940-46, NARA.)
32 American Jewish Committee, World Charter for Human Rights, 4. To the Counsellors
of Peace. Recommendations of the American Jewish Committee, New York, March
1945. (Box 17, Alger Hiss Files, 1940-46, NARA.)
Another Jewish initiative for human rights was taken by the World Jewish Congress, the
American Jewish Conference and the Board of Deputies of British Jews. These
organization submitted a joint memorandum dealing with the problem of human rights
and fundamental freedoms to the San Francisco Conference. (This document wil be
found in box 9, US Mission to the United Nations, RG 84, NARA.) American Jewish
Conference had a consultative status in San Francisco, but did not play such an
important role as the American Jewish Committee. The first organization represented the
Zionists, a unit y from which the American Jewish Committee had withdrawn. (See
Laqueur, A History of Zionism, 552-553.)
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New York Supreme Court Justice and Jacob Blaustein, led an active
campaign in which they also enlisted the media. A few days after the
opening of the San Francisco Conference Proskauer and Blaustein launched
a "crusade" in a press statement which was widely reported. "The special
plight of the Jewish victims of Nazi savagery" was their explicit and main
motivation for this action, and they stated further:
We emphasize our profound belief that while the peace conference wil
ultimately give attention to the wrongs which have been especially
inflicted on the stricken Jews of Europe by the holocaust of war and the
bestiality of Hitler, the ultimately safety of the Jewish population of
Europe wil rest upon the international enforcement of justice and equality
of treatment to all men of every race and creed.33
One morning, Proskauer relates, they were informed that the plan for a
commission on human rights was in grave danger. Mobilizing other
consultants in a last effort to "save" the commission, they drew up a
memorandum and circulated it to the other American NGOs. They got
twenty-five signatures. The memorandum insisted on a reference to a
human rights coinssion and stated further:
The ultimate inc1usion of the equivalent of an International Bil of Rights
in the functioning of the Organization is deemed of the essence of what
is necessary to preserve the peace of the world.
a) The dignity and inviolabilty of the individual must be the cornerstone
of civilization. The assurance to every human being of the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is essential not only to
domestic but also to international peace.
b) The conscience of the world demands an end to persecution and
Hitlerism has demonstrated that persecution by a barbarous nation throws
upon the peace-loving nations the burden of relief and redress.
c) It is thus a matter of international concern to stamp out infractions of
basic human rights.
33 New York Herald Tribune, 28 April 1945, printed in American Jewish CommIttee,World
Charter for Human Rights, 5-6.
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. . . It would come as a grievous shock if the constitutional framework of
the Organization would fail to make adequate provision for the ultimate
achievement of human rights and fundamental freedoms.34
The document was handed to the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius,
who was also the leader of the American delegation. On 2 May 1945,
Stettinius met the consultants at ameeting which may be seen as decisive.
There are many reports about the meeting. According to the reporter of the
N ew York Post; "The consultants made little effort to conceal their anger
at this session. Some of them pounded the table and shouted their demands
for official support of the civil rights force."35
Judge Proskauer was one of the spokesmen of the consultants. He held
a speech which every report of the meeting describes as eloquent and
decisive. "It may well prove to be the most important act of his
distinguished career," one of the other consultants stated on Proskauer' s
speech. The meeting was over in half an hour, but the outcome was clear.
Stettinius was convinced and promised the whole US delegation would
support their demand for a human rights coinssion.36
Stettinius fulfilled his promise. The delegation decided without strong
opposition to promote the establishment of a coinssion on human rights,
but met some opposition at the Four-Powers consultation. The resistance
came mainly from the United Kingdom delegation which did not want the
Charter to specify particular bodies to be created. The question of
commission was referred to a sub-cointtee, which supported the British
point of view. Three of the Great Powers were opposed to spelling out a
reference to any coinssion. But the US delegation continued to press for
the inclusion of a human rights coinssion. At this time a more general
language was proposed, which became the basis for a compromise. "The
Economic and Social Council should set up coinssions in the fields of
economic activity, socIal activity, cultural activity, promotion of human
rights and any other field within the competence of the CounciL." The final
edition of the Charter gave the human rights coinssion an even more
34 National Broadcasting Company, 24 May 1945, quoted in American Jewish Commttee,
World Charter for Human Rights, 11. "Proposals regarding human rights," US Gen 42,
2 May 1945, US Mission to the United Nations, Box 6, RG 84, NARA.
35 Mr. Riesel, New York Post, 4 May 1945, quoted in American Jewish Commttee, World
Charter for Human Rights, 6-7. This description of the events corresponds with the
minutes of the United States delegation of and from that day. Minutes of the Twenty-
sixth Meeting of the US Delegation, 2 May 1945. In FRUS: 1945, VoL. I, 528-540.
36 David A. Simmons, President of the American Bar Association. Quoted in American
Jewish Commttee, World Charter for Human Rights, 13.
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unique position: ". . . coinssions in the economic and social fields and
for the promotion of human rights and such other coinssions asmay be
required . . ." (Article 56).37
During the consultations, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China
suggested that the reference to a human rights coinssion be dropped and
replaced by a paragraph concerning human rights and fundamental
freedoms under the Economic and SocIal CounciL. This paragraph was
adopted in addition to the compromise on the human rights coinssion. At
the end of their discussions the Great Powers amendments included five
references to human rights. Their disagreement on this issue led to more,
not fewer, human rights clauses.
Before the final adoption of the Charter, the total number of human rights
references was expanded to seven. The draft preamble, produced ironically
by J an Smuts of South Africa, was chosen as basis, and his expression;
to re-establish faith in human rights, in the sanctity and ultimate value of
human personality, in the equal rights of man and women of nations large
and small, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom,
was adopted with slight changes. The last reference to human rights in the
Charter emerged in the chapter relating to the International Trusteeship
System. This issue was decided later at the San Francisco Conference, after
the human rights discussion were ended. There is no indication of any
discussion on this particular human rights reference and its wording for the
most part follows the pattern of the other human rights clauses in the
Charter.38
WhIle the American consultants wanted a human rights coinssion that
would create an international bill of rights, this was not the unanimous
interpretation of the Great Powers. In the middle of May, the US Secretary
of State, Stettinius, advocated - through a press statement - making such
a bill:
37 Minutes of the Second and Third Four-Power Consultative Meeting on Charter
Proposals, 3 May 1945. FRUS: 1945, I, 570, 581 and 584. "Amendments proposed by
the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China," US
Gen 70, US Delegation to the United Nations, Box 6, RG 84, NARA. Appendix 2.
38 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, by Smuts, South Africa, PRO, FO
371150711/u 3735; "Progress report of work in Commissions and Commttees," 28 and
29 May 1945, US Gen 197, US Mission to the United Nations, RG 84, NARA and
Robinson, Human Rights in the Charter, 20. Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of United
Nations, 232-233 and 328-330. Appendix 2.
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The four sponsoring governments agreed that an enumeration of individual
and collective human rights and fundamental freedoms in the charter
could not be attempted at this conference. It would take much too long to
obtain agreement upon such an enumeration among more than two score
nations of differing social systems, environments, and traditions. I believe
that when the organization is established the economic and sodal council,
through the commission on human rights, should promptly undertake to
prepare an international bil of rights which can be accepted by all the
member nations as an integral part of their own systems of law, just as
our bil of rights has been an integral part of our system of law. 39
This "sudden statement" caused some concern at the British side. The
United Kingdom delegation at the Conference immediately reported home
to their Foreign Office the above quoted passage. Next day they followed
up with an explanation:
The reason for Mr. Stettinius's sudden statement to the Press with regard
to an International Bil of Rights wil - according to information given
me confidentially in the D.S. Delegation - I fancy, be found to be a
desire to compensate, to certain Latin American Governments, for
countervailng concessions on the part of the latter with reg ard to regional
autonomy in the Act of Chapultepec.40
The British interpretation reflected the fact that the United States and the
Latin Americans held different views on the scope and strength of the inter-
American system, and in particular on its adjustment within the UN
framework. Whether or not this disagreement was the reason for Stettinius'
statement is hard to determine. With the Latin American pressure for an
international bill of rights in mind, the British explanation may provide part
of the reason. On the other hand, the Americans also faced a strong
domestic pressure for such a bill, and Stettinius himself seems to have been
devoted to this task. Whatever the reasons, StettinIus' statement obviously
strengthened the idea of drafting an international bill of human rights. The
39 "Statement by the honourable Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State and chairman
of the United States Delegation," 15 May 1945, PRO, FO 371150714/U 4044.
40 Telegram from United Kingdom delegation in San Francisco to Foreign Office, 16 May,
1945, PRO, FO 371150711/U 3758 and report from R.H. Hadow to the Foreign Office,
17 May 1945, PRO, FO 371150716/U 4218. See also FO 372/50712/U 3818.
The Latin American states were reluctant to give too much authority in security
questions to the United Nations at the expense of the regional Inter-American system,
while the United States gave the priority to the United Nations in security matters. See
Alfaro, "Foreword," x-xi. See also Finch, "United Nations Charter," 543-44.
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President of the United States, Hary S. Truman, later gave renewed force
to the proposal in his closing address to the San Francisco Conference:
Under this document we have good reason to expect the framing of an
International Bil of Rights, acceptable to all the nations involved. That
Bil of Rights wil be as much a part of international life as our own Bil
of Rights is a part of our own Constitution. The Charter is dedicated to
the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Unless we can obtain those objectives for all men and women
everywhere - without reg ard to race, language or religion - we cannot
have permanent peace and security.
Truman ' s address created the general impression that the commission of
human rights would draw up an international bill of rights. This
understanding was the point of departure when the commission later started
its work.41
41 Russell, History of United Nations Charter, 559-566. Truman, Years of Decision, 292.
Humphrey, Great Adventure, 13.
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3. Vying for influence
In the end, the San Francisco Conference decided to establish a special
human rights coinssion. Although it was not declared explicitly, it was
generally understood that the first tas k of this coinssion was to draft an
international bill of human rights. The decision-structure was open and the
main actors were still unknown.
The establishment of the Commission on Human Rights
The organizational structure also had bearings on the distribution of
influence in the decision-making process. The Charter of the United
Nations established the overall structure and procedures of the organization.
The Charter gave, however, no answer to the question how to make an
international bill of human rights. In terms of modern decision-making
theory, the new organization lacked standard operating procedures, i.e.
routines developed on the basis of previous behaviour in similar instances.
The United Nations had to establish from scratch its own procedures, such
as how to conduct the drafting of an international bill of human rights. To
meet these needs, the signing powers set up a Preparatory Coinssion
which recommended that the Economic and SocIal Council (ECOSOC)
establish a Commission of Human Rights, in full accordance with the UN
Charter, article 68. At its first session, in resolution 1/5 of 16 February
1946, ECOSOC established the "nuclear" Commission of Human Rights.
The nine appointed members were supposed to serve in their individual
capacity, not as representatives of governments. The Nuclear Coinssion
was to make recommendations on the definitive composition of the
Commission and on the terms of reference to the second session of the
ECOSOC taking place in May and June the same year. The Nuc1ear
Commission on Human Rights met from 29 April to 20 May 1946 at
Hunter College in New York. Only six of the nine nominees attended;
Dusan Brkish (Yugoslavia), René Cassin (France), C.L. Hsia (China),
Nicolai Kriukov (USSR), K.C. Neogi (India) and Eleanor Roosevelt (the
United States). These six persons delivered their report to the ECOSOC,
which in resolution 2/9 of 21 June 1946 established the full Commission
of Human Rights. The terms of reference were expanded. The number of
members were doubled and the type of membership had changed. These
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differences would have a significant impact on the future work of the
Commission of Human Rights, but the changes also indicated some
disagreement within the coinssion and within the ECOSOC.1
Drafting an international bill of rights was at the top of a four-point list
which spelled out the main terms of reference of the Coinssion. The
other items included consideration of international declarations or
conventions on civilliberties, the status of women, freedom of information
and similar matters; appropriate protection of minorities; and the prevention
of discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion. To giv e
the coinssion these tasks seems to be rather uncontroversial. The
Preparatory Coinssion, which initially wrote the terms of reference, had
also suggested a fifth item: "any matter within the field of human rights
considered likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among
nations."2 This broad mandate was rejected at the first session of
ECOSOC. When the Nuclear Coinssion made its recommendations, the
attitude was expansive. Among their proposals was a coinssion composed
of individual experts and a rather open-ended mandate. As the suggested
individual experts-representation was turned down at the second session of
ECOSOC, a broader mandate was approved as a compromise, identical to
the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission. When the terms of
reference caused very little debate in the Nuclear Commission as well as
in the ECOSOC, this was a sign of the broad acceptance of the mandate of
the Commission. The broad terms covered a lot of coming controversies.
Individual experts or governmental representatives?
A question which immediately caused conflict was which type of
membership the commission should have. The choice was between
governmental representatives or "uninstructed" experts. The United Nation
was a governmental organization, but the Nuclear Coinssion on Human
Rights was composed of individual experts. There was then a model for
each proposed solution.
The full Preparatory Commssion made its recommendation on the Commission on
Human Rights 23 December 1945 and the decision was approved by the General
Assemblyon 10 January 1946. OR-ECOSOC 1/1, pp. 163-164 and E/27. E/HR/6, p. 1.
Paal Berg (Norway), Fernand Dehousse (Belgium), and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre
(Peru) were unable to atten ding the Nuclear Commission, and they had no alternates.2 OR-ECOSOC 1/1, pp. 163-164 and E/27. E/38/Rev.l, p. 2. Alston, United Nations and
Human Rights, 127-128.
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The Nuclear Coinssion discussed three possible kinds of membership
of the full Coinssion: a) only governmental representatives; b) individual
experts; c) mixed representation (which included both individual experts
and governmental representatives). Originally, Kriukov (USSR) and Brkish
(Yugoslavia) supported mixed membership, and Hsia (China) suggested
individual experts, a view which the other representatives also supported.
Neogi (India) pointed out that the ECOSOC as well as the General
Assembly represented governments, and that the Commission on Human
Rights should not again consist of representatives of governments. He was
supported by Cassin (France). 3
The United States government was in favour of nonofficial membership.
That is, the expert was not completely without reference to the government
from which the individual expert would be elected. The main argument was
that the pre stige of the coinssion would diminish if the representatives
were bound by the political interests of participating member states. This
solution would, moreover, result in a manageable size of the coinssion
and it would be easier to obtain highly qualified experts.4
Eleanor Roosevelt (US) maintained that the peoples of the world looked
upon the members of the Coinssion as their representatives. Therefore,
she requested the members to advocate opinions which might be difficult
for their own government to accept. In other words, she recommended them
to act independently of their own government and argued:
(I)f one believes it is right, I think one should advocate it, hoping that if
it would be good for the world, it would therefore, in the end, be good for
one' s own government and one' s own people, too.s
Cassin, on the other hand, pointed out the disadvantages of non-
governmental membership in the Coinssion:
(I)n the past, Commssions consisting of individuals often reached lofty
conc1usions which were never observed, while commissions consisting of
governmental representatives came to less ambitious but more effective
conc1usions. It might therefore be argued that our Commission would
reach better results, if composed of governmental representatives.6
3 E/HR/lO, pp. 3-4.
4 FRUS 1946, voLl, p. 195-196.
5 E/HR/10, p. 1.
6 E/HR/lO, p. 4.
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In spite of this argument, the Nuclear Coinssion unanimously agreed to
recommend that the full Coinssion should consist of eighteen qualified
members, who should serve in their individual capacity as experts. In the
end this was not, however, an unanimous decision. When the last third of
the session of the Nuclear Coinssion remained, Alexander Borisov
(USSR) arrived. He insisted that he was the representative of the USSR,
and that Kriukov was only an observer. US comment on this case was that
it demonstrated the need for detailed rules of the procedure on the part of
the full Coinssion. The disagreement, moreover, illustrates the
dominating role of the states within the UN system, even in the case where
the participants were formally acting in their individual capacity. Borisov
to ok exception to certain agreements that had been reached, and one of
them was the question of the type of membership. He advocated
governmental representatives, and argued that non-governmental
representatives would not be able to operate effectively, because they did
not act under direct authority from their governments.7
At its second session the Economic and Social Council discussed the
report of the Nuclear Coinssion. The Council opposed the idea of
independent expert representation. The representative of the USSR, now
Nicolai i. Feonov, argued that governmental representatives would be more
effective in finding practical solutions than individual experts. The
underlying fear was to be bound by any expert decision which they had not
had any influence on. The Norwegian delegate, Ole Colbjørnsen, voiced his
support for this point of view, and argued that governmental representatives
would be in a better position to get decisions accepted by their respective
governments. The representative of Yugoslavia, Leo Mattes, shared their
view. The representatives of Belgium, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and
the United States spoke in favour of non-governmental individuals as
members of the Commission on Human Rights. The Councilleft the report
to a drafting cointtee. The drafting committee recommended that the full
Coinssion should consist of eighteen governmental representatives. It was
also decided that the members should be confirmed by the CounciL. 8
In Resolution 2/9 of 21 June 1946, the ECOSOC decided:
7 E/HRJ19, p. 7. Kriukov was present from 29 April to 13 May, and Borisov replaced him
from 15 May until the end of the session, 20 May 1946. "Comments and
recommendations on report," 22 May 1946, US-SDÆ/CNA/W.l, box 45, Position
papers, Bureau of International Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59,
NARA. E/HRJ19, p. 1; E/H26 , p. 1; E/HRJ29/Rev.l, p. 1; E/38/Rev.l, p. 1 and
E/HR. 26/Rev .1.
8 OR-ECOSOC 2/1, pp. 36-44.
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a) The CommIssion on Human Rights shall consist of one representative
from each of eighteen members of the United Nations selected by the
CounciL.
b) With a view to securing a balanced representation in the various fields
covered by the Commssion, the Secretary-General shall consult with the
Governments so selected befare the representativ es are finally nomInated
by these Governments and confirmed by the CounciL. 9
This implied that the members of the Coinssion would act as
governmental representatives. The confirmation of the governmental
representation by the ECOSOC, which was meant as a moderating
provision, seemed to be perfunctory and formaL. The Council always
confirmed the nominees. Altering representatives and the extensive use of
alternates (who did not have to be confirmed by the Council), strengthens
the impression that the member states were rather decisive in the selections
of delegates. Some representatives also met in the Coinssion before the
ECOSOC had confirmed their nomination. 10
It seems likely that the governmental representation on the Coinssion
on Human Rights was of great importance when it came to adopt the
Universal Dec1aration of Human Rights. The Coinssion acquired more
political weight. The governmental representatives had to take into account
the views of their own government and this probably increased the
character of the text as a compromise product. It even made the text easier
to pass. As Cassin put it: "(I)n the past, governmental representatives came
to less ambitious but more effective conclusions." Governmental
participation in the Commission also had the effect of increasing the
expectations and pre stige of the enterprise. World public opinion expected
results of the work. These expectations might have restrained those who
would like to refuse any declaration.11
Governmental representation did not hinder the exercise of personal
influence by the individual representatives. Personal relations and informal
discussions have generally been more important in the United Nations than
formal exchanges and public debate. According to the Director of the
Division of Human Rights, John Humphrey, their degree of instructions
varied: "Some (representatives) were more independent than their
9 OR-ECOSOC 2/1, p. 400.
10 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 17. Humphrey writes about one nominee who he had a
good reason to believe had been a Nazi sympathizer during the war. Humphrey could
not object to the confirmation of this representative, because he was not able to prove
his suspicion. E/CNA/9.
11 E/HR/lO, p. 4. The pressure of expectations wil be further examIned in Chapter 6.
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colleagues and some operated without precise or any instructions from their
governments; (and these were not the least useful representatives)." They
acted as individual experts and also had the authority of their government.
At the first session of the Commission on Human Rights, a British official,
the future delegate for the United Kingdom to the Commission on Human
Rights, Geoffrey Wilson, "expressed his astonishment over the fact that the
members from various countries had come with virtually no instrctions,"
an impression which also the United Stated shared. At an earlier stage, an
American delegate had observed that "(t)he personalities of particular
delegates may have exercised an overriding influence on the position taken
by their delegations." Studies of American and British diplomatic archives
reveal precise instructions, and this seems to have been the case for the
Soviet representative as well. Eleanor Roosevelt, the chairman of the
Commission during its first years, said in an interview: 12
Many's the time Professor Pavlov, the Soviet delegate, has come to me
and said: "Mrs. Roosevelt, would you mind postponing the meeting? I
haven't received my orders from Moscow yet."
René Cassin representing France might have had some degree of
independence. Internal British information suggests that he did not always
represent the views of the French government.
On human rights questions Professor Cassin is apparently between the
devIl and the deep sea. On the one hand he has got himself in the position
of appearing to be the champion of all the enthusiastic organisations for
12 Hadwen and Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are Made, 14 and 34-36.
Humphrey, Great Adventure, 17. Memorandum by James P. Hendrick, 13 February
1947, US Mission to the United States, Box 103, IO:ECOSOC:HR, RG 84, NARA.
"Political attitudes of members of UNO," E. R. Stettinius about the working of the UN
Preparatory Commission, box 25, E. R. Stettinius memorandums, Alger Hiss Files, 1940-
46, NARA.
See for example W. Beckett, Foreign Office to Lord Dukeston, 29 May 1947, PRO, FO
371/67 605/ UNE 456; "Brief for the United Kingdom delegation to the third session of
the General Assembly," PRO, FO 371/72811/UNE 3939 and "Draft International
Declaration of Human Rights," SD/A/C. 3/65, Position papers, Bureau of International
Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59, NARA. See also Johnson,
"Contribution of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt," 32; and Mower, Jr., United States,
United Nations and Human Rights, 46-48. Newsweek, 22 August 1949, p. 22. Quoted
in Berger, Eleanor Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 80.
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human rights in France, and on the other hand he knows that there is a
French Foreign Office which has much more sober views.13
Generally, it appears, however, that the big powers gave more detailed
instructions than smaller states. The indifference on part of the smaller
states may be because they had less power. It also reflects a general trend
as usually small states have worked to develop binding international
organisations and internationallaw. These institutions are seen as protection
from the more powerful states.
The main actors singled out
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 by the
representatives of fifty countries, and the United Nations officially came
into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by
the Great Powers (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom
and the United States) and by a majority of the other signatories. In 1948,
when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, the number
of the members had grown to fifty-eight. The different parts of the world
were not equally represented. Because of the war the defeated powers were
not accepted as UN members and most of Africa was still part of colonial
empires. Africa was only represented by four nations, and one of them was
the Union of South Africa. The others were Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia.
While the United Nations formally consisted of 58 equal governments, the
important influence in designing the international bill of rights depended on
several factors, and one important factor was the membership on the
Commission on Human Rights.14
The distribution of seats in the Commission was subject of a tug of war
in which the Great Powers played a leading role. Regular procedures for
distribution of seats in UN commissions were not yet established. Hence
the decision was expected to set a precedent. The membership of the eight
ECOSOC Coinssions (of which the Commission on Human Rights was
one) were considered as a whole, and tough negotiations unfolded. The five
big powers automatically got a seat on each Coinssion. The rest of the
seats were distributed according to regional as well as ideological
considerations. Block-thinking favoured the smaller states of Eastern
Europe, the Latin American group in particular lost influence by this
13 Memorandum by Beckett, 6 August 1948, PRO, FO 371172810lUNE 3183.
14 The Union of South Africa has been the Republic of South Africa since 31 May, 1961.
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practice. This distribution was also reflected in the composition of the
Coinssion on Human Rights. The five smaller Eastern Europe states and
the group of twenty Latin American states both got three representatives
each. The decision seems to have been for the most part a result of an
agreement between the United States and the Soviets, and the outcome was
far more favourable to the Soviets than the initial American proposals
indicated. For instance, Norway was replaced with Byelorussia in the
Human Rights Coinssion although Norway, which had been a member
of the Nuclear Commission on Human Rights, was veryeager to secure a
position in the Coinssion. The American concession to the Soviets reflect
the increasing tendency to con sider the Soviets and its allies as a minority
block within the United Nations.1s
Group
Representation on ECOSOC Coinssion
Number of seats Number of seats on
eight Coinssions
40
6
19
5
1
5
Big Five
India
Smaller Eastern
Europe
Latin America
British Dominions
Smaller Western
Europe
N ear East - Africa
Far East
Total
20
4
5
19
13
12
10
1
51
10
1
120
Source: Selection of ECOSOC Commssions, 9 October 1946, FRUS: 1946, I, 207.
is Selection of ECOSOC Commssions, 90ctober, 1946, FRUS, 1946: I, 206-210. See also
Eleanor Roosevelt, Autobiography, 315. In addition to China, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the USSR which cooperated at the San Francisco Conference, France
was now included among the big powers. FRUS 1946: I, p. 210, 9 October 1946 and
Letter from the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations (Colbjørnsen) to the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UD 30.5/7.2.
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As a result of the agreement of the big powers, the third session of
ECOSOC, on 2 October 1946, selected the following states as the first
members of the full Coinssion on Human Rights:
For two years: Byelorussia, China, Lebanon, Panama, the United
Kingdom, Uruguay.
For three years: Egypt, France, India, Iran, the Ukraine, the USSR.
For four years: Australia, Belgium, Chile, the Philippine Republic, the
United States, Y ugoslavia.16
The variation in length of term was an exception for the initial period. An
ordinary term of office was to be three years. The period of representation
was supposed to start in 1947, and the Universal Declaration was adopted
in December 1948. Thus, there was no change of member states during the
preparation of the Declaration. During the three sessions of the Coinssion
on Human Rights, when the main item on the agenda was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, these 18 governments had a unique position
of influence.17
The NuclearCoinssion on Human Rights had discussed whether or not
it had the right to draft an international bill of rights. Although it soon
acknowledged that "while it was within its competence to draft a bill of
human rights, it was not as yet in a position to do so." It left the tas k to the
full Coinssion, and when the first ordinary session of the Coinssion on
Human Rights took place in Lake Success, New York, on 27 January to 10
February 1947, the discussion focused on the critical question of who
should write the first draft. The general and loosely organized discussion
demonstrated that a small er body would be better able to produce the first
draft, and there seemed to be a general agreement about the forming of a
drafting committee. The next crucial question was who should be the
members of this cointtee. Here opinion was divided, the extremes being
represented by Australia and the USSR. The Australian delegate, William
Hodgson, argued that "no concrete results could be achieved by a drafting
16 United Nations, Yearbook 1946/47, 524.
17 Membership in any body has worth only with presence. On two occasions one of the
member states of the Commission on Human Rights did not attend a session: The
representative of the Ukaine did not attend the first session and the representative of
Iran did not attend the third session. (E/257 , p. i and E/800, p. 1.)
Another facto r that reduced the influence of some of the members of the CommIssion
on Human Rights, was the extensive use of alternates. Those governments which
frequently replaced their representatives, were less influential in the drafting proeess than
those which sent the same person during the whole proeess.
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cointtee composed of government representatives expressing different
points of view." He suggested that the Secretariat was the most competent
body to draft an international bill of rights, and got modified support from
the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in
particular. The representative of the USSR preferred a cointtee composed
of members of the Coinssion and was against giving unlimited power to
the Secretariat or outside experts for drafting purposes. His reluctance was
shared by the representatives of France, Lebanon and Belgium. The French
and the Lebanese representatives also put forward proposals which intended
to secure the influence of the Coinssion in the drafting process. The
French delegate, René Cassin, referred to the Coinssion' s mandate from
the ECOSOC, and argued that if the Secretariat did the drafting, this
implied a derogation of the Commission' s mandate. During the discussion
a majority of the representatives stressed that the responsibility had to be
vested in the Coinssion, and if the Secretariat was to do the drafting, it
should receive instructions from the Coinssion or alternatively work
under supervision of its Chairman.18
France, Y ugoslavia and Lebanon then proposed a compromise, which
forme d the basis of the final solution, stating "(t)hat the Chairman, together
with the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, undertake, with the assistance
of the Secretariat, the task of formulating a preliminary draft international
bill of human rights, in accordance with the instructions and decisions of
the Commissions at its first session, to be submitted to the Coinssion at
its second session for thorough examination. (Italics added.)" This
committee might enlist the cooperation of any member of the Commission
on Human Rights, con sult experts chosen with the consent of their
governments and any person or document it thought relevant to its work. 19
The three-members drafting cointtee set up by the Coinssion on
Human Rights met on 16 February 1947. The task of drafting the document
was given to the Coinssion' s officers, assisted by the Secretariat, and the
Chairman, Eleanor Roosevelt (the United States) gathered Chang (China),
Malik (Lebanon) and Humphrey (the Secretariat) in less than a week.
Humphrey portrays this meeting in his autobiography and dwells upon the
controversies between Chang and Malik, who "were too apart in their
philosophical approaches to be able to work together on a text." They
concluded the meeting with the decision that Humphrey should prepare a
18 E/38/Rev.l, pp. 3-4. E/CNA/SR.lO, pp. 3-4. E/CNA/SR.ll, p. 4.
19 E/259, p. 2.
39
preliminary draft although this decision in fact was contrary to the rulíng
of the Commission itself. 20
Before Humphrey had begun the drafting process, however, the ECOSOC
intervened. The question of who should write the first draft was again on
the agenda. The delegate of the USSR, Alexandr P. Morozov, did not agree
with the recommendation of the drafting group, nor with the decision to
give the drafting-task to a small group of experts. He pointed out that the
group proposed by the Coinssion of Human Rights, was too small and
did not include any European representatives; therefore, he wanted to
enlarge it from three to five members. The delegate of Czechoslovakia
supported thissuggestion. 21
The ECOSOC then transferred the report of the Commission to the
Committee of the Whole on SocIal Affairs of the Council, which proposed
the establishment of a temporary Sub-Cointtee consisting of eight of the
members of the Coinssion. The eight were the following states: Australia,
Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The basis for their
preparation of the bill was to be documentation supplied by the
Secretariat. 22
In order to avoid a decision which might have indicated lack of
confidence in the Commission on Human Rights, a special procedure was
applied. The leader of the Commission, Eleanor Roosevelt, wrote a letter
in which she recommended the strategy already de facto decided on by the
CounciL. In the letter she stressed that it was not her intention to exclude
any one of the members of the Coinssion on Human Rights from the
drafting work. Subsequently, she appointed a Drafting Cointtee composed
of the eight members of the Coinssion, in agreement with the suggestion
of the Committee of the Whole SocIal Affairs of the CounciL. 23
20 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 29. Malik confirmed Humphrey's information on the
controversies, see GAOR- TC 3, p. 858. Eleanor Roosevelt also mentions "a heated
discussion," but she describes the conversations as so "lofty" that she could not follow
them and was only "entertained by the talk of these leamed gentlemen." See Eleanor
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 317.
21 At its fourth session, from 28 February to 29 March 1947, the Council discussed the
report of the CommIssion on Human Rights at its sixty-eighth and sixty-ninth plenary
meetings.
See OR-ECOSOC 4/2, pp. 103-113; E/CNA/AC.II2; United Nations, Yearbook 1946/47,
524-525; Humphrey, Great Adventure, 29-30; and E1259.
22 The Commttee of the Whole on SocIal Affairs was and stil is one of the sessional
committees of the ECOSOC.
23 E/383. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stortingsmelding nr. 12 (1948), 13.
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On 28 March 1947 the Council adopted EleanorRoosevelt' s suggestions
which in fact were its own ruling. In resolution 46/4, the ECOSOC
requested the Secretariat to prep are a documented outline concerning an
International Bill of Human Rights. With an explicit reference to the letter
from Eleanor Roosevelt, the Council approved the Drafting Cointtee
consisting of the eight members as mentioned above. These representatives
were among the most active participants in the Coinssion, and the
selection did not seem controversial. But the final establishment of the
Drafting Cointtee was in accordance with the original preference of the
USSR delegation. A Soviet idea put forward by the representative of the
United States suggests the common effort towards an agreement, which was
a useful basis for the Drafting Cointtee. Perhaps more telling, it also
shows that the two Great Powers had something in common as super
powers, namely, to exercise national controlover the drafting process and
reduce the influence of the Secretariat and independent experts.
The creation of a drafting cointtee of eight members gave these eight
governments a distinctive advantage compared to the other UN members.
All of them did not, however, play an equally important role, and the
differences seem to a considerable degree to have been a question of
personality. The key personalities behind the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights were the members of the Drafting Committee: Eleanor
Roosevelt (United States), Charles Malik (Lebanon), René Cassin (France),
Pen g Chun Chang (China), Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) and Alexandre
Bogomolov/Alexei P. Pavlov (Soviet Union), Lord Dukeston/Geoffrey
Wilson (United Kingdom) and William Hodgson (Australia). Besides the
eight members of "the inner circle", the drafting committee, the head of the
UN Division on Human Rights, John Humphrey, also played an important
role.
In a category by herself was Eleanor Roosevelt. She chaired the Human
Rights Coinssion from the nuclear session and during the entire process
of drafting the Universal Declaration. Her leadership was unchallenged.
After the adoption of the Declaration, a particular Iribute was given to her:
"The delegates . . . rose as one to give her a standing ovation." Her
international prestige, in particular in the early post-war period, brought a
lot of attention to the work of the Human Rights Coinssion. John
Humphrey maintains that "her great prestige was one of the chief assets of
the Human Rights Coinssion in the early years." In particular, Eleanor
Roosevelt' sprestige with the Russians was enormous in the early years, and
this was an important factor in the drafting process. She also had the useful
habit of having lunch with other nations' representatives in the Coinssion
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on Human Rights. The words of praise for her professional as well as
personal qualifications are numerous. Humphrey chose this description:24
. . . Simplicity and the knack of giving other people confidence of ten go
with greatness. Mrs. Roosevelt had both. . . .
Mrs. Roosevelt was one of the greatest personalities ever to be associated
with the United Nations.
A British diplomat, however, was less complimentary and once bitterly
reported back to London that he found her too preoccupied with her own
views to serve her position properly. Nevertheless, this seemed to be an
exception. Her personality seems to have been very well suited for the
chairmanship. An old-line American State Department diplomat is said to
have described her in this way: "(NJever in all my years of diplomacy have
I seen naivete and cunning so gracefully blended," and this characteristic
seems to grasp some essential features. She did not know much about the
work in the United Nations in advance but got an intensive education.
Although the US policy in the Commission on Human Rights was
formulated by an inter-departmental cointtee, Eleanor Roosevelt was very
influential. Moreover, James P. Hendrick, her adviser in human rights
matters, seems to have been "her man" in the human rights committee: "I
tried to be watchful that nothing went into the instructions that she would
not go for." Eleanor Roosevelt had considerable authority and advocated
her opinions at the intern al American level - as will be shown below
(Chapter 4), but she admitted that as a government official she in away
had less freedom than when her hus band was president: "N ow I am obliged
to carry out the policy of the Government. When my husband was
24 See Mower, United States, United Nations and Human Rights, 53-71; Berger, Eleanor
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 67-74 and Johnson, "Contribution of Eleanor
and Franklin Roosevelt," 27-48. Both Mower, Berger and Johnson give interesting
descriptions of Eleanor Roosevelt' s contribution to the drafting of the Declaration, but
all of them tend to over-emphasize her role and they seem to forget the other participants
in the process. Evatt, Task of Nations, 8. Gurewitsch, Eleanor Roosevelt, 13 and GAOR
3, p. 934. Eleanor Roosevelt, Autobiography, 305. Eleanor Roosevelt had been the First
Lady of the United States for more than twelve years - and during a war in which large
parts of the world had put their faith in the United States and in which the US President
had become a symboL. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 4-5. Humphrey describes how
grateful the Russian representative was when he on one occasion was invited to have
lunch with Mrs. Roosevelt. It was a great honour.
42
President, although I was the White House hostess, I was, after all, a
private citizen. . . ."25
Eleanor Roosevelt also possessed an exceptional capacity for work. She
organized her time well and she ruled over the Coinssion with
impatience and energy. Humphrey's report is characteristic:
rSheJ drove the members very hard, r. . . whileJ most of the delegates,
and even more the Secretariat, suffered from loss of sleep, Mrs. Roosevelt
remained as alert as she had been when she opened the sessIon.
Because of her energy the Declaration was drafted quickly. Her greatest
contribution to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
lay in her effectiveness and speed in directing its affairs.26
During the first years of the Commission on Human Rights, Charles
Malik, representing Lebanon, served as å rapporteur. In this important post
he was in a position to interpret the decisions of the Coinssion. In
addition, he was an eager debater who seldom chose the line of least
resistance. Humphrey saw him as "a Thomist and believed in naturalIaw"
and "an energetîc defender of liberalism and traditional values." His views,
partîcularly his energetic defence of individualism, strongly opposed the
Soviet opinions, and this caused some controversies in the drafting process
between him and the Soviet representatives. Yet, he was also an impatient
defender of human rights and one of those who pushed the Declaration
through. He acted as chairman at the third session of the Third Cointtee,
and his familiarity with the draft Declaration was an advantage in the
struggle against time. Malik seems to have acted quite independently of his
government. Humphrey describes him in this way: "(H)e was one of the
most independent people ever to sit on the commission and he was
dedicated to human rights." In 1952, when Eleanor Roosevelt left the
Coinssion on Human Rights, Malik became its next chairman.27
25 UK Delegation to the United Nations to Richard Heppel, United Nations Department,
Foreign Office, 7 May 1948, PRO, FO 371172806/UNE 1929. Gardner, "Eleanor
Roosevelt and Universal Declaration," 15. Eleanor Roosevelt, Autobiography, 300-303
and 314. Lash, 62-63 and 67.
26 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 48, 290 and 314. The representative of the Dominican
Republic, Minerva Bernardino, paid tribute to Mrs. Roosevelt for her contribution to the
speedy acceptance of many suggestions. See GAOR- TC 3, p. 40.
27 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 23; see also 17,25 and 63. Eleanor Roosevelt too mentions
Malik' s support to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, see Eleanor Roosevelt,
Autobiography, 317. E/CN:4/AC.lISR.21, p. 3 and 6. "Memorandum on mIscellaneous
ECOSOC matters," 28 January 1947, US Mission to the United Nations, Box 103, LO:
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The doyen of the Commission René Cassin (France) in many instances
took lead in the discussions. He had many years of experience from the
League of Nations, had been in exile in London with de Gaulle during the
war and was now the head of the French Constitutional CounciL. Humphrey
portrays him as "a dynamic personality and a shar and quick mind; . . .
one of the best public speakers I have ever heard."28
Importantly, René Cassin formulated the first official draft declaration.
At the first session of the Drafting Committee, the representatives had
before them a huge pile of various human rightsdocumentation supplied by
the Secretariat, which also had compiled a draft outline. In addition, the
United Kingdom and the United States presented their own drafts. The
Committee decided to use the Secretariat outline as their basic working
paper, and compared it to the UK and the US alternatives. The Soviet
delegate suggested the creation of a smaller working group within the
Committee in order to collect the various opinions expressed by the
committee members and prepare appropriate drafts. After some fruitless
debate, the Drafting Cointtee established a temporary working group,
which proposed a "logical" rearrangement of the articles of the secretariat
outline, and a redrafting of them in the light of the discussion in the
Committee. In compliance with the USSR proposal, the working group was
composed of the representatives of France, Lebanon and the United
Kingdom - with Eleanor Roosevelt as an ex officio member. The working
group decided after a general discussion to delegate its task to René Cassin.
A basic draft written by one single person was hel d to be the easiest and
quickest solution. Thus, Cassin became "the father" of the first official draft
of the human rights declaration.29
Peng Chun Chang, the Chinese (Kuomintang/Chiang Kai-shek)
representative, served as the vice-chairman of the Coinssion. He was a
ECOSOC: Human Rights, RG 84, NARA.
28 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 24.
29 The UK and the US proposals can be found in E/CNA/21/Annex B and Annex C
respectively. The US proposal was a revision of the so-called Secretariat Outline.
E/CNA/AC.1/SR.6, p. 2 and 5. E/CNA/21, p. 4. Cassin was assisted by Emilie Giraud,
a distinguished international lawyer from France and an officer in the Division of Human
Rights. He had also assisted Humphrey in the preparation of the Secretariat Outline.
Cassin and Giraud' s draft was partly revised by the working group and then considered
in detail article by article by the whole Drafting Commttee. Cassin was requested to
rewrIte the draft declaration on the basis of this discussion. His second draft was
examined by the Committee and further revised. The result of this examination was
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights as a working paper for a preliminary
draft of an international declaration on human rights (E/CNAI21,Annex F).
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scholarly diplomat and seemed to have had personal qualities which eased
the work in the Commission. Humphrey held him and Cassin to be those
who intellectually dominated the Comrission, and Eleanor Roosevelt found
Chang to be "a great joy to all of us because of his sense of humour, his
philosophical observations, and his ability to quote some apt Chinese
proverbs to fit almost any occasion." But his diplomatic skills may have
been more important. As "a master of the art of compromise," "a
pragmatist" and "nearly always ready with a practical solution," he several
times found a solution when the deliberations had reached a deadlock. 30
Hernan Santa Cruz, the Chilean representative, was one of the strongest
defenders of inclusion of economic and socIal rights in the Dec1aration.
Humphrey portrays him in this way:
No one has been more continuously or for a longer period of time
associated with the human rights program.
Politically left of center, he had considerably influence with delegations
representing the economically developing countries, whose cases he
sometimes argued with gre at energy - a practice which of ten brought
him into conflict with the Western industrial powers.31
Alexei P. Pavlov functioned as the Soviet representative for a longer time
than Alexandre Bogomolov. The change of Soviet representative in the
Commission clearly demonstrate the impact of personality, even though
there was a strict governmental framework. Ambassador Bogomolov
participated in the second session of the Commission on Human Rights,
and according to Humphrey "the Soviet Union, in the person of
Ambassador Bogomolov, began to take an active part in the drafting, . . .
(tJhe Commission never had a more cooperative Soviet spokesman than
Bogomolov." His expressed admiration of Eleanor Roosevelt may partly
have given this impression. At the UN Conference on Freedom and
Information in Geneva in March/ April 1948, Bogomolov was the head of
the Soviet delegation. Western delegates interpreted Bogomolov's election
as an indication that the Russian delegation was instructed to exercise
moderation. It was a marked shift when the Soviet Union during the last
part of the drafting process was represented by Alexei P. Pavlov. He had
a different attitude, during the deliberations he was frequently criticizing
30
Lash, The Years Alone, p. 61. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 23 and 26. Eleanor
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 317.
31 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 37.
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internal conditions of the United Kingdom and the United States in
particular. Eleanor Roosevelt particularly mentioned her controversies with
Pavlov, and Humphrey describes his st yle as follows:
Some of the many interventions of A. P. Pavlov - who was now
becoming the principal Russian spokesman in human rights matters -
lasted for over an hour. r. . . Pavlov was) one of the most loquacious
speakers I have ever listened to and the most difficult of all the Russians
who worked on the Declaration. Some people said that his bourgeois
background - he was the nephew of the great Pavlov - made him
vulnerable to criticism back home and that this accounted for the show he
never failed to provide.32
The difference between Bogomolov and Pavlov can to some extent be
explained with reference to the increasing international tension at that time,
but apparently it was also a question of personalities. While Bogomolov
was particularly cooperative, Pavlov was particular non-cooperative and less
willing to find compromises.
Charles Dukes, later Lord Dukeston, represented the United Kingdom at
the first and second session of the Coinssion on Human Rights, while
Geoffrey Wilson was the British representative in the Drafting Committee
and in the third session of the Commission. Lord Dukeston was old and in
bad health during this period. He died before the drafting process was
brought to an end. More important, he was a trade unionist and was not
very familiar with human rights issues. He played a rather anonymous role
in the drafting process. Officials in the British Foreign Office did not find
his performance at the first session of the Coinssion on Human Rights
satisfying:33
Lord Dukeston showed at the first meeting of the Commission how
absolutely alien all this stuff was to him. So far from being able to take
the lead and run the Commssion as it is clear that any good British
representative could have done, he played practically no part at all and I
think show ed that this is not the sort of stuff that he ever really would be
able to handle successfully. My view is that this is really too serious and
too difficult a matter for the U.K. to be represented by somebody who is
not suited to the job.
32 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 49 and 56.
33 Beckett to Lord Dukeston, 29 May 1947, PRO, FO 371167605/UNE 456. Beckett to
Gladwyn, 16 April 1947, PRO, FO 371167601lUNE 143. It has to be added that the
British official who did not approve Dukeston' s performance, he did neither find the
other members of the Commission of Human Rights competent to deal with their task.
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Wilson was, on the other hand, a Cabinet Office-servant who was well
informed on human rights matters as he had been involved in the inter-
departmental working group on human rights. During sessions, he reported
frequently and detailed back to the Foreign Office, and he seems to have
been active behind the scene. In the Coinssion he was, however, more
anonymous. Both he himself and other officials in the Foreign Office found
it somewhat embarrassing that the United Kingdom was represented by a
low-ranking servant compared to most other delegations. With good reason,
they saw it as a sign of low priority accorded to human rights matters by
the British government.34
The Australian representative, William Hodgson, appeared to be an
anxious supporter of a strong, legally binding convention on human rights.
He also launched the idea of an international court of human rights.
Although Australia tried to act more independently of the Commonwealth
in this period, Hodgson' s views in substantial matters quite of ten
corresponded with those of the British. But as the Cold War tension
increased, Australia was more consciously "trying to reconciling conflicting
points of view" than the United Kingdom which held a more offensive
position. 35
The Secretariat of the Division of Human Rights under its director, John
P. Humphrey, was the bureaucratic actor in the drafting process. Humphrey,
a Canadian law professor, entered the Secretariat on 1 August 1946 and
retired more than twenty years later. He was recruited to the United Nations
by a friend. The friend was Henri Laughier, who was the French Assistant
Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of SocIal Affairs during
the "declaration period". Humphrey does not disguise his efforts to take an
active part in the drafting work. In his autobiography, Humphrey attacks
"the myth that Cassin was the father of the Declaration" and argued that
this "myth" was created by the fact that "Cassin ' s revision of my draft,
written out in longhand, was displayed, at the request of the French
government, at United Nations Headquarters on the tenth anniversary of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and photographic
reproductions of the same manuscript are reproduced in a collection of
some of Cassin's articles and speeches . . . ." In his review of Humphrey's
autobiography Philip Alston correctly points out that Humphrey is
preoccupied with denying "the myth" about Cassin, ". . . especially in so
34 Memorandum by Heppel, 27 April, 1948, PRO, FO 371172804/ UNE 1780 and G.
Wilson to Sir N. Brook, Cabinet Office, 7 May, 1948, PRO, FO 371172805IUNE 1882.
35 Sawer, "United Nations," 97. Vincent to Benton, 21 April 1948, Records relating to the
UN Conference on Freedom of Information, Geneva, 1948, Box 4, RG 43, NARA.
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far as that myth obscures Humphrey' s own very important contribution to
the drafting of the instrument." Humphrey is right when he points out the
many contributions and states that it is this very anonymity which gives the
Declaration some of its great prestige and authority. This statement is
totally overshadowed by a repeated over-estimation of his own role. As
Alston notes: "The strong impression with which the reader is left is that
Humphrey is implicitly saying: 'no individual can really claim paternity,
and certainly not Cassin. In fact, if anyone was the original author, it was
1.'" Alston also argues that Humphrey puts up a straw-man when he attacks
the myth that Cassin was the father of the Declaration, because Cassin has
described his own role very cautiously in his many writings on the subject.
A motive behind Humphrey' s attack on "the myth" about Cassin may be
the fact that René Cassin in 1968 got the Nobel Peace Prize because of his
activity in the drafting work of the Declaration and the Covenants. The
conclusion is that Humphrey and Cassin were important actors in the
drafting process of the Universal Declaration. They shared this honour with
many other persons, and none of them deserve any paternal title.36
Humphrey prepared the draft outline with assistance from Emilie Giraud,
a distinguished international lawyer from France and an officer in the
Division of Human Rights. It is striking that Humphrey barely mentioned
his fellow worker, who could be a significant contributor in the drafting
work. "I was no Thomas Jefferson and. . . I had practically no experience
drafting documents," Humphrey admits, and he had many models to use for
this work. 37
Other possibilities of influence
In spite of the organizational advantage in the drafting process of the
representatives already mentioned, there were several possibilities for other
actors of the United Nations to influence the draft. One group which
deserves particularly attention is the Latin American states. They displayed
much fervour during the entire drafting process - as already noted -
especially in the first stage at the San Francisco Conference. The
Organisation of American States (OAS) organised a drafting work on a
regional human rights document paralleI to the drafting work on the UN
Declaration. This regional dec1aration was adopted in March 1948 by the
Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá (therefore it
36 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 42-43. Alston, "Review of Great Adventure," 225-26.
37 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 30.
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is of ten named "the Bogotá declaration"). This declaration was in part
based on an early draft of the Universal Declaration, which again was
influenced by the Bogotá document. The link between these two parallel
processes suggests itself in the many amendments submitted by these states.
A great many of them referred explicitly to the Bogotá document. It seems
to be the goal of some of the Latin American delegates to make the UN
document a replica of the Bogotá Declaration. The latter declaration was
very different from the UN by its emphasis on duties. While the UN
Declaration only focused on the human rights, the Bogotá document placed
rights and duties on a par. A number of proposals stressing duties in the
Declaration therefore suggests the influence of the Latin American presence
in the paralleI UN process.38
However, the Latin American effort did not always represent what was
feasible to include in an universal human rights document nor did it always
approach the proper channeIs. The human rights efforts of the Panamanian
representative, Ricardo J. Alfaro, clearly illustrates this fact. In 1946, he
resigned from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Panama and went
to New York to the second par of the first session of the UN General
Assembly in order to push through the human rights declaration text
proposed by Panama. He did not seem to be aware of the existence or
purpose of the Coinssion of Human Rights or the procedure adopted by
the United Nations about the human rights document. Instead, he directed
strong efforts towards an immediate adoption of a declaration. All further
reference of the matter to coinssions, he regarded as "a useless avoidance
of the issue and waste of time." Although Alfaro struggled for the
declaration in the General Assembly and lobbied for his view in the US
delegation, he did not achieve his objective. Most delegations shared the
US view that making a human rights document was "a matter which
requires major and detailed consideration by the Coinssion on Human
Rights." Alfaro was very disappointed and annoyed when the proposed text
of the declaration was transferred from the General Assembly to the
ECOSOC and the Human Rights Coinssion. This incident characterize
the Latin American human rights activism. Sometimes they enthusiastically
introduced a human rights issue without considering whether or not the
actual proposal had a realistic chance of being adopted. Sometimes their
38 Houston, p. 258. E/CNA/AC.1/SR.36, p. 6; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 27, 28, 37, 38,49,433,
665 and GAOR 3, p. 877. E/CNA/AC.1/SR.8, p. 2; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 35, 56, 77, 88,
597, 665.
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energetic defense of rare views Iritated some of their colleagues. Thus,
their enthusiastic partIcipation became a double-edged sword.39
The members of the United Nations which were not members of the
Coinssion on Human Rights had several possibilities to participate in the
drafting process. They had a chance to deliver their own draft to the
Commission or other UN organs. The Commission also sent the draft
documents to the different governments for comments. The final detailed
consideration of the draft took place in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly, where every UN member was represented. Some national and
international organizations also had possibilities of exerting influence in
their capacity as consultative members of the Coinssion of Human
Rights. Indeed, a few of them had produced draft declarations which were
included in the material of the Commission.40
Before the first session of the Coinssion, the Secretariat had prepared
a memorandum based on eighteen different draft international bill of rights
written during World War Il and shortly thereafter. Two were written in the
United Kingdom, fifteen in the Western Hemisphere and one was adopted
by the Institut de Droit International at its session of October 1929 in New
York. But only four of these drafts were distributed among the members of
the Coinssion in a textual comparison. It is hardly an accident that these
drafts had a more official status than the others. Three of them were
originated (Cuba) or sponsored (Panama and Chile) by the governments of
UN member states. The forth one came from the American Federation of
Labor, one of the organizations which was granted consultative status by
the Coinssion.41
39 Panama submitted the draft prepared by the American Law Institute, see Chapter 2.
Memorandum of conversation by B. Wells, 11 November 1946, US/A/C.3/41, US
Mission to the United Nations, Box 44, RG 84, NARA; Sandifer to Hendrick, Maktos
and Sanders, 12 November 1946, and Memorandum for State Department, 27 November
1946, US Mission to the United Nations, Box 89, Civil/uman Rights, 1946-49, RG 84,
NARA; GAOR-TC 1/1, p. 18; GAOR-TC 2/1, p. 419-20; United Nations, Yearbook
1946/47, 177-78.
40 The international organizations in "the UN family" got a special status and were allowed
to participate without vote in the deliberations of the ECOSOC and its commssions.
UNESCO, ILO, IRO and WHO took the opportunity and sent observers to the
Commission on Human Rights. More than twenty different organizations participated in
at least one of the sessions of the Commission. This group consisted in particular of
women's, Jewish and Christian organizations. See Samnøy, Human Rights as
International Consensus, (thesis) 74-75 and 80-84.
41 E/CNA/W.16 and W.8.
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The Cuban delegation had also presented a human rights text in San
Francisco. When the Assembly refused to include the Cuban proposal in the
agenda, the Cuban delegation followed up by submitting a working
document of concern to the Coinssion on Human Rights to the President
of the ECOSOC. Panama reintroduced the same draft which its delegation
had presented in San Francisco. The Government of Chile drew to the
attention of the United Nations a human rights draft during the second part
of the first session of the General Assembly prepared by the Inter-American
Juridical Conference. Later in the drafting process, Ecuador introduced a
draft relating to the rights and duties of the individuaL. The American
Federation of Labor also submitted directly a draft declaration.42
In accordance with its mandate the Secretariat collected a "documented
outline". This outline was a collection of, a) observations made by members
of the Commission on Human Rights at its first session, b) draft
international declarations or proposals submitted by governments to the
Commission, (which included draft declarations from Chile, Cuba and
Panama and proposals from India and the United States of America), c)
national constitutions from everyone of the UN member states, which had
any written provisions; and d) draft international declarations presented by
non-governmental organizations, which inc1uded only the draft submitted
by the American Federation of Labor.43
In the period between the second session of the Commission (December
1947) and the second session of the Drafting Cointtee (May 1948), the
draft international bill of human rights was sent to the governments of the
different UN members for comments. The hearing did not bring a great
response. In the spring 1948, the United Nations had fifty-seven member
states, but only a fourth, i.e. 15 had responded. Two of them, Pakistan and
Canada, had no substantive comments.
Among the thirteen states which had more or less substantive comments
on the draft bill, six were members of the Coinssion on Human Rights
and had already had their opportunity to present their views on the drafts.
In addition to Australia, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom and the
42 See Chapter 2. AIC.1I38; this draft - a first draft of the later Bogota-declaration - was
worked out in accordance with Resolutions IX and XL of the Inter-American Conference
on Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico City during the spring 1945.
Memorandum by Mr. Power, 17 September 1947, box 89, Civil and Human Rights
1946-49, US Mission to the United Nations, RG 84, NARA and memorandum by Mr.
Wells, 3 October 1947, USIAIC.3/89, box 44, US Mission to the United Nations, RG 84,
NARA. E/CT.2/2 and E/CNA/W.16.
43 E/CN AI AC.1I31 Add.1.
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United States, Brazil, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden and the Union of South Africa delivered their reports.44
It is not clear why so few states responded. A hearing period of three
months may not have been long enough. The fact that the thirteen
substantive comments were delivered after the deadline suggests that time
was a problem. Most of them perhaps chose to postpone their comments
until the draft declaration came to the General Assembly. The active
participation and the long debate in the Third Cointtee during the autumn
of 1948 supports this explanation.
Influence for what?
Since the story of the drafting process of the Declaration is a story about
different actors struggling for influence, the question of their motives arises.
One motive may be identified as an idealistic desire to obtain as clear and
strong a human rights declaration as possible in order to prevent possible
violations. There is no doubt that the Nazi-period caused a genuine reaction
which generated a general cointment to human rights among many
individuals in particular, but also by governments. Many of the participants
in the drafting process of the Declaration appeared dedicated to human
rights - as individuals. There were, however, different views on which
human rights were most important. Individuals or states that advocated
human rights which conformed with their own national legislation may
have done this because they wanted others to have similar rights.
As for governments, although they might be genuinely dedicated to
human rights, they also had other interests which might or might not
correspond with human rights concerns. Thus, a particular policy on human
rights might have been adopted mainly as a strategic means to obtain a
superior goal. During the drafting purpose, some of the human rights
concern obviously served other political purposes. The extent of genuine
concern for human rights is difficult to judge, but an important motive -
in particular for the most powerful states - was the need to avoid criticism
and, at the same time, to have an opportunity to criticize others. Human
rights had become a weapon in the ideological warfare between the East
and West led by the Great Powers. It therefore became increasingly
important to ensure that the human rights documents conformed with
national legislation and addressed the "weak points" of the ideological
enemy as well. This double set of motives for the human rights activism
44 All the reports are included in E/CNA/85/Rev.1 and E/CNA/82/Add.1-5 and 7-12.
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was explicitly stated in the British governmental working group on human
rights:
(TJhe purpose of Ris Majesty's Government in pursuing this covenant (of
human rightsJ had been two-fold: - in the first place they regarded it as
a means of securing progress in the raising of standards of human rights,
and in the sec ond place it was a weapon of political warfare.45
The two motives were in no way inconsistent with each other. Thus, the
UK draft covenant also "proposed to protect internationally . . . those rights
and freedoms which are essential to the democratic way of life." The
aspiration of expanding the British system of rule could easily be combined
with using this standard in criticizing the Soviet Union.46
Not only the effort of the United Kingdom, but also that of the USSR
and the United States were apparently along these lines. As the Cold War
intensified, the role of human rights as a political weapon became more
important. The growing Great Power criticism against each other
concerning human rights violation is a clear indication of this development.
British and American archives reveal that the governments were fully aware
of their weak points. The British were, in particular, concerned about
colonial issues. For the Americans the situation of the Negroes was the
burning issue. The British strategy was predominantly defensive for a long
period. They tried to keep a low profile in order to provoke least possible
criticism. Later they played a more active role and were disappointed with
"other colonial powers - particularly . . . the Belgians and the French -
(that have) adopted an entirely defaitist attitude . . . ." The Americans, on
the other hand, took an offensive tack from the very beginning and
prepared material on "weak points" in the Soviet society. In addition, they
emphasized that the Declaration was not binding and that "the present
treatment of Negroes in this country involves only issues which are matters
'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of the United States" -
according to their interpretation of the UN Charter. But - just in case -
the US delegation was also provided with material which illustrated "the
steady improvement in conditions of Negroes in the United States."47
45 Record of a meeting of the Working Party on Human Rights, 22 January 1948, PRO, FO
371/72799/UNE 362.
46 Brief for the debate on human rights in the House of Lords, May 1948, PRO, FO
371172805/UNE 1869.
47 Goodwin, Britain and United Nations, 256-68. Draft International Declaration on Human
Rights: Colonial Office Circular, 30 July 1948, PRO, FO 371/72810/UNE
3183."Discrimination against Negroes in the United States," 30 August 1948,
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When Yugoslavia introduced an article about the rights of the population
in non-self-governing territories, the UK charged Yugoslavia was raising
the issue of political motives as a mean to criticize Western powers,
particularly Britain. The thought of revenge appeared immediately; "the
Delegation might be instructed to loose off in the plenary debate some of
the ammunition . . . about the abuses of human rights in Yugoslavia."
WhIle the US generally favoured greater freedom for the colonial people,
the US stand on this issue took other interests into account. The American
delegation kept a low profIle in these matters in order not to embarass
their close ally, the United Kingdom. At the same time their main worry
was that international communism would take advantage of the
independence movement in the colonies.48
The extensive use of human rights as a weapon in the political warfare
made it important for the governments to avoid including in the human
rights declaration elements which did not conform with nationallaws or
practice. The opposition against giving the text binding status also reflected
this motivation. The United Kingdom feared pressure to tre at the
Declaration as an authoritative definition of what human rights was at the
time. Their strategy was evident:
Presumably it would be difficult to resist the adoption of a definition, and
it would merely remain for the United Kingdom to make certain that the
definition did not contain anything at variance with the existing practice
both in the United Kingdom and in the territories for which the United
Kingdom is internationally responsible. But the risk makes it desirable, in
our opinion, to be careful about what we agree to put into the draft
Declaration in its early stages.49
The United States wanted to limit the debate and not reopen the substantial
deliberations on the Declaration at the third session of the General
Assembly because of the fear of "undesirable" amendments. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, was not satisfied with the content of several
SD/A/C.3175 and 76, Position paper and comment paper, box 27, Position Papers,
Bureau of International Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59, NARA.
48 UK delegation to the United Nations to Foreign Office, 29 November 1948 and Foreign
Office reply, 30 November 1948, PRO, FO 371172812/UE 4645. See also GAOR-TC
3, p. 744. "United States attItude toward foreign colonial policies," 27 May 1949,
Research project 108, box 5, Research reports on the Foreign Policy Studies Branch,
Division of Historical Policy Research, RG 59, NARA.
49 Ormerod, Commonwealth Relations Office to Hebbeltwaite, Foreign Office, 1 May 1948,
PRO, FO 371172805/UNE 1805.
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articles and submitted numerous changes.. The amendments seem partly to
have been attempts to avoid confrontation with Soviet laws and practice,
as the sentence "in accordance with the law" was suggested in many
articles. Although very few of the amendments were adopted, the Soviet
Union did not vote against the Declaration. The general impression is that
the Soviet Union in this period was more concerned with using the
Declaration as a means of criticizing others than preventing elements which
did not conform with Soviet laws and practice. It has been argued that the
USSR attitude towards international law during this period was that of
recognizing only those parts which served the interests of the Soviet state.
A selective use of internationallaw may have made it less important to
avoid clauses to which one might be opposed. The Soviet utilization of
human rights as a political weapon was well-known and feared by its main
opponents, and by the British in particular:50
It wil be interesting to see what use Soviet propaganda wil make of the
Dec1aration of Human Rights now that it has been adopted. One is
tempted to forecast that they wil in no way be impeded from employing
it as a stick with which to beat their opponents by the fact that they did
not vote for it and abstained or voted against some of the most
fundamental Artic1es. An obvious tactic would be to stimulate petitions
from colonial territories charging that the metropolitan power was denying
fundamental rights to the inhabitants.
While we shall undoubtedly be able to point out in reply that very few
rights or freedoms are granted to the population of the USSR and the
satellite states, some of the mud wil stick unless we can show that we are
doing our best to live up to the ideals of the Dec1aration in all territories
under our control.
The realization of that "some of the mud will stick . . . unless we can show
that we are doing our best to live up to the ideals of the Declaration" might
have contributed to the improvement of human rights conditions although
the main motivation for influencing the drafting of the Declaration was to
engage in political warfare.
50 "Comment paper, Draft International Declaration on Human Rights," 26 August 1948,
SP/A/C.3/70, box 27, position papers, Bureau of International Organization Affairs and
its Predecessors, RG 59, NARA. Meighen, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Democratie Representative, 21. Dalln, Soviet Union in United Nations, 8-9 and 11; see
also Tedin, "Soviet Attitude Towards Implementing Human Rights." Report on the
plenary session: Note by the Foreign Office, 14 December 1948, PRO, FO
371/72812/UNE 4858.
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The above discussion has concentrated on the motives of the Great
Powers. Additional studies will be necessary to analyze the motives of the
smaller states. It is, however, reasonable to argue that their motives also
were mixed: a desire for higher human rights standards combined with
respect for human rights as a political weapon. The second motive might,
however, not be as important as for the Great Powers because smaller states
are less active internationally focus and, to that extent, less vulnerable.
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4. The form and status of the document:
Only a moral force
The Coinssion on Human Rights was designated by the ECOSOC to
draft an International Bill of Human Rights, but the terms of reference did
not say anything about the form or status of the planned document. The UN
Charter said nothing either. There was a close relationship between the
legal status of the human rights document and its substance. The decision
on the question of form and the interpretations of its impact according to
its legal status obviously affected attitudes on substantive questions. The
point of view was also expressed in the Commission. The further the
Declaration was considered to be legally binding, the greater the effort to
restrict the scope of the Declaration.1
The many forms that were under consideration determined the legal
status, but the forms could be interpreted in many different ways. The form
was decided without an explicit decision on the legal status. Serious
disagreements were covered up and the debate has continued. These
disagreements directly relate to the questions of national sovereignty,
interference in intern al affairs and the controversial supranational role of the
United Nations.
The form of the International Bill of Human Rights
The Nuclear Coinssion on Human Rights left to the full Commission the
determination of the form and the legal status of the Bill, as well as the
determination of its content. The question of form was discussed at the first
session of the Coinssion on Human Rights and the first session of the
Drafting Cointtee. The final decision of the form was not made until the
second session of the Coinssion. In its night meeting on 16 December
1947, the Commission on Human Rights decided to apply the term
"International Bill of Human Rights" or, for brevity, "Bill of Rights", to the
1 E/CNA/SR.7, p. 3.
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three documents in preparation, named "Declaration", "The Covenant of
Human Rights" and "Measures of Implementation". 2
Charles Malik, Rapporteur of the Coinssion, presents the deliberations
and the decision in this way:
From the very beginning it became c1ear that our task was threefold.
First, we must elaborate a general Dec1aration of Human Rights defining
in succinct terms the fundamental rights and freedoms of man which,
according to Artic1e 55 of the Charter, the United Nations must promote.
This responsible setting forth of the fundamental rights wil exert a potent
doctrinal and moral and educational influence on the minds and ways of
men. It wil serve, in the words of the present Dec1aration, "as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples."
Second, there was the insistent need of something more legally binding
than a mere Dec1aration. Such a document can only be a convention, an
international treaty, setting forth in precise legal terms the maximum area
of agreement to which governments are wiling to be legally bound in this
domain. What the convention losesby reason of its more restricted
subject-matter, it makes up for by the fact that those who sign it are
wiling to covenant themselves into the strict observance of its terms.
Hence we have called it "the Covenant on Human Rights."
Finally, it was obvious we needed adequate machinery for making sure
that human rights are observed and for dealing with cases of their
infraction. We called this machinery "Measures of Implementation.,,3
Malik gave a precise description of the three parts of the Bill of Rights, but
the agreement and discussion of the form and the status of the document(s)
to be drafted, were not as uncomplicated as he portrayed it.
From the very beginning of their work, it was evident that the
representatives had different aspirations. The mandate of the Coinssion
was to draft an International Bill of Human Rights, but what exactly did the
term "Bill" refer to? Some of the delegates interpreted it as "hard"
international law as a contrast to a "soft" declaration, which they
2 E/HR/29, p. 2. The discussion of the question of form is mainly found in these
documents: E/CN.4/W.4, E/CN.4/SR.7-9 and 14-15, E/CN.4/4, E/CN.4/11, E/259, p. 3,
OR-ECOSOC 4/2, p. 103, E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 3, 5 and 7, E/CN.4/21, p. 3,
E/CN.4/SR.25, 27-29 and 35, E/600, p. 3. E/600. The decision did not determine whether
the measures to be proposed would form a part of the Covenant (as later decided) or not.
3 Malik, "International Bil of Human Rights," 519.
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interpreted as referring a "recommendation". This understanding was
strongly opposed by others. Eleanor Roosevelt maintained that there was
no existing concept of "bills" as such in internationallaw, and consequently
a Bill of Rights did not need to be cast in convention form. Most of them
interpreted "treaty" and "convention" as binding instruments and
"declaration" and "resolution" as having a more recommending character.
This was in accordance with common international usage, but even this
distinction caused some confusion. The representatives did not always mean
the same thing by using the same words.4
The Coinssion on Human Rights worked with different draft
declarations, but other solutions were also possible. In a working paper, the
Secretariat considered, three alternatives regarding the form of the
International Bill of Human Rights: 1) a declaration adopted by the General
Assembly as a resolution; 2) a binding convention, which had to be ratified
by_ each state, or 3) an amendment to the UN Charter. These alternatives
were presented at the first session of the Coinssion on Human Rights. In
addition, the Indian representative suggested a Bill of Rights to be adopted
by the UN Assembly as a General Act. The status of such an act did not
seem quite clear, and the general opinion in the Coinssion was that the
General Assembly had the power to pass resolutions, but not acts.5
"Bill of Rights" as an amendment to the Charter was obviously a solution
nobody wanted. Nor was it realistic. Therefore, they had to choose between
a declaration or a convention. Most of the delegates spoke in favour of a
declaration, including most of the Great Powers. Others argued
energetically for a more binding instrument. The dilemma was the desire
for an effective implementation combined with a broad acceptance. The
question went to the core of the issue of domestic jurisdiction.6
The first session of the Commission did not vote on the issue of form,
but it reported to the ECOSOC as follows: "Concerning the form of the
International Bill of Human Rights, the consensus of the Commission was
that it should be submitted to the Coinssion by the drafting group as a
4 E/CNA/SR.25, p. 6; E/CNA/SR.28, pp. 4-6; E/CNA/SR.29, pp. 4 and 14.
5 E/CNA/WA, pp. 10-11. E/CNA/ll and E/CNA/SR.9, pp. 3, 5 and 6.
6 Artic1e 108 and 109 in the Charter indicated two different ways to adopt amendments
to the Charter. Both of them required adoption by two thirds of the United Nations
members, including all the permanent members of the Security CounciL. Such a broad
agreement was not easy to obtain. See also Eichelberger, "United Nations Charter," 103-
104.
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draft resolution for presentation and approval by the General Assembly.
(Italics added.)"7
The first session of the Drafting Committee repeated the discussion on
the form and the status. Some of the representatives favoured a declaration,
others felt that it should be in the form of a convention. The supporters of
a declaration, however, agreed that the document should be followed by
one or several conventions on specific groups of rights. In the same way,
those who favoured the convention form, assumed that the General
Assembly in recommending such a convention to the member states, might
adopt a more general declaration. The underlying views, which were related
to the question of sovereignty, were not easily combined. Provisionally the
Committee decided to prep are two drafts; a working paper in the form of
a declaration and another in the form of a convention. The unanimous
agreement in the drafting Cointtee was that the final decision on the form
had to be made by the whole Coinssion. When the CommissIon
convened its second session in December 1947, this caused a difficult
debate lasting through four meetings.8
China, theUSSR, the United States and Yugoslavia were the supporters
of a human rights document in the form of a declaration. None of them
opposed the convention-form openly, but wanted to postpone the discussion
until the draft declaration was considered. VIadislav Ribnikar, the
Yugoslavian representative, interpreted the instructions from the ECOSOC
in favour of a declaration. Whether a covenant should be drawn up as well
should rest with the General Assembly to decide.9
Originally, the United States had preferred to prepare a declaration first
and then one or more conventions. But, according to Eleanor Roosevelt,
United States' position had been modified and priority was now given to
the Declaration. "The Coinssion should not proceed to draw up (the
conventionJ until it was sure that such Conventions could be accepted and
applied in all good faith by the participating States." This was in fact a
very strong reservation. 10
The USSR delegate favoured a postponement of a convention. At this
stage, it was the common opinion in the West that the Soviet Union would
7 E1259, p. 3.
8 E/CNA/AC.lISR.2, p. 3, E/CNA/AC.lISR.7, pp. 3-4.
9 E/CNA/AC.lISR.5, pp. 3-4; E/CNA/SR.25, p. 10 and E/CNA/SR.29, pp. 8-9;
E/CNA/SR.25, p. 10; and E/CNA/SR.28, p. 10 respectively.
10 "Legal form of an international bil of human rights," 3 1 October 1946,
SDÆ/CNA/W.lO, box 45, position paper, Bureau of International Organization Affairs
and Its Predecessors, RG 59, NARA. E/CNA/SR.25, p. 10; compare also E/CNA/4.
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never accept a binding convention, a view which was confirmed by off-the-
record remarks from Russian diplomats.ll
The opposite position was an impatient defence for a strong binding
instrument in the form of a convention. Lord Dukeston, Hansa Metha and
William Hodgson, the representatives of the United Kingdom, India and
Australia respectively, were the most zealous fighters for a convention. This
suggests a Commonwealth alliance, and the United Kingdom was the
obvious leader. They obtained support from Belgium, Lebanon, Panama and
the Philippines. 12
The representative of Lebanon, Charles Malik, offered a perceptive
explanation: "He gathered from the Coinssion's discussion that the issue
of a 'Declaration' or a 'Convention' was a challenge between small and
great Powers," the records explain. Given that the USSR and the United
States were the primary Great Powers at that time, this is areasonable
assumption. This understanding of the small states as the strongest
defenders of internationallaw is in accordance with the general opinion.
"When small states work so diligently for international conflict regulation
through internationallaw, it is not because they from the outset are better
than others," as the Norwegian President of the Parliament (Storting), C. J.
Hambro once said, "but rather because they have less power to do injustice
rthan larger statesJ."13
Malik "could understand the difficult position of some Great Powers, but
he believed that if the medium and small Powers combined their efforts,
they could invite the 'Big Powers' to follow their lead, in the same way as
the small and medium Powers followed the Great Powers in their efforts to
secure peace; they could by contrast speak more frankly and set more freely
to promote general agreement. . . . He trusted that hopes of agreement
would not be disappointed."14
Lord Dukeston (United Kingdom) said it seemed to him "dangerous to
prep are a draft Declaration without a draft Convention. r. . . MJachinery for
implementation could not be contemplated within the framework of a
Declaration. The latter could not legally bind Governments as could a
Convention." According to Dukeston a Declaration was nothing more than
a document of propaganda. He later argued that "rhJistory showed that
11 E/CNA/SR.25, p. 2. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 41.
12 E/CNA/SR.25, pp. 2, 5-7 and 11; E/CNA/SR.28, pp. 6-10 and E/CNA/SR. 29, p. 1.
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa, 26 May 1947, PRO, FO 371/67604/UNE 443. (UK draft convention is attached.)
13 E/CNA/SR.28, p. 12. Bergesen and 0streng, Internasjonal politikk, 29.
14 E/CNA/SR.28, pp. 11-12.
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Declarations imposing no juridical obligations had remained inoperative for
centuries."15
The British position as a strong defender of a binding convention needs
to be explained. First, it is necessary to keep in mind what kind of a
convention the United Kingdom supported. The UK draft convention was
very much in accordance with the existing common law in their own
country. The draft stressed individual rights and economic and social rights
were not included. Thus, the British struggle for a strong, binding
convention had less far-reaching implications than it might first appear.
Moreover, the British enthusiasm for a legally binding convention did not
last. The international climate changed and the human rights agenda
included several issues which the United Kingdom found problematic. In
June 1948 - although its former vie w was still the official policy - the
UK attitude towards a binding human rights document was much more
reluctant: 16
During the last few weeks it has been necessary to obtain authority for the
line to be pursued by the U .K. Delegation at the Human Rights
Commssion. This submission of important problems concerning Human
Rights to higher authority has evoked an expression of considerable
misgivings. The misgivings centred round the dangers which might flow
from the coming into force of the covenant, despite any safeguards which
it might be possible to have included in the Covenant. The Lord
Chancellor, for instance, has stated that he regards the whole question
with even greater apprehension. It is also in line with these views, which
anticipate considerable political difficulties if the Covenant ever comes
into force, that the Secretary of State decided to instruct the U.K. delegate
to adopt Fabian tactics when the question of individual petitions comes up
for discussion.
Viewed in the light of the political considerations mentioned in the
immediately preceding telegram, therefore, there would be every
advantage in delaying the coming into force of the Covenant and even
greater advantage in postponing this event sine die. The present
unsatisfactory state of international relations underlines even more the
importance of such inc1usion.
15 E/CNA/SR.25, p. 11. E/CNA/SR.28, p. 7.
16 UNÆ/CNAI21, Annex B; "Bil of Human Rights," . 1 1 June 1947, PRO, FO
371/67605IUNE 610; Secretary of State's speech, draft by Beckett, 14 January 1948,
PRO, FO 371172801IUNE 997. Memorandum by Mr. Hebb1etwaite, Foreign Office, 8
June 1948, PRO, FO 371172808/UE 2273.
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In public, still, the United Kingdom'sdelegate was astrong defender of a
binding convention. His Australian college, William Hodgson, went further.
He "would like to know whether the Declaration . . . was to take the form
of a recommendation of the General Assembly or whether it was a
Declaration, to be ratified by States, in which case it would have binding
force under both municipal and internationallaw. Those who favoured a
Declaration should explain what they meant; if it was merely to be a
recommendation, the peoples of the whole world would be disappointed
and the Coinssion would have made a hypocritical decision." Similarly,
Panama argued that a declaration which avoided assuming responsibilities
would be a legal monstrosity.17
None of the supporters of the convention completely opposed a
declaration. They gave priority to the convention instead. Thus, the Belgian
Fernand Dehousse considered "a Declaration on Human Rights . . . of little
importance," but still, he did not completely oppose such a declaration. The
representatives of Chile, Egypt, France and Uruguay took an intermediate
position. They wanted to combine a declaration with a convention, and
appreciated a declaration more than the most zealous supporters of a
convention. They did not share the view that a convention was preferable
to a declaration because the latter lacked value. Instead, they considered a
convention as a way to deal with those details which would over-Ioad a
declaration. One of their' arguments - as maintained by France - was that
a declaration would be written immediately - as a first stage, and it
"would immediately strike public opinion and serve as a guide to the future
policies of States." Contrary to states that defended a declaration because
they obviously did not want too strong provisions and feared interference
in domestic affairs, their position was pragmatic. They did not oppose a
binding convention, but considered a declaration to be more realistic at that
time. The representative of Chile, Hernan Santa Cruz, emphasised this
"practical aspect," and Juan J. C arb aj al Victorica, who represented
Uruguay, regarded it "easier to examine the Declaration first."18
The UK representative neither openly opposed a declaration, but
emphasized the simultaneous adoption of the Convention and the
Declaration. This was i.e. based on the fear that "(e )ven if the Declaration
were drafted as a mere statement of ideals, . . . attempts will be made, if
17 E/CNA/SR/28, p. 6; this quotation ilustrates also the confusion about the terminology.
E/CNA/SR.28, p. 9.
18 E/CNA/SR.25, pp. 6-7. E/CNA/AC.1/SR.2, p. 3 and SR.5, p. 3; E/CNA/SR.25, p. 5;
E/CNA/SR.23, p. 3; and E/CN A/S R. 35 , p. 8 respectively. E/CNA/AC.1/SR.5, p. 2.
E/CNA/AC.1/SR.5, p. 3 and E/CNA/SR.35, p. 8.
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there is no Covenant, to base accusations upon it and to distort it into a
legally binding obligation."19
The disagreement over form had an impact on the organization of the
second session of the Coinssion. The Belgian representative tried to
bridge the gap between the divergent points of view and submitted a
compromise proposal which was ultimately adopted. By a vote of nine to
five, the Coinssion decided to set up three working groups to deal with
the Declaration, the Convention(s) and the Implementation respectively.20
The status of the Declaration
Even though the Coinssion on Human Rights had decided upon the
question of form, the agreement was only apparent. The Commission had
decided to draft 1) a declaration, which was to be adopted as a General
Assembly resolution; 2) a convention, which was legally binding upon the
ratifying states; and 3) the measures of implementation - the machinery
which should supervise adherence to both the letter and spirit of the
convention. Formally, this decision solved the question of the legal status
of the forthcoming bill of human rights. The decision was also ambiguous
and open to interpretation. Conflicts over interpretation happened
frequently. In spite of the adopted compromise, the members of the
Commission maintained their different positions and repeatedly expressed
them during the drafting process. The member states of the Coinssion as
well as the other UN members expressed different points of view with
respect to both the question of national sovereignty and the interpretation
of the UN Charter. These views resulted in different evaluations of the legal
status of the Declaration. Hence, the disagreement on the legal status
affected the whole drafting process of the Declaration.
1) The question of national sovereignty
The close connection between the question of the status of the Declaration
and the question of national sovereignty was prominent. The USSR and the
other East European states were the most determined and outspoken
defenders of the principle of national sovereign ty. In the general debates as
well as in connection with special issues, they insisted that any interference
19 "Human rights," draft brief for the UK delegation to the third session of the General
Assembly, PRO, FO 371172811/UNE 3939.
20 E/CN.4/SR.28, pp. 2-5.
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in domestic affairs must be avoided. Such interference was against the
Charter of the United Nations and might lead to international strife by
transforming intern al disputes into international disputes and thus endanger
world peace. The representative of Yugoslavia, VIadislav Ribnikar,
expressed it this way:21
(T)he principle of State sovereignty as independence both in internal
affairs and in international relations with other states . . . was the oldest
democratic principle in the fields of State relations, and. . . this principle
was only opposed . . . by those people who had ideas of international
domination and generally represented reaction.
The Russian representative, Alexei P. Pavlov, expressed a somewhat
contradictory view. Again and again he attacked various human rights
provisions which he considered violations of the principle of national
sovereignty. This attitude was not consistent. On the other hand, one of the
USSR objections against the draft declaration was its failure to ensure and
guarantee the implementation of rights, especially the rights dealing with
social, economic and cultural rights.22
In addition to the USSR and the East European states, El Salvador,
represented by Hector David Castro, feared the possibility of intervention
in domestic affairs although not with a specific reference to the
International Bill of Human Rights, and argued that the United Nations was
not a super-state. The Syrian delegate, Abdul Rahman Kayaly, was also
concerned not to violate the principle of national sovereignty. Augusto
Rallrez Moreno from Colombia pointed out that the drafters of the
Declaration text did not intend to interfere in domestic matters. The Iranian
member of the Commission, Ghassame Ghani, warned against any
infringement of national sovereign ty. The suggestion of creating a Court of
Appeal to pass judgement on violations of human rights was interpreted by
the Iranian government as an infringement of national sovereign ty. 23
21 On the discussion of national sovereignty, see E/CNA/AC.lISR.3, p. 2;
E/CNA/AC.2/SR.5, p. 12; E/CNA/AC.2/SR.9, p. 13; E/CNA/ACA/SR.7, p. 1;
E/CNA/SR.38, pp. 8 and 10; E/CNA/AC.lISR.21, p. 3; E/CNA/SR.49, pp. 6-7;
E/CNA/SR.55, p. 7; E/CNA/SR.59, p. 10; E/CNA/SR.61, p. 5; E/CNA/SR.81, p. 14;
OR-ECOSOC 7/3, pp. 646, 658 and 699; GAOR- TC 3, p. 49; GAOR 3, p. 923. Cf. also
Dallin, Soviet Union in United Nations, 45-50. GAOR-TC 3, p. 59. E/CNA/SR.39, pp.
11-12.
22
E/CNA/AC.lISR.21, p. 3; E/CNA/SR.81 , p. 14 and E/CNA/SR.59, p. 10. Compare
E/CNA/SR.49, p. 11; E/CNA/AC.lISR.21, p. 3 and E/800, pp. 30-31.
23 E/CNA/SR.8, p. 3. See also GAOR-TC 3, pp. 44 and 705 and GAOR 3, p. 163.
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The representatives of France and Chile, René Cassin and Hernan Santa
Cruz respectively, were among those arguing most consistently in favour
of the need of limits on national sovereignty, and they made specific
references to the World War Il experiences. The opinion of René Cassin is
referred to in this way:
Experience had shown the tragic results of unlimited national sovereignty,
and France, by its Constitution of i 946, was ready to give up part of
sovereignty, provided such action was reciprocated. (Italics added.f4
Hernan Santa Cruz maintained that "(ilt had been recognized at San
Francisco, when the horrors of war and totalitarianism were still fresh in the
memory of the world, that if the causes of war were to be eliminated, the
sovereignty of States must be limited by considerations of international
solidarity and co-operation . . . . (Italics added. )"25
Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Denmark, and Ecuador voiced similar thoughts,
though not as far-reaching as the ideas of Chile and France. The
representative of Bolivia, Eduardo Anze Matienzo, maintained that national
sovereignty would have to be subordinated to international requirements
and regarded the Declaration as a new international constItution which
would limit the rights of States in the interest of the rights of individuals.
He also hoped that the Declaration would become an integral part of
internationallaw.26
Argentina, Liberia, and Mexico actually wanted to strengthen the
supranational character of the UN, but Argentina did not consider the world
advanced enough to abolish national sovereignty, and Mexico and Liberia
complained that such a supranational body was contrary to the Charter.27
The point of view of the PhIlippine Republic, expressed by Charles
Romulo, was also clear:
The Commssion could . . . visualize the hypothesis of a world
government from which the international bil of human rights would result
and of which it would be the cornerstone.28
24 E/CNA/SR.73, pp. 2-3.
25 E/CNA/SR.50, p. 6.
26 GAOR 3 p. 297; GAOR 3, p. 900 and GAOR-TC 3, p. 42; GAOR-TC 3, p. 402; GAOR
3, p. 891; and GAOR 3, p. 920 respectively.
27 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 697 and 701; GAOR 3, p. 165.
28 E/CNA/SR.9, p. 2.
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Romulo also refuted the allegation that the Declaration of human rights
infringed on national sovereignty but generally , the Philippines tried to steer
clear of a confrontation on such a difficult matter. of principle. Mexico
stated that the Declaration was not inconsistent with the principle of
domestic jurisdiction. In fact, their position supported limited
sovereignty.29
The Australian A. S. Watt argued that certain matters of domestic
jurisdiction could be transferred to international jurisdiction, and it would
not constitute a violation, but rather an exercise of sovereignty. The Belgian
delegate, Fernand Dehousse, supported limitation on national sovereignty
by re-defining the concept of national sovereignty:
First, there was the concept of absolute sovereignty, which exc1uded all
international co-operation; but he considered that a State, if it possessed
absolute sovereignty, had the power thereby to limit its sovereignty and
power. In this case, the State would be based on the second concept of
relative sovereignty, which was sovereignty limited according to the
practical interests of the country. (Italics added.J30
He further referred to the German abuse of the notion of absolute
sovereignty and considered any support of such a concept as reactionary.
2) The interpretation of the UN Charter
The discussion of national sovereignty was really a discussion on how to
interpret the UN Charter, especially Article 2.7:
N othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
N ations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vii.3!
Other relevant sections in the Charter were Article 1.3 which states as a
part of the purposes of the United Nations "to achieve international
cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
29 GAOR 3, p. 868 (Philippines) and E/CNA/82/Add.i, p. 2 (Mexico).
30 E/CNA/SR.39, p. 9 (Belgium) and GAOR-TC 3, P . 702 (Australia).
31 Chapter VII concerns action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and
acts of aggregation.
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion"; article 55 which repeats this as an objective for the Economic
and SocIal Council and artic1e 56 where all members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of this purpose.32
These provisions in the Charter were interpreted both to approve and to
disapprove of dealing with violations on human rights. Only some of the
UN members presented their points of view explicitly. Most were more
circumspect. The two main interpretations may be classified as A) the
absolute doctrine of non-interference, and B) human rights as international
la w. 33
On the one hand, the USSR and its supporters emphasized the passage
which said that the United Nations was not authorized to intervene in
matters within domestic jurisdiction. One of the USSR representatives in
the drafting work, Vladirnr Koretsky, expressed the Soviet doctrine of non-
interference forcefully:
(T)here did not exist such a thing as a world government. The Group was
faced with the co-existence of sovereign states. The United Nations itself
consisted of 50-odd states that had agreed to co-operate, but had not
renounced any of their sovereignty. It would be improper . . . to establish
the dependence of one country upon another. The United Nations Charter
. . . does not allow interference in the domestic affairs of a state.34
The opinion emphasising human rights as international law, on the other
hand, took at least three different forms.
A) "By subscribing to the Charter, States had accepted the incorporation
of human rights into internationallaw and had voluntarily abandoned part
oftheir sovereignty," argued the Chile an representative, Hernan Santa Cruz.
He thereby did not reject the principle of national sovereignty, but saw
human rights as taking priority over notions of national sovereignty. 35
B) A recurring argument held that human rights were not a matter of
domestic jurisdiction, hence there was no conflict between actions in the
human rights field and the provisions in the Charter related to non-
intervention. Already during the opening of the first session of the
Commission on Human Rights, the Assistant Secretary-General of the
32 See Appendix 2.
33 See Newman, "Interpreting Human Rights Clauses of United Nations Charter."
34 E/CNA/ACA/SR.7, p. 1. See also GAOR-TC 3, p. 59.
35 GAOR-TC 3, p. 702.
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United Nations in charge of Social Affairs, Henri Laughier, declared that
no violation of human rights should be covered up by the principleof
national sovereignty. 36
Charles Malik gave a fuller interpretation of the view that human rights
was outside and beyond questions of national sovereignty. The Charter
showed, he argued, that:37
IFJirst, that the promotion of respect for human rights was second only
to the maintenance of peace and security. The violation of human rights
was one of the causes of war, and, if the first aim of the United Nations
was to be attained, the observance of human rights must be guarartteed.
Secondly, the Commssion on Human Rights was in the unique position
of being the only CommIssion mentioned by name in the Charter. Thirdly,
the function of the Commission was the promotion of human rights, and
since it could not promote what was still vague and undefined, the first
tas k of the Commission must be a precise definition of those rights. It
could be said that the CommIssion was called upon to finish the work
initiated by the Charter, in giving content and meaning to the phrase "the
dignity and worth of the human person." In the fourth place, since it had
been decided at the San Francisco Conference that an elaboration of
human rights, which had been urged by many delegations, was too large
a task to be attempted at that time, this CommIssion was virtually a
prolongation of the San Francisco Conference and its work a completion
of the Charter itself. Those facts should be bome in mind, since the
Commssion was apt to be regarded as just another organ of the United
Nations. It was, in fact, more fundamental than any other body of the
EconomIc and Social Council, and almost as fundamental as any of the
principal organs of the United Nations. (Italics added.J
The statement was echoed by other energetic supporters of human rights.
The representative of Brazil, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, argued that human
rights had been removed from the purely domestic jurisdiction of States and
had become an international concern. In the Third Committee of the
General Assembly, René Cassin (France) maintained that the provisions of
the Charter relating to matters of domestic jurisdiction could not be used
to circumscribe the UN' s competence on human rights. The question of
human rights was no longer purely domestic but of international concern.
He pointed out the danger represented by excessive respect for national
sovereignty in questions going beyond the domestic jurisdiction of States,
and referred to the experiences with Hitler. Jorge Carera Andrade from
36 E/CN.4/SR.l, p. 2.
37 E/CN.39, p. 7. E/CN.4/SR.50, pp. 4-5.
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Ecuador followed up by stating that human rights did not stop at national
frontiers. Panama' s Antonio de León objected "to the oft-repeated sophistry
that the UN was helpless to prevent violations of human rights because the
Charter forbade interference in matters which were within domestic
jurisdiction," as did the Norwegian representative, Frede Castberg.38
C) A third argument for considering human rights as international law
was introduced by Ecuador' s Jorge Carrera Andrade. He emphasized that
interference with human rights endangered collective security. Because it
was within the mandate of the United Nations to take actions towards
everything which could be expected to endanger international peace and
security. This argument supported concern over human rights. Similar
opinions were also repeatedly expressed by other delegates, e.g. Mexico and
Lebanon.39
3) Was the Declaration legally binding?
One of the principal questions during the drafting process was whether the
Declaration colild be considered legally binding or not. Two opposite points
of vie w were represented: 1) The Dec1aration is not legally binding, but a
moral standard only. 2) The Dec1aration is a continuation of the Charter and
defines the human rights mentioned therein. This gives it an authoritative
status which also implied a legal binding. There was also an intermediate
position. Some representatives were not willing to give the Declaration any
legal status, but warned against what they called an under-estimation of its
value. This point of vie w can also be considered as a variation of the
opinion that the Declaration did not have any legal value.
The United States was the leading force among those who stressed the
non-binding character of the Declaration. Over and over again, Eleanor
Roosevelt underlined that the Dec1aration was only a guide and a source of
inspiration. It would serve as a beacon towards which all nations should
strive. "The draft declaration was not a treaty or international agreement
and did not impose legal obligations; it was rather a statement of basic
principles of inalienable human rights, setting up a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. Although it was not legally
binding, the declaration would nevertheless have considerable weight."
38 OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 645 (Brazil); GAOR-TC 3, pp. 35 (Norway), 36 (Ecuador), 43
(Panama) and 61 (France).39 GAOR 3, p. 920 (Ecuador); E/CNA/82/Add.1. p. 3 (Mexico); OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 2
(Lebanon).
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EleanorRoosevelt expressed this point of view in detailed fashion at the
opening of the third session of the Coinssion on Human Rights, referred
in records as:40
(IJn the opinion of her delegation the Declaration should serve two
purposes:
1) To establish basic standards which would guide the United Nations in
the realization, within the meaning of the Charter, of international co-
operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all;
2) To serve as a guide and inspiration to individuals and groups
throughout the world in their efforts to promote respect for human rights.
The Dec1aration should not be in any sense a legislative document. The
General Assembly was not a legislative body. The manner in which the
United Nations could and would wish to undertake the task of promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
remained in large measure to be determined. Further, it was clear that the
Declaration, as envisaged, did not create legal remedies or procedures to
ensure respect for the rights and freedoms it proposed to the world; that
ideal would have to be achieved by further steps taken in accordance with
international and domestic law. The Dec1aration would have moral, not
mandatory , force.
In addition, the United States repeatedly reminded other delegates that the
US federal system was an obstacle to ratification of international treaties.
Only H. Plain, who represented the United States in the working group for
the convention during the second session of the Coinssion on Human
Rights, expressed the unorthodox view that: "(iJnasmuch as the American
Federal State played a predominant role in world affairs and had now
become, in fact, the leading country in the world, it should adapt its federal
system to the requirements of human progress and prevent its own intern al
provisions from impeding the ratification of a Convention on Human
Rights." The US delegation to the third General Assembly was aware that
parts of the Declaration did not conform with their nationallegislation. The
right of access to public employment was in conflict with the American
restrictions on employment for Communists. In order to pre vent internal
criticism on such issues and to secure internal American acceptance of the
40 GAOR-TC 3, p. 32; see also E/CNA/82/Rev.l, p. 18 and OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 642.
E/CNA/SR.48, pp. 5-6.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt emphasised the
Declaration as a compromise which did not reflect completely the point of
view of any of the participating governments. The US delegation made
strong endeavour to publish her speeches in the American press. The
repeated American insistence on the non-binding character of the
Declaration was a part of this strategy.41
The Chinese delegate, T. Y. Wu, shared the US point by arguing that
"the declaration could only serve as a moral standard towards which
mankind should aspire." He was joined by representatives of Australia,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Union of South Africa
and the United Kingdom explicitly expressed that they did not consider the
Declaration to have any legally binding character. 42
There existed also a considerable fear among those states that the
Declaration finaiiY might be interpreted to have some legal force. The UK
representative at the seventh session of ECOSOC, Christopher Mayhew,
objected to the point of view that the Declaration could be considered as
an authorised interpretation of the relevant provision of the Charter and he
particularly protested against Cassin's point of view. The British fear of a
strong Declaration was repeatedly expressed in internal documents. "There
is . . . a risk . . . there will be pressure . . . for treating the Declaration as
an authoritative definition of what human rights are at the present time."
Because of this risk there were internal suggestions to be careful about
what they agreed to include in the draft Declaration. The British fear was
also shared by New Zealand, Poland and the Union of South Africa. The
South African representative, E. H. Louw, wanted to be quite sure that
there would be no unforeseen legal or moral obligations after the
Declaration had been adopted. In his opinion, the Declaration had no legal
significance. He was afraid of the possibility that some might insist on
interpreting its provisions in the light of certain passages of the Charter and
41 E/CNA/AC.3/SR.4, p. 7. Minutes of 
the Fourth meeting of the US delegation to the third
regular session of the General Assembly, 24 September 1948, US(P)/A/M(Chr)/4;
Minutes of the Fifth meeting of the US delegation to the third regular session of the
General Assembly, 25 September 1948, US (P)/A/M(Chr)/5, and US Delegation
Decisions, 25 September 1948, box 60, US Mission to the United States, RG 84, NARA.
GAOR 3, p. 862. Eleanor Roosevelt, "General Assembly Adopts the Universal
Declaration," 751. In the United States there was some opposition to the International
Bil of Human Rights; see Holman, "Dangerous Implications" and "Human Rights on
Pink Paper."
42 E/CN./AC.1/SR.20, p. 6. GAOR 3, p. 876; 885; 873; OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 652 and
GAOR 3, p. 888; GAOR 3, p. 905; and OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 697 respectively.
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might likewise insist on the existence of legal obligations. This was exactly
the intention of those who considered the Declaration as legally binding.43
The position of Australia, with less internal or colonial problems, was not
consistent. While holding that the Declaration had no legally binding
character, representatives also referred to the Declaration as a definition of
the UN Charter' s reference to fundamental human rights. This was a point
of view generally held by those who gave the Declaration some sort of
legal value.44
Those opposed to the Declaration having any legal force underscored its
great moral force. The Mexican representative, Pablo Campos Ortiz, even
considered that a moralobligation was just as strong as a legal binding one.
Some of the delegates were afraid of being interpreted as under-estimating
the value of the document. This refers in particular to the representatives
of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and Canada who pointed out that the
Declaration was an extremely important document. The representative of
Canada, L. A. D. Stephens, declared that "(tJhat fine statement of principles
would certainly influence the course of legislation in States which
considered, or would consider themselves, bound by it." Similarly, the
USSR representative, Alexei P. Pavlov, did not agree that the Declaration
should be confined to pious wishes. It was not only an educational
document (as the UK representative had said), but must be a
recommendation, he argued. Even more important than the drafting of the
document was the genuine desire for cooperation in putting its principles
into practice. This high price of the Declaration was, however, mostly a
question of tactics, at least for some of them. UK' s Geoffrey Wilson for
instance maintained that "history had proved over a period of time the
effectiveness of such declarations as the US Bill of Rights and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man." But the British were never whole-
hearted defenders of a Declaration. Their strategy clearly reflected fear of
criticism.45
Those who stressed the authoritative character of the Declaration most
consistently - Chile, France and Lebanon - were represented by three of
43 Ormerod, Commonwealth Relations Office to Hebbelthwaite, Foreign Office, 1 May
1948, PRO, FO 371172805/UNE 1805; see also OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 697. OR-ECOSOC
7/3, pp. 646 (Poland) and 652 (New Zealand); GAOR-TC 3, p. 39 and GAOR 3, p. 911
(Union of South Africa).
44 OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 695; GAOR-TC 3, p. 55; GAOR 3, p. 876.
45 GAOR-TC 3, p. 668 (Mexico); E/CNA/SRA1, p. 5 and SR.49, p. 7-12 (USSR); OR-
ECOSOC 7/3, p. 655 (Canada); E/CNA/AC.lISR.29, p. 6, E/CNA/82/Add.9, p. 2 and
OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 697 (United Kingdom). OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 655.
E/CNA/AC.lISR.29, p. 6.
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the most energetic delegates in the Commission on Human Rights (Santa
Cruz, Cassin and Malik). All admitted that only the covenant would be
legally binding, but this probably was said partly for tactical reasons.
Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) called attention to the fact that the Declaration
merely stated rights granted by the Charter, and that violation by any state
of the rights enumerated in the Declaration would mean violation of the
principles of the UN. This was a legalobligation and those who did not
fulfil it were liable to the sanctions provided for in the Charter, or, at any
rate, to the moral censure of the world.46
René Cassin presented two conflicting views about the legal force of the
Declaration:
Some saw the Declaration purelyas a document interpreting the Charter
and therefore vested with the same mandatory force as the Charter itself.
Others saw it as a purely formal document, giving expression to a hope
of a rather limited moral influence, and of no legal value until its
principles had been embodied in one or several covenants.
The Frenchdelegation did not share either of those too strict and simple
views. The French Government believed that the Declaration, which
would in a sense be an explanation of human rights in existence before
the Charter, rights which it was incumbent upon the Members of the
United Nations to protect in accordance with the Charter, should to a
certain extent bear an assertive character. Even in the absence of any
Covenant, therefore, the principal organs of the United Nations would, in
the opinion of the French delegation, be entitled to take cognizance of the
fact if any State violated human rights. Moreover, there was legal
precedent to support that opinion, as appeared when the General
Assembly decided that the Indian complaint against the Union of South
Africa was within its competence.
The Declaration should not, however, be of a purely assertive charaeter.
It should be a guide and, by that function, introduce new conceptions. In
so far as it assumed the role of a guide, it would be required to make a
distinction between those obligations which applied to the United Nations
as a whole and those which applied to each particular nation.
The United Nations Organization was subject to the obligations imposed
by the General Assembly' s resolutions. In respect of the United Nations
as a whole, therefore, the mandatory force of the proposed Declaration
46 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 50 and 671 (Santa Cruz/Chile). E/CNA/SR.48, pp. 7-9; OR-ECOSOC
7/3, p. 648; GAOR-TC 3, p. 61 and GAOR 3, p. 865 (Cassin/rance). E/CN A/S R. 50,
p. 5 GAOR-TC 3, p. 51 and GAOR 3, pp. 188-192 (Malik/ebanon).
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would derive from the resolution the General Assembly might adopt on
it.
In respect of individual States, the new concepts which the Declaration
would contain, such as the right of nationality or the right of asylum,
would have only the value of a recommendation like the resolutions of the
General Assembly.
The French delegation, then, envisaged the Declaration as a document
shorter than the Covenant, without the legal value of a convention, but
which would have the function of keeping the fulle st possible list of
human rights in everybody's mind. (Italics added.t7
Perhaps it seems peculiar to classify France among those who gave the
Declaration some legal force, in particular because Cassin explicitly
dissociated himself with that position. It is nevertheless reasonable to
\
defend such an interpretation in the light of all his statements on the issue.
He c1early attached more importance to the Declaration than most of the
other delegates and later Cassin argued that it would be dangerous to tell
the peoples that the Declaration lacked full legal validity and merely was
a guiding beacon. The Declaration was a complement and a clarification of
the Charter and a basic instrument of the UN, having all the legal force of
such an instrument, he maintained. Moreover, during the drafting process
Cassin expressed clearer and clearer the legal value of the Declaration.
Thus, under the 1948 General Assembly, he maintained that the document
was an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter and therefore, he
concluded, human rights had become a part of positive internationallaw.
In addition to Chile, France, and Lebanon, some Latin American
countries, Denmark, and Belgium also expressed in different ways that they
regarded the Declaration a legally binding document. The Bolivian Anze
Matienzo regarded the draft as a new international constitution, whereby the
rights of states were limited in the interests of the rights of individuals, and
the representative hoped that the Declaration would become an integral part
of international law. He also saw its adoption as a new phase, which was
to lead to the establishment of a true international constitution, founded on
the limitation of the sovereignty of the states for the benefit of the
individuaL. Enrique C. Armand U gon, the representative of Uruguay, the
47 E/CNA/SR.48, pp. 7-9.
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Haitian representative, Emile Saint-Lot and Denmark, represented by Max
SØrensen expressed similar views.48
Belgium deserves special attention. Represented by Fernand Dehousse the
delegation had originally argued that the Declaration was not legally
binding. During the drafting process, the delegation, represented by both
Dehousse and Henry Carton de Wiart, modified its opinion. The Belgian
point of view now was that the Declaration would be communicated to
member states of the United Nations in the form of a recommendation of
the General Assembly. The authority of the General Assembly, the highest
organ of the UN, was based on the Charter. The General Assembly was a
juridical organ and any recommendation made by it had an undeniable legal
character. Admitting that legal binding or not was not a simple question.
The Belgian representative stated that the Declaration had both an
unprecedented moral value and contained a p otenti al legal status.49
The questions of national sovereignty, the interpretation of the Charter,
and the legal status of the Declaration were in fact three ways of discussing
the same question of whether the Declaration should be in any way legally
binding. Therefore, most of the UN members did not participate in all three
debates. Those who did had adopted consistent positions. The defence of
national sovereignty corresponded with the strong interpretation of the UN
Charter and with the objection of giving the Declaration any legal value -
and vice versa. ChIle, France and Lebanon were the leading forces among
those who saw the Declaration as binding. They got support from a lot of
smaller states, especially a number of Latin American countries. On the
other side there were the Great Powers, China and the United Kingdom and
the super-powers the United States and the USSR. The division between
small and Great Powers described by Malik was obvious. The same idea
was inherent in the Panamanian statement when its representative, M.
Amado, as a citizen of a small country, stated that it was the responsibility
of the Great Powers to draft a declaration that was not merely idealistic, but
would effectively guarantee the rights it proclaimed.50
What was the final legal status of the Declaration? A statement from the
Norwegian representative, Frede Castberg, answered this:
48 GAOR- TC 3, p. 43 (Panama); GAOR- TC 3, p. 42 and GAOR 3, p. 900 (Bolivia);
GAOR 3, p. 887 (Uruguay); GAOR- TC 3, p. 431 and GAOR 3, p. 853 (Haiti) and OR-
ECOSOC 7/3, p. 653 (Denmark).
49 E/CNA/SR.25, p. 6 and E/CNA/ACA/SR.2, p. 2. GAOR-TC 3, pp. 199-200 and GAOR
3, p. 800.
50 E/CNA/AC.2/SR.1, p. 4.
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While the declaration was designed to set moral standards rather than to
impose legal obligations, it would be of practical value, since it would
undoubtedly serve as a basis for the discussion in the United Nations of
any question of human rights.51
In the end, the Declaration was adopted with a variety of views on its legal
value. The following years have proved its value, in away which some
feared and other desired.
51 GAOR- Te 3, p. 35.
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5. The negotiations on the substance:
A minimum common denominator
In spite of their many differences, the members of the United Nations had
a common point of departure as well a common, ultimate goal. Hence, a
strong motivating factor was present during the drafting process. First, it
is remarkable that human rights had positive connotations for all the
participants in the drafting process. Of course they defined the concept in
different ways and had their own "favourite rights", but none of them
questioned the existence of human rights as such. All of them wanted to
present themselves as protagonists in the stf,uggle for such rights.
At the second session of the ECOSOC, Nikolai i. Feonov, the
representative of the USSR, spoke about human rights conditions in the
Soviet Union. Human rights were not only provided for in the Constitution,
but violation against the observance of human rights was punishable by
law. Charles Malik, the Lebanese representative during the entire drafting
proeess, declared that his country was deeply interested in the struggle for
freedom of thought and conscience, and had always been a haven for
persecuted minorities. He therefore welcomed the creation of an
international bill of rights. Alexandre Argyropoulos, the Greek
representative, emphasised that the Greek people had always fought for
human rights at all times and had made their contribution to the
development of those rights. The British representative, Charles Dukes
(later Lord Dukeston), presented the United Kingdom as a country which
had always been in the forefront in the struggle for human rights. He
argued that his government had always and everywhere fostered the
emancipation of the human person, along with the promotion of education
and of socIal and economic pro gress. In 1940, according to Charles Dukes,
the United Kingdom had been the sole champion of freedom against
tyranny , and the country would remain faithful to that ideaL. The list of
examples could go on and on. There was no shortage of high- flown
rhetoric. The participants seemed to compete for the honour of being the
most zealous human rights defender. They competed from start to end of
the drafting process. During the last months before the Declaration was
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adopted all of the delegations emphasized their great interest in human
rights work. 1
Second, the tas k of drafting a human rights bill must be seen in its
historical context. In a long term perspective, the drafters had in mind the
ideas of the French Revolution -liberty, equality and fraternity. These had
become global ideals on the last two centuries. The immediate experiences
seemed even more important. The World War Il experiences had a decisive
impact on the drafters. For most, perhaps all of them, human rights were
defined as those rights which had been violated so grossly by the Nazis and
the Fascists. The formulation in the preamble of the UN Charter, "to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights (italics addeâ)," also supports
such a view. Their alliance against a common enemy, Nazism or Fascism,
formed a definition of the concept of human rights. Human rights became
the antithesis of Nazism. As Juliusz Katz-Suchy, representative for Poland,
said: "(V)iolation of human rights and contempt of human dignity lay at the
very roots of fascist ideology." Although the Soviet representatives were the
most ardent opponents of N azism and Fascism, it was widely believed that
the best and most effective way to cure the evils of Nazism and Fascism
was to ensure basic freedoms.2
Third, the United Nations members had a common ground for
negotiations. There were the fundamental freedoms, proclaimed in 1941 by
the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. He enumerated
the four freedoms - freedom of speech and expression, freedom of
worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. These became the
banner which united all in the struggle against Nazism. After the war, these
four freedoms were recognized as a basis upon which the definition of the
concept of human rights could be built. Both Panama' s representative, Guy
Pérez Cisneros and Charles Malik, representing Lebanon, emphasized that
the declaration had be en directly inspired by the proclamation by President
Roosevelt of the four essential freedoms.3
F ourth, every participant publicly supported the decision to make a
declaration or some kind of a human rights document. This consensus also
OR-ECOSOC 2/1, p. 35-40.
2 Robinson, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 35 and Cassin, "Man and Modem
State," 43. OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 647; see also E/CNA/SR.28, p. 11; GAOR-TC 3, p. 435
and GAOR 3, p.857. E/CNA/SR.25, p. 9; E/CNA/AC.2/SR.8, p. 4; E/CNA/AC.lISR.21,
pp. 3 and 8; E/CNA/AC.lISR.26, pp. 6 and 11; E/CNA/AC.lISR.28, p. 3;
E/CNA/AC.lISR.32, pp. 7-10; E/CNA/SR.49, pp. 9-11; E/CNA/SR.74, p. 7;
E/CNA/SR.75, p. 10.
3 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 164 and 857. Several other delegations expressed similar views: Haiti,
Lebanon, Chile and Paraguay. See GAOR 3, pp. 853, 857, 863 and 901 respectively.
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created a common ground for negotiations. In the General Assembly 1948,
the representative of Venezuela, Eduardo Plaza, emphasized that "(p)revious
debates had shown a unanimous desire to draw up an international
instrument of definite value." Although some UN members were not very
enthusiastic about the text that was to be adopted, there was a reluctance
to be seen rejecting the declaration. None of those that expressed the
strongest criticism of the draft Declaration voted against the text. They
instead abstained on the final vote. Some like the United Kingdom may
have had serious objections but voted in favour because they feared
negative publicity.4
Moreover, it was difficult to withdraw from the drafting process after
first to have participated. A decision to leave the process would create
negative attention. It was important that the USSR representative at the
second session of the Commission participated substantially in the drafting
process. At earlier stages the USSR had reserved itself, and without any
real participation by the Soviets in the drafting process, it is difficult to
imagine an adoption of the Universal Declaration. By the participation,
however, the USSR bound itself to the on-going process.
Limits of the terms of reference
Despite the broad terms of reference, the possibilities were limited in the
content of the planned international bill of human rights. Some decisions
were explicitly or tacitly made in advance.
The United Nations had decided to make an "International Bill of Human
Rights" and had given the tas k to the Coinssion on Human Rights. The
terms of reference did not say anything about what was meant by "human
rights". Nowhere in the UN Charter were "human rights" or "fundamental
freedoms" defined. However, some conventional ideas helped. "Human
rights" were generally seen to include 1) the principle of non-
discrimination; 2) certain civil and political rights; 3) some social and
economic rights. Moreover, 4) there was a clear understanding that the
proposed bill had to be universaL. The different declarations which were the
basic material for the Coinssion on Human Rights were surprisingly
similar. Thus, in the single enumeration of rights there was a considerable
degree of agreement. 5
4 GAOR-TC 3, p. 53.
5 McKeon, "The Philosophie Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man,"
35.
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1) The principle of non-discrimination: The UN Charter (Art. 1, 13, 55
and 79) repeatedly stated that the projected. rights and freedoms were
subjected to "all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
The principle of equality or non-discrimination was established and
therefore almost beyond discussion. The representative of South Africa
caused strong reactions in the Third Cointtee when he maintained "that
not now or ever would certain people enjoy equal rights . . . and that
women could never have the same rights as men. ,,6
2) Civil and political rights: It was natural that the eighteenth century
civil and political rights should be included. Civil and political rights made
up the traditional interpretation of human rights. The difficulty was how to
express them. Because their inclusion were self-evident, none of the
representativ es found it necessary to give them any special attention to
ensure their position in the bill.
3) SocIal and economic rights: The inclusion of socIal and economic
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a novelty at that
time. It has been argued that this was a result of pressure from Eastern
Europe and the USSR in particular, but this is a myth. The myth may have
been created partly as a result of later political development. In the later
debates on the covenant(s), the Soviet bloc participated very actively in
discussions on the social and economic matters while the United States
sought to exclude economic rights from the binding document. During the
drafting phase of the Declaration, however, it appears that to include social
and economic rights was an uncontroversial decision tacitly agreed to
beforehand. Henri Laughier, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social
Affairs, opened the first meeting of the nuclear Coinssion on Human
Rights this way: 7
y ou wil have to show that the political rights are the first condition of
liberty but that today the progress of scientific and industri al civilization
has created economIc organizations which are inflicting on politically free
men intolerable servitude, and that therefore, in the future, the declaration
6 Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the US delegation to the third regular session of the
General Assembly, 14 October 1948, US(P)/A/(Chr)/15, box 60, US mission to the
United Nations, RG 84, NARA. However, the final text of the Universal Declaration
included astatement which some saw as an exception to the principle of non-
discrimination. Article 25,2 reads: Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care
and assistance.
7 See e.g. Alston, "Universal Declaration at 35," 61-62. Malik, Human Rights in the
United Nations, and Johnson, "Contribution of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt," 34.
E/HR/6, p. 2.
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of the rights of man must be extended to the economic and social fields.
(Italics added. J
Most of the draft declarations which were the basic material of the drafting
process were written during and after World War IL. All of them dealt with
the problem of socIal security. This was also the case for the four basic
drafts. SocIal and economic rights were also included in a draft bill of
human rights written by the American administration as early as in 1942.
From the very beginning of the drafting process, it was agreed to include
these rights in the Declaration. When John Humphrey, the Director of the
UN Division of Human Rights, gives himself the honour of introducing the
economic and socIal rights, he largely over-dramatizes his own role. Several
delegates had strongly argued for the inclusion of the economic and socIal
rights at the first session of the Commission of Human Rights, and
Humphrey had no alternative but to include those rights when preparing the
Secretariat Outline several months later. 
8
The most zealous defender of socIal and economic rights was Chile' s
representative, Hernan Santa Cruz. He argued that "if the Drafting
Cointtee did not introduce economic and socIal rights into the
Declaration, it would not appear to the world to be acting realistically." On
this occasion, he was supported by Eleanor Roosevelt, who pointed out that
the ECOSOC had laid stress on the inclusion of socIal and economic rights.
The representatives of the Philippine Republic, Belgium and France were
also among the supporters of socIal and econornc rights. Charles Romulo
of the Philippines added that "a traditional declaration of political rights
would be insufficient unless buttressed by a declaration of economic and
socIal rights." On several occasions and by different representatives,
Belgium desired to affirm the social and economic rights and welcomed
their inclusion. René Cassin "warned against the danger of placing too little
importance upon social rights." Later China, now represented by C. H. Wu,
also added its support declaring that without freedom from want, there
could be no question of human rights nor peace. Therepresentatives of the
USSR and Yugoslavia had promoted social and economic security in the
8 "Bil of Rights," draft approved 3 December 1942, box 2, Human Rights, Alger Hiss
Files 1940-46, NARA. Humphrey declares that: "It is by no means certain that the
economic and social rights would have been included in the final text if I had not
inc1uded them in mine," in Humphrey, Great Adventure, 32. See also Chapter 3.
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IECOSOC at an earlier stage, but did not participated veryactively on this
matter in the drafting process of the declaration.9
In the debate of the General Assembly before the adoption of the
Declaration, the delegations competed with each other to praise most highly
the socIal and economic rights. The representative of the Netherlands, J. H.
van Roijen, recognized the inclusion of social and economic rights as a
marked improvement compared to previous declarations. The New Zealand
delegation, represented by C. C. Aikran, noted with satisfaction the place
given to economic and social rights. He argued that those rights could giv e
the individual the normal conditions of life which would enable him to
experience greater freedom. Enrique V. Corominas from Argentina
maintained that social and economic rights should serve as a basis for the
whole declaration, and so on. Only the Union of South Africa expressed
criticism and argued the UN Charter had not intended to include these
rights. It this statement had any impact, it may have strengthened the others
in their opinion to include these rights, because South Africa was already
rather isolated.10
Apart from South Africa, even the most sceptical attitude to economic
and social rights did not imply any rejection. The United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, India and Lebanon were more or less ambiguous about
a detailed enumeration of these rights. They rather preferred to include
them in general terms. However, Australia held these rights as important as
civil and political rights and Lebanon referred to the lacunae in the League
of Nations, which had not recognized the economic and social rights. The
United Kingdom was apparently afraid that a high priority would be given
to these rights, but kept a low profile in the UN discussions on this issue.
This low profile was a part of its caution in matters which the Soviet Union
could use to criticize UK. The social standards in the British colonies was
a delicate subject. 11
9 E/CNA/AC.lISR.9, p. 10-11. GAOR, p. 868; see also E/CNA/SR.8, p. 2. E/CNA/SR.14,
p. 5; see also E/CNA/SR.8, p. 4 and GAOR-TC 3, p. 49 (Belgium); E/CNA/AC.3/SR.8,
p. 5 (China) and ECOSOC 2/1, pp. 35-36 (USSR) and 42 (Yugoslavia).
10 See e.g. GAOR 3, p. 874 (Netherlands); GAOR-TC 3, p. 504 and GAOR 3, p. 888 (New
Zealand) and GAOR-TC 3, p. 41. GAOR-TC 3, p. 45 and GAOR 3, p. 911
11 E/CNA/SR.50, p. 7; E/CNA/99; E/CNA/AC.lISR.9, p. 10. and GAOR 3, p. 876 and
OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 2. Some of them also opposed the inclusion of the social and
economic rights in a convention, arguing that they could not be defined as legal
obligations; E/CNA/21, p. 27. On the Australian position, see E/CNA/AC.lISR.29, p.
2; E/CNA/SR.71, p. 4; OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 2 and GAOR 3, pp. 875-76. Australia,
which was represented by a great variety of delegates, was not consistent. Usually, its
delegate warned against any impression of priority to social and economic rights, but one
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As noted, the Americans started out with a positive attitude towards
socIal and economic rights, a position which changed in the early i 950s.
It the US State Department was reluctant to include these rights in the
Declaration Eleanor Roosevelt persuaded them. The economic and social
rights in the Declaration were incorporated in more detailed terms than the
United States desired. The problem seems, however, not to have been the
inclusion of socIal and economic rights as such, but that some elements of
the American federal system fell within the jurisdiction of states. As
Eleanor Roosevelt explained after the adoption of the Declaration: 12
. . . (M)y government . . . does not consider that the economic and socIal
and cultural rights stated in the declaration imply an obligation on
governments to assure the enjoyment of these rights by direct
governmental action. . . . This in no way affects our whole-hearted
support for the basic principles of economic, socIal and cultural rights set
forth in these articles.
This reveals a real point of disagreement. When the representatives of the
USSR began to participate substantially in the debate on the question of
socIal and economic rights in the Commission on Human Rights, the
question of whether or not to include them was not on the agenda. The
Eastern bloc did not only want to include them. One of their arguments was
that the declaration in particular should ensure and guarantee the
implementation of the economic and social rights.13
A fourth limitation was that the Declaration was intended to be universaL.
This assumption was implied in the name of the planned project, an
international bill of human rights. It was never stated openly that one
fundamental principle was universality. The principle was widely accepted
of its representatives at one time argued that freedom from want had been widely
accepted in the world, that people were especially Interested in economIc and socIal
rights, and therefore, it was important to include them. Draft brief and brief for the UK
delegate to the third session of the Commission on Human Rights, PRO, FO 371/72806-
7/UNE 1987 and 2071; Wilson to Foreign Office, 15 lune 1948, PRO, FO
371/72809/UNE 2462.
12 It has been argued that the reference of Franklin D. Roosevelt to freedom from want was
interpreted in broader terms than the President intended. His main concern is said to
have been the United States traditional defence offree trade. (See lohnson, "Contribution
of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt," 20-22.) Lash, The Years Alone, p. 62 and van den
Heuval, "40th Anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 2. Pratt, 53 and
58. Eleanor Roosevelt, "General Assembly Adopts the Universal Declaration," 751.
13 E/800, pp. 30-31; OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 659;GAOR-TC 3, p. 498 and GAOR 3, p. 855.
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though with different interpretations. Universality was an argument to
defend or oppose several amendments.
The first interpretation of the principle of universality was a demand for
universal participation in the drafting process. From the very beginning of
the drafting process, it was emphasized that the membership in the
Commission on Human Rights should have an equitable geographic
distribution. René Cassin emphasized the value of gathering documents
concerning human rights from the whole world, not just from the Western
Hemisphere. The other members of the nuclear Coinssion supported
Cassin in his effort to gain the views of different regions. This view was
also confirmed later in the drafting process. The United Nations fulfilled
this aspiration of universality to a rather high degree. In spite of the many
colonies at that time, the participation of third world countries was
extensive. Chile, China, Cuba, India, Lebanon,Panama and the Philippines
were among those that most actively participated in the drafting process.14
The second interpretation of the principle of universality was the desire
to get the support and approval of the Declaration. Hoping to get universal
support for the human rights document, it was important to take care of the
interests of the different parts of the world. René Cassin strongly
emphasized the' importance of writing a Declaration of Human Rights
which any nation which might want to join the United Nations would have
to accept. It was therefore it was necessary to take into consideration the
great variety of views. The presupposition of universal support meant that
some special provisions had to be excluded. It was also essential that none
of the UN members withdrew from the drafting process. The support of the
USSR and its allies were given special care. As communists they
represented the alternative and minority ideology in the United Nations.1s
The third interpretation of the concept of universality was expressed by
the Chinese representative, Peng Chun Chang. He argued that "the principle
of human rights should be given universal application regardless of human
leveL." By the term "everyone", this principle linked the whole Declaration,
and this universal claim was not controversial, he said. The universal
validity of human rights was taken for granted. 16
14 E/HR/lO, p. 2. E/HR/13, p. 2. E/HR/I5, pp. 5-6 and E/HR/29, p. 3. E/CNA/SR.9, p. 2
and SR.LO, p. 5. See also Alston, "The Universal Declaration at 35," 61.
15 E/HR/13, p. 2.
16 E/CNA/SR.7, p. 4.
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Obstacles to the adoption of a Declaration
There were two categories of obstacles to the declaration. The first category
was the name-calling, the practice of criticizing concrete intern al conditions
of other states. The second was certain issues about which the actors in the
drafting process disagreed.
Accusations against concrete conditions within any particular states,
known as name-calling, was not an especially effective strategy in the
drafting process. Such accusations would easily disturb the possibilities for
an agreement. According to Humphrey, the drafting process of the
Declaration had very little name-calling. He describes the first session of
the Commission on Human Rights in this way:
The Cold War had already begun, and the difficulties which faced the
commission and all the uncertainties inherent in a new undertaking were
compounded by political controversy and recrimination. But politics
nevertheless played a secondary role in the early years and, by United
Nations standards, the commission performed its mandate well. Specific
instances of violations of human rights, real or alleged, were rarely
mentioned. Paradoxically, this was the proper approach at a time when the
commission was performing a quasi-Iegislative function. Too much name-
callng would have diverted us from the working in hand, and there were
other forums in the United Nations for the purpose. Mrs. Metha
nevertheless found an opportunity early in the session to mention the
treatment of Indians in South Africa.17
The Indian attack on the Republic of South.Africa was repeated many times
by the USSR representative, Alexei P. Pavlov, "the great name-caller". He
held the conditions for the Indians in South Africa and the negroes in the
United States as examples of discrimination by the law and contrasted this
with conditions in the USSR where, according to Pavlov, all citizens
enjoyed absolute equality and sixty nationalities lived side by side in peace.
Eleanor Roosevelt felt Pavlov "could be very thorough in seeking out
American weaknesses," e.g. by quoting old laws, and in such cases the
Americans were at a loss for an answer. In other cases, Mrs. Roosevelt
answered USSR criticism, in particular when Pavlov attacked social
conditions in the United States and compared them favourably to those of
the USSR.18
17 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 24.
18 E/CNA/SR.2, p. 3; E/CNA/AC.lISR.21, p. 3; E/CNA/SR.27, pp. 5-6; E/CNA/SR.49, p.
11 and GAOR-TC 3, p. 131. Roosevelt, Autobiography, pp. 311-12 and E/CNA/SR.37,
p. 6. Compare with E/CNA/SR.66, pp. 14-15.
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Alexei P. Pavlov also criticised the United Kingdom, especially Its
treatment of the colonies. The United Kingdom representative, Christopher
Mayhew, replied in a strong language:
Communism was one of the most cruel forms of political and economIc
dictatorship that the world had ever known. r. . . T)he fact that thousands
of democrats, socialists, peasant or trade union leaders, men who had
distinguished themselves in the struggle against fascism, were fleeing
from countries under communist control, was sufficient to reduce the
mountain of Soviet fairy-tales to nothingness. . . . Like hitlerite Germany,
the communist countries had a one-party Government. . . . It was never
possible for the people in communist countries to express their opinion. 
19
He also criticised the case of Soviet women who had maried British
subjects and who had been refused the right to accompany their husbands
to the UK. He "deplored the fact that the Third Cointtee was used by
some delegations as a platform from which to make tendentious accusations
for propaganda purposes against countries that did not share their ideology."
Then he attacked the existence of forced labour in the USSR.20
Pavlov answered by declaring that Mayhew had been the first to launch
the cold war which was being conducted against the Soviet Union in the
Third Cointtee. That attitude did not help the Committee' s work. He
compared Mayhew with Goebbels and also put Winston Churchill on the
list of fascists.21
These mutual accusations obviously did not improve the negotiation
climate. Several states protested, a criticism which they directed against the
USSR in particular. The Lebanese representative emphasized that the
Commission was not on a battlefield, and Chile's Hernan Santa Cruz
wondered aloud whether the Third Cointtee was receiving the
constructive participation in its work that it had a right to expect from a
great Power. The Mexican representative regretted the verbal duel between
the representative of the major Powers. "In spite of divergencies of ideas,
the Allies had achieved close collaboration which made victory possible.
It was that collaboration which had made it possible to draw up the Charter
at San Francisco; if the labours of the Third Committee were to be crowned
19 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 65-66. For Pavlov's criticism, see GAOR-TC 3, pp. 57-59 and 131.
20 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 159-60.
21 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 66-67 and 169-70.
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with success, such collaboration should govern the study of the declaration
of human rights."22
The creation of sub-commissions was one of the first signs of
controversies during the drafting. The tas k of establishing sub-commissions
on particular issues was a part of the mandate of the new Coinssion on
Human Rights. The nuclear Coinssion recommended a sub-cointtee on
Freedom of Information and (Freedom) of the Press. When the ECOSOC
discussed this recommendation, the representative of the USSR, Nikolai i.
Feonov, argued that Protection of Minorities and Elimination of
Discrimination were as important fields as Freedom of Information and of
the Press, and suggested the creation of two other sub-coinssions. This
may be interpreted as an attack on the US delegates who had been
preoccupied with the freedom of information and of the press. It also
indicates the political, ideological and rhetorical interests of the two super-
powers. The solution was three sub-coinssions: a sub-coinssion on
Freedom of Information and of the Press; a sub-commission on the
Protection of Minorities, and a sub-commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination. It was scarcely an accident that these issues were among
the most controversial ones in the further work on the Universal
Declaration.23
The issues of protection of minorities and the freedom of information
were highly controversial in the Coinssion on Human Rights as well as
within the United Nations as a whole. Elimination of discrimination seemed
less problematic; only the Union of South Africa openly opposed this
principle. The different interpretations of discrimination revealed important
disagreement on this point. 24
There were many controversies. Some were fundamental, but others
seemed only to be a question of taste. The drafting participants put different
emphasis on the freedom of the individual as distinct from the interests of
the state. Should the Declaration abolish death penalty or not? Should there
be any particular reference to non-self-governing territories (the colonial
22 E/CN.4/SR.51, p. 11 (Lebanon) and GAOR-TC 3, p. 147 (Chile). GAOR-TC 3, p. 163.
23 The ECOSOC had already established the Sub-Commssion on the Status of Women
subordinated to the CommIssion on Human Rights. This sub-commssion was given the
status of a full commIttee at the second session of ECOSOC; OR-ECOSOC 2/1, p. 405.
E/HR/16, pp. 3-4; E/38/Rev.1, p. 7 and OR-ECOSOC 2/1, p. 36. E/HR/2. OR-ECOSOC
2/1, p. 402. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 20. E/259, p. 18. The Commssion on Human
Rights decided to combine the two last mentioned sub-commIssions were combined in
one, which yet exists. ECOSOC abolished the Sub-Commssion on Preedom of
Information and of the Press in 1951.
24 A/C.3/275 and GAOR-TC 3, pp. 136-37.
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issue)? In which legal terms should rule of lawbe formulated? What about
the question of retroactivity of laws? W ould such a principle contradict the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials? How should human rights be justified? With
a reference to God or by reason or by other means? Should the Declaration
include an explicit reference to Nazism and Fascism? It so, how should
these concepts be defined? To what extent should the right to asylum be
granted?
The different interpretations of democracy represented another problem.
The discussion on family and marriage revealed deep-rooted cultural
differences on the equal rights of men and women. The delegates also had
different views on the limits of the freedoms of thought, religion,
expression, association, assembly and movement. The right to own property
was viewed differently within the various economic systems. The right to
work raised discussions on the questions of guaranteeing work and
protection against unemployment. Which standards of living was reasonable
and how should socIal security be interpreted? Should there be limits on
science? Should parents choose the kind of education for their children?
Which limitations should be set for the exercise of these rights? As these
questions illustrates, there was an abundance of matters for conflict.
Facilitating factors to adopt the Declaration
The process of achieving compromises depended on five types of
mechanisms. 1) The most extreme strategy was to reject problematic issues
by not including them in the Declaration at all. 2) Another strategy was the
general and diffus e expression of difficult questions. 3) The inclusion of
limitation clauses in the Declaration was also a factor which contributed to
acceptance of difficult matters. 4) The agreement to disagree on the
questions of foundation of the Declaration allowed possible compromises
of the human rights text. 5) Finally, crosscutting argumentative cleavages
simplified the process of achieving an agreement on the content.
1) Rejecting controversial issues
Particularly difficult and controversial issues could be handled by simply
not putting them on the agenda. Few questions were solved in this way.
This suggests a high degree of willingness to negotiate and find
compromises. The formulation of the right to work was one of the difficult
questions in the drafting process, but in spite of these controversies it was
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generally agreed that a Declaration without this article was
inconceivable.25
Some of the issues which were rejected were not proposed as complete
articles, but only as additional explanations to already existing draft articles.
The prohibition of abortion as an additional part of the article stating the
right to life was such a matter. This inclusion was introduced at the first
session of the Drafting Cointtee by the representatives of Lebanon and
Chile. Hernan Santa Cruz wanted to include that unborn children should
have the right to life, and Charles Malik suggested that the right to life be
declared to begin from the moment of conception. The practice of abortion
was allowed in some European countries, and prohibition was opposed by
representatives of the United Kingdom, the USSR, the United States, China,
Australia and France. René Cassin supported the substance of the
amendments, but argued that it would not be acceptable to all the UN
members. Others argued that such an inclusion was unnecessary, because
abortion was forbidden by law in their country. The Lebanese and Chile an
initiatives led nowhere. The discussion of the issue continued as far as the
drafting of a convention, but the question of abortion was left to national
law.26
A rather curious suggestion by René Cassin to include an article dealing
with a public force and declaring military service an honour was rejected.
The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia
argued that this was neither a right nor a freedom, and the issue was not
discussed further. 27
The right to own property was another issue which some of the
participants considered too difficult to agree upon. At an early stage, the
representativ es from Australia and the United Kingdom maintained that the
best solution was to eliminate any reference to property. The Chinese and
the Chile an representatives believed that omission of the article was a real
threat. Only at the very end was a compromise found.28
The right to petition was another article which from the beginning was
proposed to be included in the Declaration. René Cassin emphasized that
this right had been mentioned in all the historical declarations of the rights
25 GAOR- TC 3, p. 542.
26 E/CNA/21, Annex F, p. 74. The discussion on the question of abortion, see
E/CNA/SR.35, pp. 12-16; E/CNA/AC.1/SR.35, pp. 2-6 in particular, but also
E/CNA/AC.3/SR.l, p. 4-SR.2, p.2 and OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 656 and GAOR-TC 3, p.
111.
27 E/CNA/AC.l/W.2/Rev.l, Art. 28 and E/CNA/AC.1/SR.9, p. 3.
28 See E/CNA/AC.1/SR.8, p. 10 and E/CNA/AC.1/SR.38, pp. 2 and 5.
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of man and questioned whether the declaration could be considered as
complete without such a right. Cuba, Ecuador and Argentina also supported
this right, but most of the states - among them the USSR, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Belgium - were
occupied with the question of national sovereignty. The right to petition
was not formally rejected, but instead recommended to further examination
in connection with the study of the draft covenant and the measures of
implementation.29
The conflicting views were too strong to compromise on the essential
question of minorities. This problem was finally solved by rejecting the
article altogether, although many attempts were made to reach a
compromise. The protection of minorities was a rather controversial
question during the drafting process. The main division of the attitude
towards this issue was between the Western and the Eastern Hemisphere.
The Inter-American Conference in Chapultepec in 1945, which in other
respects proved to be an important incentive toward the adoption of the
Declaration, had stated that the existence of groups claiming minority status
was not desirable in America. Both Eleanor Roosevelt and several Latin
American representatives followed up by rejecting the view that the
minority question was an American problem. Their problem was how to
achieve their goal of asimilation of minorities. On the other hand, the
USSR and the other Eastern Europe countries, supported by Lebanon, saw
the protection of minorities as crucial. 30
Charles Malik described the problem of minorities as arising from two
different basic conceptions of the state. There was the uni-national, uni-
cultural state which incorporated various ethnic, racial, religious and
linguistic groups and practised a "melting-pot" policy, and there was the
multi-national, multi-cultural state which encouraged the development of
diversified groups and was best exemplified by the USSR. Malik
maintained that the United States and most countries of South America had
based their policy toward ethnic and cultural groups on the principle of
assimilation. The countries of Western Europe had been able to create fairly
homogenous States by the amalgamation and fusion of various ethnic and
29 See E/CNA/AC.1I3/Add.l, pp. 246-53 (art. 28); E/CNA/21, pp. 78-79 (art. 24) and
GAOR-TC 3, pp. 694-716 (Third Commttee debate).
30 The entire discussion of the minority question wil be found in the following documents:
E/CNA/AC.1I3/Add.l, pp. 380-86; E/CNA/AC. LISR. 15, pp. 5-6; E/CNA/AC.2/SR.9, p.
5; E/CNA/SR.40, pp. 16-17; E/CNA/85, pp. 47-48; E/CNA/SR.73, pp. 5-13 and SR.74,
pp. 2-6; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 588 and 717-36 and NC.3/307fRev.2. The US policy of
assimilation is clearly expressed in "Possible modes of dealing with minorities," 14
October 1943, box 3, American group at Dumbarton Oaks, Alger Hiss Files, 1940-46.
91
linguistic elements of the population. Malik held France as an outstanding
example of that homogeneity. He did not recognize the principle of
assimilation as applicable to many countries of Eastern Europe and Asia,
such as India. As a model, Malik referred to his own multi-religious
Lebanon which, according to him, had been exerting every effort to protect
the freedom of religious belief of its heterogenous population.31
At its first session, some of the members of the Coinssion on Human
Rights, India, Australia and the Philippines, had referred to the need of
protecting minorities. The inc1usion of such a provision was secured in the
first draft declarations, but agreement could not be reached to recommend
any article on this at any stage of the drafting process. The first session of
the Drafting Cointtee referred the matter to the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Then two
different texts were sent to the governments for comments. The first vote
on the topic was taken at the third session of the Coinssion. An article
on the protection of the minorities was rejected by 10 votes to 6. The vote
was not taken by a roll-call, but the supporters of this article were the
USSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and most likely the
Philippines. The USSR representative, Alexei P. Pavlov, recognized the
right of minorities to use their own language in schools as particularly
important.
Australia, China, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Uruguay proposed to delete the article. Their arguments varied.
Some of them argued that the problem did not exist in their parts of the
world (the United States, Uruguay), some hel d the minority groups to be
protected by other articles (Egypt, Belgium, India, Australia) and one
representative argued pragmatically, saying it would be too difficult to
satisfy all needs (Geoffrey Wilson, the United Kingdom). Some of the
Belgian resistance was connected with the use of irredentism by Hitler in
the pre-war years (the Sudetenland is the most well-known example). There
were German mInorities on Belgian soil. 32
The issue of minorities was reopened in the Third Committee. In addition
to the Eastern Europe countries, Denmark eagerly defended the protection
31 Lebanon was long an example of a stable, consociational democracy, but lately the
sItuation is totally changed. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 147-50.
32 E/CN.4/SR.73, p. 5-SR.74, p. 6. The French point of view seemed to be dependent of
the representative present at this stage. France was represented by Ordonneau at parts
of this session, not by René Cassin. At a previous stage, Cassin considered the article
about protection of the mInorities as one of the most important (E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.15, p.
6) and France had proposed its own text on this issue (E/CN.4/82/Add.8, p. 6).
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of minorities, as well as India and others. The American states continued
to be the strongest opponents of such an article. While they argued that the
problem did not concern them because of their policy of assimilation, they
still feared it would disrupt national unit y . As a result, the action for the
minorities led nowhere.33
2) General and vague formulations
Vague expressions of controversial and difficult issues was another way to
get a compromise. A short text could be chosen which did not have room
for any precise details. Moreover, there were always vague terms which
could be interpreted in different ways. Both strategi es were used.
Since the Declaration was given status as "a common standard of
achievement" and was not a law, it was not necessary to be precise. One
possible consequence was that states would be willing to accept an
ambitious text that was not legally binding document. The implementation
of the principles would be considered voluntary and the states did not have
to coint themselves.34
The preamble of the Declaration is the best example of the strategy of
adopting diffuse formulation. Egon Schwelb has quite rightly described as
deliberately obscure;
The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance. (Italics added.)35
Another illustration of the conscious use of vague language is the use of the
word "arbitrary". The word allows for individual judgment, which doubtless
was intended. Four of the articles of the Declaration use the word
"arbitrary":
33 Denmark' s special interest in the minority question was interlinked with the Danish
minority in Germany. "Danish amendment to Human Rights Declaration," 30 September
1948, US(P)/A/C.3/11, box 60, US Mission to the United Nations, RG 84, NARA.
34 Quoted from the preamble of the Declaration.
35 Alston, "Universal Declaration at 35," 61-62.
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No arbitrary arrest, detention or exIle. (Art.9.)
No arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence.
(Art.12.)
No arbitrary deprivation of nationality. (Art.15.)
No arbitrary deprivation of property. (Art.l?)
The sections on social and economic rights also contain some words which
clearly show the very general character of these articles. The text includes
for example the right to socIal security in accordance with the organization
and resources of each state (Art. 22); the right to just and favourable
conditions of work (Art. 23.1); the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection (Art. 23.3); the right to reasonable limitation of working hours
(Art. 24); the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including . . . (Art. 25). As with the term
arbitrary, these articles required judgment.
Another strategy was the selection of terms and concepts which the
drafters defined in different ways. The participants had a somewhat
ambiguous attitude towards this strategy. On the one hand, a reference to
Fascism and Nazism was rejected because of the difficulties in defining
these concepts. The French representative, Grumbach, pointed out the
danger of using expressions which could be interpreted differently. The
USSR and their allies regarded it essential to include an explicit reference
to Fascism and Nazism. Pavlov argued that without such a reference the
Declaration was a mere abstraction. This might give opportunity for the
propagation of Fascist and Nazi views. He declared that during the war
there was no need for any definition of Fasc'sm and N azism, but if it was
necessary now, it was not difficult. Fascism meant dictatorship,
imperialistic in its foreign policy and reactionary in its domestic policy.
This definition met opposition, e.g. by the representative of the United
Kingdom stating that the word "fascism" had lost its value. Churchill had,
after all, been called a fascist by a USSR representative.36
Similarly, the word "democracy" was included in the Declaration in spite
of the variety of interpretations. Interestingly, it was the USSR and its allies
that urged an inclusion of "democracy" in the text. Opposition or
scepticism was expressed by the United Kingdom, India, Chile, China and
Belgium. Representatives of these countries argued that the concept had
36 The discussion on the concepts of 
"Nazism"/"Fascism", see E/CNA/AC.lISR.21, pp. 3-7;
E/CN.4/SR.49, p. 10; OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 698; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 67, 415 and 426.
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come to have different meanings in different countries for instance, the
United Kingdom did not want to allow the right to vote "in certain
backward countries." Some delegates also criticized the Soviet conception
of democracy. The USSR representative, Pavlov, defined a democracy as
a state in which all citizens had an equal right to participate in the
government, and he denied that the existence of a number of parties was
a critèrion of democracy. The actual term, however, was only mentioned
once, namely "the general welfare in a democratic society" (Art. 29.2).
Political rights were expressed in Article 21 without using the term
"democracy". Instead the right to democracy was defined as a minimum
common denominator:37
i. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The wil of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this wil shall be express ed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
This final wording conformed to a considerable extent to the Soviet
proposal, and its delegation was very satisfied.
Given the varying economic systems in the different countries, the right
to own property was a delicate question in the drafting process. The
participants were fully aware of the difficulties, and the representatives of
Chile, France, the USSR and China emphasized that an agreement could
only be a result of compromise and an abstract formulation. The later
Convention did not achieve any agreement on such an expression and
omitted the entire issue. The drafters of the Declaration managed to adopt
a very general text (Article 17):38
i. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
This formulation said so little that everybody could agree with it. At the
same time, it allowed each participant to re ad what he wanted into it.
37 The discussions on the concept of "democracy", see E/CN.4/SR.49, pp. 9-11; SR.51, pp.
2-11; A/C.3/296/Rev.1 and GAOR-TC 3, p. 473. Memorandum by 1. P. Hendrick, 13
February 1947, box 103, US Delegation to the United Nations, RG 84, NARA.
38 E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.8, pp. 9-10; E/CN.4/AC.2/SR.8, pp. 2-3 and E/CN.4/SR.38, pp. 2-3.
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An interesting case of general formulation is the article on family and
mariage (Article 16). The question of divorce is especially important. One
of the intentions of the article was to secure equal rights for men and
women in marriage. This of course also raised the question of divorce. The
problem was that the Catholic Church did not accept divorce and neither
did many of the Catholic countries. They could not accept any statement
which implied that the United Nations approved such a "disrupting factor"
on the same footing as marriage. Among the drafters there was also a desire
to protect the economically weaker partner in case of divorce. The
compromise was a general formulation: "Theyare entitled to equal rights
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution." They avoided any
explicit mention of divorce. For the marriage could also be dissolved by
death.39
At the third session of the Coinssion René Cassin rightly pointed out
that there were two tendencies in the Coinssion concerning the length of
the document. Some tried to shorten the text of the Declaration as much as
possible, others added a lot of details. The attempt to draft a short text was
also a way of making it general and vague. The United States was the
strongest supporter of this tendency, supported by China, the United
Kingdom and India.40
3) Limitation clauses
Another way to deal with controversial matters to achieve compromises was
the explicit use of limiting clauses. These clauses either limited a right in
a defined area or gave a general limitation which then could be given a
wide or a narrow interpretation, according to the wishes of the individual
state.
The USSR used this strategy frequently by proposing clauses such as "in
accordance with the law of the state/country." This was in particular the
case regarding freedom rights. Alexei P. Pavlov argued that the freedom of
information, the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly had
to be limited because of the danger of Fascist propaganda and war-mongers.
He maintained that freedom of thought and religion had to be limited
because many "superstitions" were incompatible with national laws and
public morality. These forms of belief were also dangerous for the moral
39 A/C.31287; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 363-79 and A/C.3/400/Rev.l, p. 128.
40 See E/CNA/SR.55, p. 16; E/CNA/36 and 36/Add.l; E/CNA/82/Rev.l, pp. 18-20;
E/CNA/95, pp. 14-15; E/CNA/102 and E/CNA/99.
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education\Qf youth, health and for respect for others. Even more important,
some religious practices represented a real danger for society, a point
supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Pavlov also wanted to limit the
freedom of movement because he hel d this matter to be within domestic
jurisdiction. Nor could anyone leave his country without consideration of
"the higher interests of his homeland." None of these suggested inclusions
of the phrase "according to the laws of the state" were adopted. The final
Declaration had a similar expression in only one instance, "the right to be
presumed innocent until prove d guilty according to law." (Italics added.)
(Art. 11.)41
One article, however, received a clear limitation clause, the right to seek
asylum (Art.14). This right was already included in the first drafts, but the
limitation was introduced by the Drafting Group at the second session of
the Commission. The limitation applied to criminals, in particular war-
criminals. The French proposal was very similar to the final wording:42
This right (to seek and enjoy asylum) may not be invoked in the case of
prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. (Italics
added.) (Art. 14.2.)
At the third session of the Commission on Human Rights a move to delete
this limitation c1ause was narrowly defeated. The USSR and their allies
were most zealous defenders of such a limitation, while India, the United
Kingdom, China and the Philippines preferred the article formulated in
general terms.43 During the considerations of the Third Cointtee, this
clause was strongly supported. Both the Polish and the French
representatives criticized the Latin American countries for giving asylum
to Nazi war criminals.
From the very beginning of the drafting process, every draft had included
alimiting article. "The rights of others" was the limitation most used in the
41 E/CNA/AC.1/SR.32, pp. 7 and 10 and SR.44, p. 3; E/CNA/SR.49, p. 12; SR. 60, p. 7;
SR.61, p. 7 and SR. 63, p. 2; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 391 and 408; GAOR 3, p. 855 and
E/800, pp. 31-35. Egypt and Saudi Arabia's main reason for limiting religious freedom
was that Islam did not permt the freedom to change religion, an interpretation which
Pakistan challenged; see GAOR-TC 3, p. 392 and GAOR 3, pp. 890 and 912.
E/CNA/AC.1/SR.21, p. 3 and E/CNA/SR.55, p. 7.
42 E/CNA/AC.1/3, Art. 34; E/CNA/21, Annex F, Art. 14; E/CNA/57, Art. 14; E/600, p. 16,
Art. 11 and E/CN/AC.2/SR.5, pp. 5-6. The French proposal, see E/CNA/82, Add.8, Art.
10.
43 E/CNA/SR.56, pp. 7-12 and SR.57, pp. 2-11. GAOR-TC 3, pp. 341-42.
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early drafts. Later "the requirement of the democratic state" was added as
a limiting clause. The reference to "morality and public order" was
inc1uded in the last part of the third session of the Commission, submitted
by Egypt after consultations with the representatives of France and the
United Kingdom. The Uruguayan representative, Fontaina, objected to the
expression "public order". He argued that many crimes had been committed
in the name of public order, and the Lebanese representative supported him.
However, such an expression was adopted, very similar to the final text,
which reads:45
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society. (Art. 29.2.)
In the General Assembly, the representatives of Uruguay and France feared
that this article should give rise to arbitrary acts, and the Netherlands
wanted this clause as narow as possible. Also the United Kingdom, Greece
and Lebanon were aware that this article opened a door to abuses by the
state, but nevertheless, the article finally was adopted with only one
abstention. 46
However, according to Art. 29.3: "These rights and freedoms may in no
case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations," and, according to Art. 30: "Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein." Thus, the Declaration included a
counterweight to a too broad an interpretation of the general limitation
clause in Article 29.2.
4) No philosophical justification?
Several scholars have rightly maintained that natural rights philosophy has
inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The very ide a of the
declaration challenges the legal positivism which only holds positive law
as normatively binding. The drafters were inspired by several sources, and
45 E/CNA/57, Art. 2 see also E/CNA/AC.V3, Art. 2 and E/CNAI21, Annex F, p. 73, Art.
4. E/CNA/SR.74, p. 11-15.
46 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 643; 645; 647; 649; 651 and 664.
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the final formulation of the basic, first article of the Declaration was a
compromise in many ways:47
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood.
A somewhat similar article was introduced by René Cassin at the first
session of the Drafting Cointtee as a part of his revision of the
Secretariat Outline:
All men, being members of one family are free, possess equal dignity and
rights, and shall reg ard each other as brothers.48
The changes from the first draft to the final text seem less extensive than
for many other articles, but required considerable drafting. The different
philosophical views, or "the fundamental conflict of ideologies" which the
articles touche d on, are clearly shown in a commentary produced by
UNESCO at the time. In spite of the Coinssion's rejection of this report,
the UN members chose the strategy recommended by the report:
We agree about the rights but on the condition that no one asks us why.
. . . In the field of practical conclusions, . . . agreement on a joint
declaration is possib1e, given an approach pragmatie rather than
theoreti c aL. ,,49
The fact that an agreement on the Declaration finally was reached, was due
largely to the rejection of giving religious or phIlosophical justifications to
human rights.
The most persistent attempt to include the source of human rights in the
Declaration came from those who wanted a reference to God as the Creator.
This opinion was first set forth in the seventh session of the ECOSOC by
the representative of the Netherlands, and Canada gave its support. During
47 Morsink, "Philosophy of Universal Declaration" and Donnelly, "Human Rights and
Human Dignity" and "Human Rights as Natural Rights."
48 Lindholm, "Article One: A New Beginning?" 4.
49 Maritain, "Introduction," 9 and i l. See also d' Entrèves, Natural Law, 114. The
Commssion on Human Rights rejection of the UNESCO report seems to have been a
result of territorial rivalry between the two bodies; see Samnøy, Human Rights as
International Consensus, (thesis) 74-75 and 80-82; Lindholm, "Article One: A New
Beginning," 36-38 and E/CN.4/SR. 26, pp. 11-17.
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the Third Cointtee' s examination of the Declaration, some Latin
American states - Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Bolivia - were warm
defenders of a reference to the human beings as created in the image and
likeness of God. Augusto Rarnrez Moreno, representing Colombia, also
suggested that a reference to God could be interpreted by each country in
accordance with its religious belief. Realizing the difficulties such an
inclusion encountered, L. J. C. Beaufort, the representative of the
Netherlands, later recommended to withdraw the reference to God, only
later to amend it again in the preamble. His curious argument was that
those who were agnostics or atheists could simply ignore this amendment.
This argument caused a Polish reprimand on the danger of applying such
a reason to any part of the declaration, since it could also be applied to
other parts.50
There was another problem. The draft article read "endowed by nature
with reason and conscience." The clause "by nature" was interpreted by
some as distinct from, and even a rejection of, God. As a compromise, the
Belgian representative, Henry Carton de Wiart, suggested to delete the
ambiguous words "by nature" , a proposal which was adopted by a great
majority. "That measure would obviate any theological question, which
could not and should not be raised in a declaration designed to be
universally applicable," as the Chinese representative put it. The decision
expressed an intended renunciation by the General Assembly of the pure
ideas of natural right as a philosophical foundation of the Declaration. Still,
some of the delegates found sufficient naturallaw heritage to judge the text
acceptable.5l
The text of Article 1 was a minimum common denominator for the
philosophy on human rights of the UN members. Article 1 represented a
typical case of what John Rawls terme d an overlapping consensus. This
was possible because the participants managed to hold their divergent views
outside the debates. They agreed to disagree on these philosophical matters
50 OR-ECOSOC 7/3, pp. 644 and 655. In the Third Committee, the representative of Brazil
proposed an amendment to article 1 (A/C.3/243) and was supported by several other
Latin Americans. See GAOR- TC 3, pp. 55, 109, 112 and 113. The Netherlands'
initiative, see A/C.3/314/Rev.1 and GAOR-TC 3, pp. 755 and 776. The representative
of the Netherlands was a clergyman. See Castberg, Minner, p. 145. GAOR-TC 3, p. 762.
51 E/CNA/95. GAOR- TC 3, pp. 90-126, in particular pp. 96, 98, 101, 111, 114, 117-19 and
125. P. C. Chang (China) supported the Belgian proposal; GAOR- TC 3, p. 98.
Lindholm: "Article One: A New Beginning" and Castberg, Minner, 144-145. Cf.
Meighen, Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Democratie Representative, 32.
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in order to attain a practical goal, the adoption of the Universal
Declaration.52
5) Crosscutting cleavages
The effect of socIal and political crosscutting cleavages to produce
moderation and political stability is an important idea in modern political
science. Crosscutting cleavages in arguments, it seemed, produced
moderation and contributed to solutions that made it easier to achieve an
agreement on the con tent. Those who were opponents in one case could be
allies in the next. 53
The East-West ,conflict was only one among many others that affected
the drafting process. According to Humphrey:
There was much controversy but it was usually pertinent to the issues in
debate. Although these issues were most sharply drawn in exchanges
between the spokesmen of the traditional democracies and those of the
new "popular democracies", it would be an oversimplification to think
that the ideological debate was carried on only between communists and
noncommunists. There were also sharp differences between the spokesmen
for traditional democracy. 54
For instance, Charles Malik advocated nearly unrestricted individualliberty.
He also argued that man needed protection against the new form of tyranny
exercised by the masses and the state. He saw the human person as more
important than the racIal, national or other group to which he may belong.
The USSR representative opposed it. The most powerful attack came from
the representative of the United Kingdom, Charles Dukes (later Lord
Dukeston), who believed it was impossible in an organized society to
prevent groups from exercising a certain pressure upon individuals.
According to Dukes, that was the price which had to be paid for freedom
of association. He saw it as useless to try to define the liberties of the
individual without taking into account his obligations towards the state or
benevolent organisations. The conflict between Pavlov and Malik was not
surprising in view of their ideological orientations. More interesting is the
criticism by the UK representative of Malik, usually a close ally, and the
52 See Rawls, "Idea of Overlapping Consensus."
53 See e.g. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies.
54 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 25.
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defense of views close to the Soviets. In this case the traditional opponents
were allies and, thus, clearly illustrate the crosscutting cleavages in
argument. The Netherlands expressed an intermediate view, emphasizing
that the rights of the individual were not absolute. It was necessary to
define the restrictions on individualliberty with reference to the rights of
other individuals.55
The confrontation between the representatives of Poland and New
Zealand went along unexpected lines. Freedom of the individual was the
over-arching theme. New Zealand opposed the right to choose whether or
not to join a trade union. Poland attacked compulsory membership in a
trade union. The Polish view won through. (Art. 20.2 and 2304.)56
The conflict over whom shall control education did not follow the
conventional form. Early in the drafting process, the USSR representative
had stressed the role played by the state in all levels of education. When
the third session of the Coinssion discussed the relevant article, Malik
feared that the word "compulsory" connected to education could be
interpreted as depriving the parents of their right to choose the appropriate
education for their children. His interpretation was rejected. He nevertheless
suggested a reference to the rights of parents in this matter. Cassin pointed
out that there were two trends regarding the system of education. He
refused to refer either to the right of the state or to the right of the family.
Most of the other members of the Coinssion also held Malik' s
amendment to be unnecessary, and it was rejected.57
But the last word had not yet been said. In the ECOSOC, Brazil stressed
parental authority over their min or children ineducation. And when the
issue was examined in the Third Cointtee, Lebanon as well as the
N etherlands proposed amendments to this effect, with support from
Colombia, Pakistan, Ecuador and Belgium. The Netherlands withdrew their
amendment in favour of the Lebanese one. The vote was taken by roll-call.
This is a perfect example of the changing alliances during the drafting
process. In the end, the Lebanese amendment was adopted by 17 votes to
13, with 7 abstentions. The positions were as follows: Infavour: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, India,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Pakstan, New Zealand, Paraguay,
55 E/CNA/SR9, p. 3 and E/CNA/SR14, pp. 3-4; see also E/CNA/AC.l/SR21, p. 6.
E/CNA/SR14, pp. 4-5. The Soviet-Lebanese confrontation, see E/CNA/AC.l/SR21, p.
3-6.
56 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 518 and 521. A New Zealand law from 1936 declared employment of
non-union members ilegaL.
57 E/CNA/SR8, p. 4; SR67, pp. 14-18 and SR68, pp. 2-11.
102
PhIlippines, Sweden. Against: Afghanistan, Byelorussia, Ecuador, France,
Mexico, Poland, Ukaine, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Abstaining: Canada, China, Czechoslovakia,
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, Turkey. 58
The attempt to include a reference to God yielded a similar division, but
the roles as winners and losers had changed. Lebanon, Netherlands, Brazil,
Argentina, Colombia and Bolivia supported an inclusion of "God", but the
other participants rejected it. The question of abortion produced a division
between Lebanon and Chile on the one hand and on the other hand the
United Kingdom, the USSR, the United States, France, China and
Australia.59
Alliances followed lines other than the cold war divide. This was also the
case with respect to the right to petition. While France, Cuba, Ecuador and
Argentina defended such an article, opposition was strong from the USSR,
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and
Belgium. A paralleI situation occurred when a few representatives
suggested to grant the right to asylum. The strongest protests were
expressed by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.
Regarding the possible inclusion of the terms "Fascism"/"Nazism" and
"democracy", the East- West division prevailed. The USSR and its allies
were strongest opposed by the United Kingdom, France, Chile and some
other Latin American states.60
The article dealing with the right to work caused much debate, at least
in the Third Cointtee. This was an important issue for the USSR, which
wanted to obligate the state to provide work and to secure a high degree of
security in the event of unemployment. On the other hand, the United
States preferred a short and general article. The USSR proposals met with
much sympathy from European and Latin American states. In the end, only
the representative of the United States voted against it. 61
An interesting alliance appeared towards the end of the Third Committee.
It was a division that foreshadowed the coming years in the United Nations
when the USSR and the other socialist countries together with numerous
Third World constituted a majority. Yugoslavia proposed an inclusion
which declared that all the rights in the Declaration applied to persons in
independent and non-self-governing areas as well. The suggestion was
58 OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 646; A/C.3/302; GAOR-TC 3, pp. 45, 584, 589, 594 and 599.
59 E/CNA/SR.37, p. 11 and E/CNA/AC.1/SR.38, p. 8.
60 E/CNA/AC.1/SR.36, pp. 7-16 and SR.37, pp. 8-14.
61 See GAOR-TC 3, pp. 516-54 and 680-89.
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obviously an attack on the colonial powers. The amendment was adopted
with a narrow majority (16-14).62
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
On the evening of 10 December 1948, just before midnight, the United
Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Forty-eight
states voted in favour and eight abstained. The abstaining votes were the
socialist states, the USSR, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Y ugoslavia, and, in addition, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.63
Statements made by the UN members on this occasion giv e an
impression of a massive support for the Declaration. The President of the
General Assembly, Herbert Evatt (Australia), has later described how a real
enthusiasm gripped all the members. That is evident by the abundance of
praise. The events was characterised as "the most important document of
the century" (Ecuador), "a world milestone in the long struggle for human
rights" (France), "a decisive stage in the process of uniting a divided
world" (Haiti), "an epoch-making event" (Pakistan) and "a justification of
the very existence of the United Nations" (the Philippines). Appreciation
was also expressed by those who abstained in the final vote of the
Declaration. The USSR considered the document as containing many
positive elements, and in connection with the adoption of the right to
democracy, the USSR representative considered it as "one of the all too
rare cases when the Third Committee had adopted progressive ideas. The
conciliatory spirit manifested on that occasion was very encouraging.,,64
The universal character of the Declaration was also greatly appreciated.
Charles Romulo, representing the Republic of Philippines, described the
Declaration as the first document in history which, from a truly universal
standpoint, defined the basic rights and the fundamental freedoms to which
62 A/C. 3/307 /Rev.2. The USSR had set forth a similar proposal for inclusion in the
preamble.A/C.3/314/Rev.1. GAOR-TC 3, pp. 740-46. In favour: Byelorussia,
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Iran, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia. Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, France, Honduras, Netherlands,
Paraguay, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil,
Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Uruguay, Venezuela.
63 GAOR 3, p. 933. Honduras and Yemen were not present.
64 Evatt, Task of Nations, 115. GAOR-TC 3, p. 36 (Ecuador); GAOR 3, pp. 864 (France);
852 (Haiti); 889 (Pakistan) and 867 (the Philippines). GAOR 3, p. 923 and GAOR-TC
3, p. 473.
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all men were entitled. The Paraguayan view, expressed by Carlos A.
Vasconcellos, was that the Declaration was the most universal that had so
far been achieved. Emile Saint-Lot from Haiti praised65
. . . a declaration of human rights which, for the first time, was to be
universal in scope (and in spite of) rival ideologies confronting each other,
the United Nations representatives had sought out, among old-established
and recent political, economic, social and cultural rights, formulas which
might be acceptable to men from the four corners of the earth. The text
of the draft declaration represented a kind of common denoinnator for
those various ideas. It was perhaps not perfeet, but it was the greatest
effort yet made by mankind to give society new legal and moral
foundations; it thus marked a decisive stage in the proeess of uniting a
di vided world.
New Zealand's representative, C. C. Aikman, and France' Cassin also
praised the universal aspects of the Declaration. The representative of Saudi
Arabia, Jamil M. Baroody, however, was more ambiguous. He stated that
the Declaration was based largely on Western patterns of culture, which
were frequently at variance with the cultural patterns of Eastern states. That
did not mean, however, that there was any antagonism between the two.
Some weeks later he strongly defended the provisions on socIal rights,
declaring that socIal security was arecent historical development in
Western society, but old in Islam. He assumed of course that social rights
in the text were drawn mostly from non-Western values.66
The claim of the Declaration to be universal was more difficult. The
freedom of belief also included freedom to change religion. The
representatives of Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Egypt pointed out this
problem. The representative of Pakistan, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan,
argued - by quoting the Koran - that Islam recognized the right of
conversion. Because of the difficult point Saudi Arabia chose to abstain on
the final vote. South Africa objected to the Declaration text because of its
broad universality. The Declaration went beyond what South Africa
considered to be generally accepted rights. South Africa was in particular
sceptical about the inclusion of social and economic rights, while the USSR
65 GAOR 3, pp. 867-68 (Philippines); p. 901 (Paraguay); pp. 853-54 (Haiti); p. 888 (New
Zealand); p. 866 and OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 649 (France). GAOR 3, pp. 853-54.
66 GAOR-TC 3, p. 49 and 515.
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and the other socialist states attacked the text for not guaranteeing these
rights and for not being sufficiently democratic.67
Even those who voted for the Declaration had objections. Almost every
delegation in the general debates pointed out omissions and shortcomings
of the text. The Declaration clearly appeared to be a compromise. In the
words of the Brazilian representative:
The draft dec1aration did not reflect the particular point of view of any
one people or any one group of peoples. Neither was it the expression of
any particular political doctrine or philosophical system. It was the res ult
of the intellectual and moral co-operation of a large number of nations;
that explained its value and interest and also conferred upon it great moral
authority.68
67 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 392 (Saudi Arabia) and 884 (Afghanistan) and GAOR 3, p. 912
(Egypt). GAOR 3, p. 890 (Pakstan). The Islamic or rather Muslim fundamentalist
objections against the Dec1aration or the idea of human rights resurfaced when Khomeini
seized power in Iran in 1979. See Gellner, "Human Rights and New Circle of Equity."
GAOR-TC 3, p. 39 (South Africa). GAOR-TC 3, pp. 46-47 and 58-59 and GAOR 3, pp.
880, 882, 896, 913 and 923.
68 GAOR 3, p. 878.
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6. A struggle against time
In J anuary 1947, the Coinssion on Human Rights had started to draft the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Less than two years later, by
December 1948, the Declaration had passed all the procedural hurdles in
the United Nations and was adopted by the General Assembly. It was a
remarkable feat. The time from the beginning to adoption of the
Declaration was unusually short compared to other international human
rights documents. One reason, perhaps, was a growing awareness in the
United Nations that if the dec1aration were not adopted then, it could never
be. This certainly seems, in retrospect, to be right. Formulating the
declaration was a "task that would have been inconceivable at any other
period in history."l
The importanee of time
Three factors show the value of the timelyand speedy adoption of the
Declaration: 1) The horrors of World War Il were becoming less vivid; 2)
the Cold War intensified; and 3) the question of self-determination became
increasingly sensitive. The pressure of expectations also helped to accelerate
the drafting process. The actors were aware of the pressure of expectations
and the fading memory of the war. The relatively strong international
interest in human rights in the late 1940s, and especially its high priority
on the UN agenda, was a direct result of World War IL. However, the effect
of the war would decreasewith the passing of time. In 1952 Charles Malik,
then chairman of the Coinssion on Human Rights, described the general
circumstances of the Coinssion's work in this way:
Now, the troubled world situation has been with us for a number of years,
but the more we are removed in time from the original moral indignation
evoked by the Second Wodd War in favour of man and his freedoms, the
Hessel, "Remarks," 21. See also Alston, "Third Generation of Solidarity Rights," 321.
Also contemporary observers recognized the rapid drafting process of the Declaration,
see Hendrick, International Bil of Human Rights, 14.
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more the questions of war and peaee east their pall upon the reality of our
w ork. 2
Competing political developments and events emerged on the international
agenda. The issues important by the end of World War Il seemed not so
important any longer. The drafting of the declaration of human rights was
a struggle against time and the erosion of memory.
As the Human Rights Declaration was taking shape, the beginning of the
Cold War crowded out the already fading memories of W orld War Il. Many
hoped that cooperation between East and West on concrete issues could still
be possible. The deepening tension during the latter part of the 1940s
between the Soviet Union and its former wartime allies made this difficult.
While less contentious than other issues dividing the large powers, the
Human Rights Declaration was also affected. The drafting process, it will
be recalled, started in J anuary 1947, about half a year after Churchill
recognised the Cold War division of Europe in his "Iron Curtain" -speech.
Work on the Declaration was continued in the shadow of the Berlin crisis
and the communist coup d etat in Czechoslovakia. Probably the single most
formative event of the Cold War, the Prague coup to ok place in February
1948, when the Declaration was still several months from its final adoption.
At the third session of the Coinssion on Human Rights (May-June) the
deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union
was clearly evident. The pace of mutual criticism increased. When the third
session of the General Assembly was convened in Paris during the autumn
of 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt gave a speech at Sorbonne. In this speech she
stated that there was "a fundamental difference in the conception of human
rights" as it exists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in the other
UN member states.3
Another increasingly controversial issue was the self-determination of
peoples, which in particular affected the colonies in Africa and Asia. This
question was only just mentioned in the debates during the drafting of the
declaration, but it became a major and controversial issue on the UN
agenda in the subsequent human rights debates. Malik describes the
question of self-determination as the most complicated issue at the
Coinssion's eighth session in 1952. From the forth session of the General
2 Malik, Human Rights in United Nations, 2.
3 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 53 and Eleanor Roosevelt, Autobiography, 313. "The
struggle for human rights," 28 September 1948, Research project 87: American Soviet
relations, Research Reports of the Foreign Policy Studies Branch, Division of Historical
Policy Research, RG 59, NARA.
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Assembly (1949) this question, connected with other colonial issues,
constituted a considerable part of the human rights issues voted upon. From
this perspective, "(iJt was something of a miracle that the great General
Assembly debate on the Declaration took place in 1948," as Humphrey
declares. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was only one of
three parts in the forthcoming International Bill of Human Rights, several
delegations wanted them to be adopted at the same time and to this end
proposed a delay of the Declaration. It this procedure had been adopted, the
Declaration would have been affected by the controversies over self-
determination. Such was the fate of the covenants. They were not adopted
until 1966 (and not ratified until ten years thereafter).4
Pressure of expectations
The enormous pressure of expectations which was directed at the United
N ations in general and the Coinssion on Human Rights in particular
çaused the process of drafting to be hurried. The adoption of a declaration
of human rights became some kind of a litmus test of the effectiveness of
the United Nations. The UN members were full y aware of this. As the
Cuban representative said at the beginning of the first session of the
General Assembly:
All through the war that brought into existence the United Nations, it has
been repeatedly said by our great leaders that the victory would lead us
into a new world organization based on justice and on law; and if that is
true, now that victory has been won and the United Nations has come into
existence, carrying the expectations of the whole world, we need to tell
that world that we have not forgotten the promises that were made in San
Francisco, and that though there are urgent matters that wil require our
attention in the days to come, from the very beginning the United Nations
stands by its obligations, and that we are going to establish those human
rights and those rights of nations.5
When Henri Laughier, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social
Affairs, opened the first meeting of the nuclear Coinssion on Human
4 Malik, Human Rights in the United Nations, 5-7. Rowe, "Human Rights Issues in United
Nations," 426. Rowe's table shows the sessions two by two, and examIned thus the third
and forth session in combination. Compared with the information of Humphrey quoted
above, the fourth session of the General Assembly appeared as the turning point.
Humphrey, Great Adventure, 66.
5 GAOR 1/1, pp. 102-103.
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Rights, he expressed himself in this way: "Y ou know . . . that all men of
all the free peoples and of all the peoples liberated from slavery , put in you
their confidence and their hope, so that everywhere the authority of these
rights, respect of which is the essential condition of the dignity of the
human person, be respected." At the same session, Eleanor Roosevelt
declared that the peoples of the world looked upon the members of the
Coinssion as their representatives, which implied a heavy responsibility.
Later that year a US governmental working group on human rights
emphasized the "urgent need for the Coinssion (on Human Rights) . . .
to demonstrate real progress (in the drafting process)."6
The question of the pre stige of the United Nations was a part of the
reason why the United Kingdom, which had wanted to postpone of the
Declaration, ultimately agreed to a 1948 adoption. On the other hand, when
the House of Commons debated the report of the Coinssion on Human
Rights in February 1948, one of the representatives maintained that the
prestige of the United Nations had not fallen so low that it could accept
merely a declaration.7
At the third session of the Third Cointtee of the General Assembly, the
representative of Argentina, Enrique V. Corominas, argued that the
members of the Third Cointtee were responsible to their peoples. They
could not return from the current session empty-handed, and must respond
to the civic and socIal aspirations of mankind and adopt the declaration of
human rights for which the world was waiting. The Belgian representative,
Henry Carton de Wiart, recommended the adoption of the Declaration at
this session "because it was important for the United Nations to give the
waiting world a tangible proof of its activity and usefulness." René Cassin
expressed similar views: 8
6
E/HR/6, p. 1. E/HR/lO, p. l; Mrs. Roosevelt used this as an argument for non-
governmental representation in t~e Commssion on Human Rights. "Preparation of an
international bil of rights," 31 October 1946, SDÆ/CN.4/W.ll (Rev.2), box 45, position
papers, Bureau of International Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59,
NARA.
7
"Human Rights," Notes for meeting with representatives of the Commonwealth High
Commissioners by R. Heppel, PRO, FO 371/728lO1UNE 3479. The United Kingdom's
desire for postponement of the draft Bil of Rights is clearly expressed in numerous
documents from the British Foreign Office, but in the United Nations the British kept
a low profile on this matter. Fletcher, House of Commons, 26 February 1949, PRO, FO
371/728001UNE 847.
8 GAOR-TC 3, p. 36 and 49; see also pp. 867-68 and 889. GAOR-TC 3, p. 61.
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From the moral point of view, it must not be forgotten that it was at the
end of the San Francisco Conference that the President of the United
States had, speaking in the name of the United Nations, promised the
peoples of the world that respect for their essential rights would be
ensured by an international bil. The time had come to ful fil that promise.
From the beginning, the Coinssion on Human Rights was faced with "the
problem of considering a large number of appeals and communications
addressed to the United Nations from groups and individuals who
considered themselves to be victims of violations of their rights. The
petitioning was controversial since it concerned the intern al affairs of states.
A concrete examination of every petition was nearly impossible, at least at
that time. Therefore, at its first session, the Commission recognized that it
had no power to take any action about complaints concerning human rights.
The Commission voluntarily restricted its mandate so as not to deal
substantively with these controversial matters. Several members of the
Commission were willing to study some of the petitions "in so far as they
were likely to contribute towards the drawing up of the Declaration." The
petitions were mere ly identified and enumerated in closed meetings, and the
petitioners were only informed that their communications had been brought
to the Commission' s attention. The stream of complaints did not cease,
however, and in an indirect way exerted some pressure on the Coinssion.
The Coinssion had to justify its refusal to accept the petitions by
producing a speedy draft of a Universal Declaration.9
Adoption of schedule
The ECOSOC Resolution 46/4 of 28 March 1947, which appointed the
eight members of the Drafting Committee, also contained a procedure and
a step-by-step procedural timetable for completing the Declaration. The
United Nations imposed restrictions on itself. The time procedure included
the following seven steps: 10
1) Preparation of a draft by a drafting commIttee on the basis of
documentation prepared by the Secretariat;
2) Consideration of the draft by the Commssion on Human Rights;
9 E/CN.4/SR.l, p. 2. Alston, United Nations and Human Rights, 127-29. E/CN.4/SR.26,
pp 5-6. E/CN.4/SR.23, pp. 9-12; E/CN.4/SR.26; E1259, pp. 5-6; E/600, pp. 7-8 and
E/800, p. 6.
10 OR-ECOSOC 4, p. 356 and E/325.
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3) Subrnssion of the resulting draft to Members of the United Nations for
observations, suggestions and proposals;
4) Consideration of the above observations, suggestions and proposals as
a basis of redraft, if necessary, by the Drafting Comrnttee;
5) Consideration of the resulting draft by the Commission on Human
Rights;
6) Consideration by the Council of the resulting text;
7) Submission of the draft Bil of Human Rights by the Council to the
General Assembly in 1948.
The origin of this procedure is not completely clear. It was recommended
by the Committee of the Whole Social Affairs, a recommendation which
Eleanor Roosevelt repeated. The procedure was not openly opposed,
although intern al British documents complained about the "ill-considered
haste" of the drafting process. The United Kingdom, it will be shown
below, had a strong desire to prolong the drafting process.11
It was a very demanding and optimistic schedule. The draft documents
had to go through a long and complicated decision process. Delay could
easily occur on any one of these points. It so, the total delay might be at
least one year, since the General Assembly, which needed to giv e final
approval, had only one session annually. A brief look at the time-span for
the drafting process shows that there was not much spare time. Some of the
sessions over-Iapped. And between the sessions which had to examine the
whole draft, the two sub-coinssions and the Coinssion on the Status
of Women were expected to consider relevant articles, which they also did.
This use of the sub-coinssions was in fact a method of saving time. The i
sub-coinssions examined two and four articles each. These examinations
meant a considerable relief for the Commission. Controversial issues were
dealt with before they were submitted to the Coinssion.12
11 E/CNA/AC.1/2, p. 5 and E/383. Record of ameeting held in the Foreign Office to
discuss the work of the CommIssion on Human Rights, 30 April 1947, PRO, FO 371/67
603/UNE 335.
12 See Table 1. The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of DiscrimInation and the
Protection of Minorities met from 24 November to 6 December 1947 and discussed four
of the articles in the draft declaration. These were the article on non-discrimination (the
final Article 2); the right to freedom of movement (the final Article 14); the right to
equal access to public service (the final Article 21,2) and the rights of mInorities (finally
rejected). See E/CNA/52. The Sub-Commission on Freedom on Information and of the
Press gave their recommendations on two articles at their session from 19 J anuary to 3
February 1948. Later this spring the UN Conference on Freedom of Information also
delIvered its draft on the same issues. The sub-commIssion and the UN Conference
considered the articles dealing with freedom of opinion and expression (the final Articles
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In order to keep the schedule, different procedural arrangements were
introduced. At the second session of the Coinssion on Human Rights,
only one speech for and one speech against each amendment was allowed.
Several night meetings continued into the early hours of the morning and
"most of the delegates, and even more the Secretariat, suffered from loss
of sleep." The delegates really had a reason to be tired: The summary
records from this session reported twenty-three plenary meetings and nine
working group meetings more than three hours average, more than hundred
hours in total. In addition, the delegates had a lot of preparation between
the meetings. At the second session of the Drafting Cointtee, a discussion
on an article was only re-opened if any changing proposals were set forth.
Thus, half of the draft articles were submitted to the Coinssion on
Human Rights without consideration. At the third session of the
Commission, more than ten sub-cointtees were set up in order to
combine different preferences and suggestions on various issues. These sub-
committees were an addition to the ordinary meeting program and the
representatives who had specific suggestions in the different cases were
frequently appointed as members in these cointtees. They worked out
compromise articles, and the controversies were solved outside the entire
Commission, which prove d to be a time-saving procedure.13
When the draft Declaration was submitted to the General Assembly in
September 1948, it had reached its final stage. Still, there were hindrances
left. A majority of the delegations were not familiar with the previous
drafting work in the Coinssion on Human Rights, and others saw a new
opportunity to fight for their points of view. As a result the Third
Committee went through the text again and reopened most of the questions
which had been discussed by the Coinssion. Many amendments and sub-
amendments were under consideration, more than ten for some of the
articles. Each had to be voted on. Every one of the thirty articles of the
Declaration was discussed in great detail and the meetings were often
dramatic. The Third Committee spent nearly two months on an article-by-
article consideration of the draft Declaration. In the first weeks, one
meeting a day was held, but soon there were two, sometimes three,
meetings a day. The average length of the meetings was three hours. The
last day in which the Third Cointtee examined the declaration it held
18 and 19). See E/CN.4/84.
13 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 48. A matter was thoroughly discussed within the whole
Commssion before any sub-commIssion was established. Otherwise, it is remarkable that
France and the United Kingdom attended practically all of the sub-committees.
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three meetings which lasted more than twelve hours in a race to keep the
schedule.14
When its consideration was completed, the Third Cointtee decided "to
set up a sub-cointtee . . . to examine the full draft text of the declaration
of Human Rights, . . . with the mandate of reviewing the consistency and
uniformity of the draft and to submit proposals to the Third Cointtee."
The Committee examined the report from this sub-cointtee, suggested a
few changes and made a slight re arrangement on the articles. When the
draft Declaration was put to the vote as a whole in the Third Cointtee,
it was adoptedby twenty-nine votes to none, with seven abstentions. Then
the draft was passed on to the General Assembly sitting in plenary. The
Assembly dealt with the declaration at four meetings, and late in the
evening on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
was adopted as a whole. The voting was taken by roll call. Forty-eight
voted in favour, eight abstained and none voted against.15
In terms of the schedule, it was a close call. As Humphrey puts it:
I was soon preoccupied by another worry: W ould the committee get
through the draft before the end of the session ? At times it seemed that
itcould not, and as it tumed out it was a very near thing. We finished just
in time for the General Assembly to vote the final text in the night of i O
December - only two days before the end of the session. Rad the
discussions gone on any longer the adoption of the Declaration would
have had to be postponed for another year, or perhaps indefinitely.16
14 In a few cases the CommIttee could not agree upon a text, and then it set up a sub-
committee in order to work out compromIses. The sub-commIttees met at night after the
adjournment of the main commttees. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 70.
15 A/C.3/380. The sub-commttee was supposed to examIne the twenty-nine articles and the
preamble, adopted by the Third Commttee. The sub-commttee was composed of the
following eleven members: Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Lebanon,
Poland, Union of the Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.
The report from the Sub-Commttee, see A/C.3/400/Rev. l.GAOR- TC 3, pp. 879-880.
The seven abstaining states in the Third CommIttee were Byelorussia, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukaine, the USSR and Yugoslavia. As the vote numbers show,
several states did not atten d this vote. Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa, who
abstained in the final vote in the General Assembly did not attend, nor did Norway.The
report from the Third Commttee to the General Assembly, see An77.
The eight abstaining states in the final voting were the six states of Eastern Europe,
Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa. Canada had changed its vote, probably
because of the company in which it found itself.
16 Humphrey, Great Adventure, 71.
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Priority to the Declaration
At its second session, the Coinssion on Human Rights decided to prep are
the International Bill of Human Rights in three parts: a Declaration, a
Convention, and Measures of Implementation. As a consequence of this
decision, the Commission provisionally divided itself into three working
groups, which dealt with the different parts. It was quite obvious for the
Commission members that these three drafting tasks had different degree
of difficulty. Therefore, it was of great importance for its speedy
completion that the Declaration in fact was given priority at this early stage
of the drafting process of the International Bill of Human Rights. Initially
the Commission tried to examine all three drafts and some of the actors in
the drafting process had a different priority. The Declaration took the lead,
however, and explicitly so at the third session of the Coinssion lasting
from 24 May to 18 June 1948. As René Cassin expressed it: "(T)he
Coinssion should begin by dealing with the Declaration which was the
first document on which agreement could be reached." One of the US
arguments for giving priority to the Declaration was "the advantage of
relatively speedy adoption." This decision seems fortunate for the
Declaration since the Coinssion did not have time to consider the other
parts of the bill at this session. In twenty-six days the Coinssion held
thirty-five meetings and numerous sub-cointtee gatherings, and almost all
of them dealt with the Declaration.17
The Commission on Human Rights had earlier decided that the seventh
session of the ECOSOC would discuss the Coinssion' s report, even
though it had not been delivered the required six weeks before the Council
opened its session. The ECOSOC session nearly turned out to be a
stumbling block. The report of the Commission on Human Rights was not
the only human rights item on the Council' s agenda. It had to consider,
amongst others, the final act of the UN Conference on Freedom of
Information which contained three draft conventions on this matter and the
draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide. After some discussion the
Council decided to refer all these items, without first considering them in
plenary, to a temporary human rights cointtee. Several representatives,
among them the Chilean, Hernan Santa Cruz, objected to the organizing of
a human rights committee. He argued that this would be another drafting
committee and that such a cointtee would not be able to complete its task
17 See E/CN.4/SR.46-S1, E/CN.4/S1-154 and E/SOO. E/CN.4/SR.47, p. 2. "Legal forms of
an international bil of rights," 31 October 1946, SPÆ/CN.4/W.10, box 45, position
papers, Bureau of International Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59,
NARA.
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on schedule. This proved true. The human rights cointtee spent two
weeks discussing the report of the Coinssion on Status of Women. It
continued on other items before the Declaration could be put at the agenda.
"By the end of the next week the situation was critical," Humphrey
concluded, "there were only two weeks left, and it seemed that the special
cointtee would not get through its agenda. One heard talk of an attempt
to sabotage the Declaration or, at the very least, to prevent its reaching the
General Assembly that year."18
It is difficult to prove any attempts of sabotage. The members of the
ECOSOC were obviously concerned about the modest progress in its
human rights cointtee. They discussed working arrangements for the
session during the three meetings when reciprocal accusations of
complications and obstructions were brought forth. The main problem in
the temporary human rights cointtee seemed to be the conventions on
freedom of information. These questions had not obtained the necessary
consensus before the session. The debate reflected the large East-West
division. The committee consequently proceeded very slowly. Some
Western representatives were afraid that the conventions on freedom of
information would not be completed. Several other representatives argued
that human rights was the most important issue at this session and therefore
the Council should pay special attention to the draft Declaration of Human
Rights (and the draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide). The solution
which was adopted by a gre at majority, was to withdraw the draft
Declaration and some other human rights issues from the temporary human
rights cointtee. They were transferred directly to the General Assembly
without having been discussed by the ECOSOC in plenary.19 The schedule
was kept because the ECOSOC gave priority to the Declaration.
When the General Assembly opened its third session on 21 September
in Paris, the different items were for the most part left to their respective
cointtees. The draft declaration was one of eleven items on the Third
Cointtee's agenda. The Declaration also received high priority as most
of the ninety-seven meetings held by the cointtee was dedicated to the
Declaration. This was not an obvious procedural decision. The general
debate also dealt with the other parts of the human rights bill. The Third
Cointtee adopted an Egyptian proposal on 5 October. Henceforth they
18 E/600, p. 4. OR-ECOSOC 7/3, pp. xxv-xxvi and 57. Humphrey, Great Adventure, 57.
19 The accusations of obstructions reflected the East-West division and involved the USSR
versus France, the United Kingdom and the United States in particular; see OR-
ECOSOC, pp. 382-389, 412-432 and 434-438. OR-ECOSOC 7/3: Byelorussia, p. 418;
Chile, p. 421; China, p. 430; the USSR, p. 431. OR-ECOSOC 7/3, p. 438.
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were to examine only the draft declaration and prepare a text for adoption
by the General Assembly during the present session.20
Rejection of alternative drafts
When the Coinssion on Human Rights opened its second session on 2
December 1947, the Coinssion had before it the first official draft
declaration, prepared by the Drafting Cointtee. A single text was useful
if the schedule was to be followed. As general negotiation theory points
out, a single negotiation text is an effective strategy to produce results, as:
"(M)any-party negotiations are often too diffus e to be effective unless they
focus on a single negotiation text."21
When the Drafting Cointtee convened its second session in May 1948,
a procedural proposal was taken which could have destroyed the advantage
of a single draft. The USSR representative, Alexei P. Pavlov, suggested a
general discussion on the basic questions of the Declaration. This implied
that work begin all over again. It such a procedure had been adopted, it
would obviously have delayed the drafting work and the final adoption of
the Declaration. The representatives of the United States and Chile strongly
opposed this proposal. They used the terms of reference given by the
ECOSOC. The commission was only to revise the prepared document on
the basis of comments from governments. The USSR proposal led
nowhere.22
At its third session, the Coinssion on Human Rights had before it the
last report of the Drafting Cointtee, a French draft, a Chinese draft, and
a common reviewed edition of the report of the Drafting Cointtee
presented by the United Kingdom and India. Different members of the
Commission proposed amendments or revisions for separate articles. The
negotiation text remained as was prepared by the Drafting Cointtee. Even
the United Kingdom which did not approve this text, found it difficult to
abandon a draft in which so much work was invested.23
Problems appeared at a later stage as well. In March 1948, the Latin
American states had adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man in Bogotá. In the Third Cointtee, the representative of
Cuba, Guy Pérez Cisneros, suggested that a sub-cointtee study and
20 GAOR- TC 3, pp. 74-82 and A/C.3/222.
21 E/CN.4/21. Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation, 254.
22 E/CN.4/AC.lISR.20, pp. 2-4.
23 Memorandum by Hebbelthwaite, 18 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/72806/UNE 1928.
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compare the Bogotá text and the draft Declaration. The procedure implied
a new basis for the drafting work and would have caused considerable
delay. The Cuban proposal was supported by several other Latin American
states. The Latin American region had more than a third of the
representatives of the Assembly (twenty of fifty-eight). A joint Latin
American initiative could cary great weight. Despite their numerous
strength, they only occasionally acted as a voting bloc, neither did they in
this case. The representative of Chile, Hernan Santa Cruz, who had been
an active member of the Commission on Human Rights, continued to
defend the original text:24
It should not be forgotten that the draft dec1aration was a result of two
years' painstaking effort by several organs of the United Nations to reach
a compromise, acceptable at least to the majority, of all those conflicting
views. The text of the Bogotá dec1aration had not been overlooked. While
there was no complete concordanee between it and the draft dec1aration,
it had been given thorough consideration, and many of its artic1es had
been accepted.
The representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the USSR
expressed similar views. The Cuban procedural proposal was rejected.25
Postponement turned down
When every member state of the United Nations was invited to comment
on the draft International Bill of Rights in the first three months of 1948,
serious attacks were directed against the time-table. The criticism was in
particular voiced by Canada and New Zealand. Behind the scene the United
Kingdom was the leading force, although carefully avoiding to take any
initiative in this matter in public. The UK found it premature to submit the
draft declaration to the 1948 General Assembly and tried to persuade its
Commonwealth fellows, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, to support a
postponement. They responded positively . Then the British UN delegation
sounded out the opposition from China, France, the United States and in
particular the Latin Americans, and it concluded that it was "unwise to risk
24 GAOR-TC 3, p. 38 and A/C.3/218. The Bogotá text wil be found in E/CNA/122.
Hohmann, "Latin American Voting Bloc in United Nations," 38 and Evatt, Task of
Nations, 16-17; see also Ball, "Bloc Voting in General Assembly." GAOR-TC 3, pp.49-
50. See also E/CNA/AC.VSR.36, p. 6.
25 GAOR-TC pp. 63, 65 and 75.
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ill with a proposal so little likely to succeed." Therefore, in the hearing,
only Canada and New Zealand proposed postponement. Canada explained
that its government wanted to hear the opinion of the Parliament, which
was not available before the time limit. New Zealand explained its position
in this way:26
(H)owever desirably may be the early conclusion of an agreement or
agreements on human rights, it is essential that sufficient time should be
allowed for each government to consider the views and comments of other
governments, for different viewpoints to be reconciled, and for the
greatest possible measure of agreement to be achieved. Some delay would
be preferable to the over-hast y adoption of texts which any considerable
number of states might, upon reflection, be unwiling to ratify.
Such suggestions had only minority support, and they were not given much
weight by the members of the Coinssion. During the third session of the
Commission on Human Rights the UK made, nevertheless, another attempt
to postpone the Declaration - without success. Then the British vie w
changed; "Departments here have in the meantime come round to the view
that there will be no harm, and possibly advantage, in the Declaration going
forward and being adopted by this year's Assembly." Thus, one of the
ardent defenders of a postponement of the Declaration was "converted".27
In September 1948, when the General Assembly opened its debate on the
draft Declaration, New Zealand continued its previous line and got support
from Haiti. The USSR followed up by requesting the General Assembly to
postpone the final adoption of the declaration to its next session. The
argument for such a proposal was "unsatisfactory aspects of the draft". This
proposal obtained support only from the other Eastern European states. As
if they had forgotten completely their own efforts to postpone the drafting
process, the British delegates complained repeatedly over "the delaying
tactics of the Slavs." Now, the UK as well as the US delegation were very
anxious not to reopen the substantial discussions on the Declaration, as they
feared that the text could change in an undesirable way. The postponement
tactics did not succeed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
26 "Human Rights," May 1948, PRO, FO 371/72807 lUNE 2071. "Draft brief for debate on
human rights in the House of Lords," May 1948 PRO, FO 371/72805/UNE 1969.
Foreign Office to UK delegation to the United Nations, 10 February 1948, PRO, FO
371/72799/UNE 488 and UK delegation to the United Nations to Foreign Office, 14
February 1948, PRO, FO 371/72800/UNE 618. E/CNA/82/Rev.1, pp. 1-2 and
E/CNA/82/Add.12, p. 2.
27 Foreign Office to UK delegation Geneva, 14 July 1948, PRO, FO 371/72809/UNE 2863.
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adopted after a drafting process of less than two years. This is aremarkably
short period for an international document of this kind. As one of the
important persons in the preparation of the Declaration and from 1951 the
chairman of the Coinssion of Human Rights, he compared the ongoing
work on the covenant with his previous experiences in the work on the
Declaration:28
Certainly the sense of urgency and drive that characterized the preparation
of the Declaration back in 1947 and 1948 was absent, and it was
impossible to brush aside the reflection that the proclamation of the
Declaration in 1948 was really something of a miracle, so that if it were
not proclaimed then, possibly we would stil be working on it now.
28 GAOR-TC 3, pp. 34, 78, 80, 887-890 and A/C.3/407. UK delegation to the United
Nations to the Foreign Office, 6 December 1948 and Report on the Plenary Session:
Note on the Foreign Office, 14 December 1948, PRO, FO 371/72812/UNE 4722 and
4858. The delaying tactics of the Soviets were partly interpreted as obstacles to a
General Assembly discussion on Korea, the next item on the agenda. See Luard, History
of United Nations, 229-239. "Comment paper, Draft International Dec1aration on Human
Rights," 26 August 1948, SP/AIC.3/70, box 27, position papers, Bureau of International
Organization Affairs and its Predecessors, RG 59, NARA. UK delegation to the United
Nations to Foreign Office, 29 November 1948, PRO, FO 371/72812/UNE 4636. Malik,
Human Rights in United Nations, 2.
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7. The aftermath of the Declaration
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted almost fort y-five
years ago. Was it "an epoch-making event"? The Declaration was intended
to be only one part of the International Bill of Human Rights and was
intended to be the least important part. When the General Assembly had
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, some
resolutions regarding the further human rights work were also made. The
Commission on Human Rights was already working on the Covenant and
the Measures of Implementation. It was widely thought that these texts
could be prepared for adoption at the next session of the General Assembly.
This hope seemed to be too optimistic.1
The drafting process of the remaining parts of the International Bill of
Human Rights was hampered by controversial issues. There was the
question of self-determination and even whether there should be one or two
covenants. Another difficulty appeared. Malik complained: "Nobody
seemed to be in a hurry to push our work to a conclusion." The
circumstances which speeded the adoption of the Declaration, later hindered
the adoption of the covenant(s). Because of different opinions about social
and econoinc rights, there was an argument whether there should be one
or two covenants. It was decided finally to have two covenants; one on
civil and political rights and another on social, economic and cultural rights.
Because of these difficulties, there were many long delays.i
Another difficulty was the shift in United States policy. President
Eisenhower in 1953 officially declared that the United States would neither
participate in the drafting of any covenant nor ratify such a document. This
position caused strong criticism from, among others, Eleanor Roosevelt,
who declared that "(e )ven the Soviet Union, though many of us are fairly
sure it will not ratify, have not announced through their government that
they will not ratify." As it turned out, the USSR did ratify both the
Conventions while the United States did not. One reason was because of
the federal system. An even more important reason was the general
Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, the representative of Pakistan in the General Assembly in
1948; see GAOR 3, p. 889. UN Resolution 217 (ILL) B-P.
2 Malik, Human Rights in United Nations, 2. See also Martin, "Human Rights and World
Politics," 43-44 and Neal, "United Nations and Human Rights," 125-135.
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unwillingness of the US to be subordinate to international interpretations of
human rights. The Coinssion dealt with the covenants until 1954, and the
deliberations continued in the General Assembly until the adoption of the
documents in 1966. The covenants had to be ratified by thirty-five nations
before they came into force, and sufficient signatures were not collected
until 1976.3
The measures of implementation, which were supposed to be the third
part of the International Bill of Human Rights, were included as parts of
the covenants. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
established a Human Rights Committee. It started to function in 1977 and
was made up of 18 members serving in their personal capacity. A
corresponding Cointtee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights was
also established. The first session was in the spring of 1987, and the states
which had ratified the covenants had an obligation to report to these
committees. Even though these states are obliged to submit regular reports,
the United Nations has no means of pressure if the states do not report
voluntarily. Connected with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
there existedan Optional Protocol. It allowed the Cointtee to "consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant." Eastern European states used
to ratify conventions more quickly and in greater numbers than the other
states, but these states did not accept complaints from individuals. On 1
January 1993, 115 states had ratified the International Covenant on Civil
3 See Falk, "Ideological Patterns in the United States Human Rights Debate: 1945-1978"
and Sohn, "International Consequences of the United States Human Rights Policies."
Johnson, "Contribution of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt," 46: The criticism from
Eleanor Roosevelt was devastating: "The Russian representatives are not in quite as
awkward a position as those of the U.S. . . . We have sold us to the Brickers and
McCarthys. It is a sorry day for the honour and good faith of the present Administration
in relation to our interest in the human rights and freedoms of peoples throughout the
world. . . . We are not wiling to sign anything that binds us legally in the field of
human rights and freedoms. Yet, we in the U.S. find legal decisions helpful in gaining
rights for our own people. Other nations may bind themselves if they wish, but we feel
that it is impossible "to codify standards of human rights as binding legal obligations,"
and the Eisenhower Administration does not want to fight a section of the American Bar
Association, or the isolationists or those who might vote for the Bricker amendment. In
other words, we use high-sounding phrases but we are afraid - afraid to tackle a
difficult thing and try to improve it and accept it ourselves as far as we are
able."(Johnson, 46-47.) Even the Convention on Genocide adopted by the United Nations
in 1948, was not finally ratified by the United States until 4 November 1988. In 1992,
the United States finally ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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and Political Rights and 117 states had ratified the corresponding Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.4
The influence and the impact of the Declaration
For more than twenty-five years, from 1948 until the covenants were
ratified in 1976, the Declaration was the only internationally accepted
standard of human rights. In this period the document had an immense
influence. The effects were visible in several ways. First, a number of new
human rights instruments both within and without the UN framework were
inspired by the Universal Declaration.5
Second, several states which became independent during the fifties and
sixties included the Declaration or similar texts in their constitutions.
Previous French colonies followed this practice especially. According to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, by 1968 a total of fort y-
three constitutions that were adopted in the foregoing years were clearly
inspired by the Universal Declaration. Legislation could be found on all
continents which quoted or reproduced provisions of the Declaration text. 6
Third, the Declaration - from its adoption - has influenced other UN
texts and has served as a basis and justification for numerous decisions
made by different United Nations bodies. The most striking example may
be the Declaration on Colonialism (1960). It declared that all states should
"observe faithfully and strictly . . . the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," a text which was adopted without objections. This was an explicit
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by those states
which had become UN members after 1948. It also implied an approval of
the Declaration by those who abstained in the final vote on the document
in 1948. The USSR representative, Professor G. i. Tunkin, argued for the
adoption and value of the Declaration of colonialism in 1960 by
emphasising that even though all the Great Powers did not vote for it, none
of them voted against.7
4 Marie, "Classifications and Status of Ratifications," 62.
5 The influence and the impact of the Declaration are examIned by numerous authors. See
Sohn and Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, 516-18 and
Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order, 23-30.
6 The speech by U Thant is referred in Robertson, Human Rights in World, 28.
7 United Nations, United Nations Action on Human Rights, 15-20; see also Humphrey,
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 357-58. Ninety voted in favour, nine
abstained and none voted against the Declaration on Colonialism. The text was
confirmed two years later by 101 votes in favour, none against and four abstentions; see
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The record in the early years is ambiguous. The Declaration had little
apparent impact on US policy. Contemporary analysis of foreign policy in
the immediate post-World War period makes little reference to human
rights. The subject was not very important for Washington. The Universal
Declaration had immense influence and status elsewhere. A senior diplomat
from Yugoslavia (one of the abstaining countries in 1948) insisted a few
months later (after Yugoslavia had broken with the Cominform) that his
country had voted in favour of the Declaration. This event suggests the
growing status of the document. 8
In 1949, one of the energetic supporters of the Declaration, O. Frederick
Nolde stated that "(aJdequate appraisal (of the DeclarationJ must await the
perspective of time." The appraisal has become higher than most of its
drafters expected. In 1948 some of those who praised the Declaration the
highest insisted that the text was an authoritative interpretation of the
human rights references in the Charter. Others feared such a development
and therefore abstained from voting , for example South Africa. Fort y-five
years later, its pre stige has reached out and diffused to all parts of the
world. The Declaration has become a part of international customary law.
Humphrey maintains that "(iJts political authority is now second only to
that of the charter itself. . . . In the considerable legislative work of the
United Nations, the Declaration has become as a matter of practice the final
arbiter and standard of reference to which every new text in related matters
must conform. ,,9
The wide formal acceptance of the Declaration is not without ambiguity.
The broad expressions which facilitated the drafting process, can now be
used to justify acts which many consider as violating human rights. It is
one thing to approve human rights in words and another to approve human
rights in deed. The broad expressions of the Declaration also makes a direct
implementation difficult.
Robertson, Human Rights in World, 28. Humphrey, "United Nations Charter and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 53-54.
8 Johnson, "Contribution ofEleanor and Frankin Roosevelt," 28 and 30. Humphrey, Great
Adventure, 71.
9 Nolde, 6. Nolde represented one of the NGOs which urged for international protection
of human rights. He attended the drafting proeess of the Declaration as an observer. On
the Universal Declaration as a part of customary law, see Humphrey, "International
Protection of Human Rights," 51-53; Humphrey, "M agna Charta of Mankind," 37-39;
Prochazka, "Changing Character of Universal Declaration;" Schwelb, Human Rights and
International Community, 36-37; Sieghart, International Law of Human Rights, 53-54
and Vasak, "A 30-year Struggle," 29.
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The stage of deciding norms?
A great many human rights instruments were adopted within the frame of
the United Nations during and after the preparation of the International Bill
of Human Rights. First came adoption of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. This convention was
more directly influenced by the Nazi crimes during World War Il than the
Universal DeclaratIon. It has lived its life totally overshadowed by the
Declaration. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was
adopted in 1951. The Slavery Convention of 1926 was amended by a
Protocol in 1953. There were further conventions, such as the Convention
on the Political Rights of Women (1953), the Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery (1956), the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples (1960), the ConveniIon on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacIal Discrimination
(1965), the Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious
Intolerance (1967), the Declaration on Protection from Torture (1975), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (1979), the Convention against Torture (1984); the Declaration on
the Right to Development (1986), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (1989).10
It has been argued that during the first period of the United Nations and
the Coinssion on Human Rights, their human rights activity concentrated
on creation of norms and standards. This period was followed by efforts to
make the human rights standards binding cointments. According to some
the norm-creating period lasted until 1954, but others have extended this
time-period to 1966. Looking at the list above, it may be asked whether it
really has finished. A third phase has, however, started. The creation of
norms and standards are only one part of the international protection of
human rights. Standards are of little use if they are not respected. When the
norms were adopted, the United Nations had to consider concrete violations
of human rights. The strategy of name-calling was a hindrance in the
process of drafting the Declaration, and it continued to be a hindrance of
the observance of the Dec1aration. For a long time the ability of the United
10 This list are mainly based on Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, VII.
The list may not be exhaustive, but nevertheless most of the norms created by the United
Nations are included.
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N ations to react was paralysed. The Cold War blocked any attempt to raise
specific issues on the agenda. When, for example the United Kingdom
suggested a resolution conderning the USSR treatment of Andrej
Sakharov, the USSR "answered" by a counter-move on human rights in
Northern Ireland. In the end, proposals and counter-proposals neutralized
each other because the majority refused to take a stand on issues raised in
the context of the East-West confrontation.ll
This practice changed. The international reaction against the South
African policy of apartheid became the turning point. In the late sixties the
UN Coinssion on Human Rights established a special coinssion which
delivered shocking reports and led to the convention against apartheid. The
barrier was broken. The broad agreement on the criticism of South Africa
expanded to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Pinochet terror
in Chile. Later El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Equatorial Guinea, Central
African republic, Uganda, Iran, Afghanistan, Poland among others appeared
on the list of states which were openly and critically evaluated. Fact-finding
groups and special rapporteurs were among the "whole range of tools and
mechanisms to deal in public with consistent patterns of gross violations on
human rights." In addition, a secret procedure for considering potential
violations of human rights was developed, the so-called "1503 procedure".
This method was a compromise and involved a confidential examination of
the alleged violation on human rights. The documentation was published
only if the assertions were proven true.12
The practices referred to above represented an expansion of the UN
activity for human rights. Decisions to consider human rights violations
were still made on political grounds. They were not made on the basis of
the severity of the violation. Serious violations of human rights were not
always criticised because of political circumstances. This double standard
or selectivity has been the target of much criticism, pointing to the need for
improved selection criteria. Others find it unacceptable that a situation of
gross violations of human rights in any country should not be discussed, or
11 Forsythe, "United Nations and Human Rights," 250; Tolley, u.N. Commission on Human
Rights, and Eide, "Det internasjonale menneskerettighetsvern," 216.
12 van Boven, "United Nations and Human Rights; Innovation and Stagnation," 11-13 and
16. The "1503 procedure" is named after the number of the ECOSOC resolution which
in 1971 adopted this practice. The procedure is thoroughly examIned by Alston, United
Nations and Human Rights, 144 ff. See also Gonzales, "Procedural Debates in United
Nations."
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actions taken therein, simply because other situations have not been taken
up as weii.13
Human rights activity outside the United Nations
The growing and concern for human rights is not only manifested within
the United Nations. Much important human rights activity unfolds in other
fora, either within regional IGOs or within NGOs.
On the regionalleveL, several multilateral treaties include explicit
references to the Universal Declaration as a part of their foundations. One
of the most important is the legally binding European Convention on
Human Rights (1950), later buttressed by several protocols. Within this
framework the protection of human rights is entrusted in the European
Human Rights Commission and the European Court of Human Rights. The
Convention permits individual complaints of human rights violations, and
has so far the strongest enforcement provisions than any other UN
measures. The Convention deals almost exclusively with civil and political
rights.
The American states got their Declaration in the spring of 1948 (the
Bogotá Declaration) and adopted later (1954) a resolution which approved
the Universal Declaration. A corresponding convention was adopted in
1969. The Charter of the Organization of African Unit y, adopted 1963,
included a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This
Charter has later been supplemented by the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Freedom, adopted in 1981, in force from 1986. By 1992 it has been
ratified by all member states except two, Ethiopia and Swaziland). A draft
Charter on Human and People's Rights in the Arab World, was made by
Arab human rights experts in 1986. Neither the League of Arab States nor
any single Arab state had by 1993 approved the document. 14
The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975, also known as The
Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), included
statements on human rights. East-West cooperation and human rights were
linked by the Final Act. The CSCE declarations represented a new
development in this fie1d. The Helsinki Conference put human rights on the
13 van Boven, "United Nations and Human Rights; Innovation and Stagnation," 14.
14 See Camargo, "American Convention on Human Rights" and Kullig, Benedek and
Mahalu, Emerging African System, 95- 106. It has been argued, however, that the African
Charter on Human and People Freedom represented a step backward in the protection
of human rights. The Charter include a lot of references to limitation clauses such as "in
accordance with the law."
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international agenda by connecting human rights questions to the
negotiations on disarmament. The USSR, which was reluctant to speak
about human rights on internationallevel, had to accept the issue as part of
the Final Act. 15
In the United States there was a shift away from policy of the fifties
which hampered the promotion of human rights. When President Jimmy
Carter in 1977 gave human rights high priority in his foreign policy, this
greatly helped international human rights activity. The end of the Cold War
and the world wide wave of democratization in the 1990s have consolidated
the position of human rights as a central issue on the international political
agenda.
The NGOs' activities on human rights have increased during the last
decades. The drafting process of the Universal Declaration and the human
rights references in the UN Charter in particular, were inspired by
individuals dedicated to human rights. Such activity, led by NGOs, has
continued to play an important part in the field of human rights. Because
of the criticism of the double standard in the human rights activity of the
United Nations and other governmental agencies, such activism has been
increased a lot. These organizations have also lobbied energetically at the
United Nations. They must deserve much credit for the UN progress in the
field of human rights. Among the most influential organizations are
Amnesty International and the International Red Cross. Charta 77 and
similar groups and organizations linked to churches and labour unions also
played an important part.16
Towards a human rights regime
The influence and status of the Declaration has exceeded the most far-
reaching and optimistic interpretations during the drafting process. A
document, which the Great Powers in particular refused to give binding
force, is now widely accepted as a part of international customary law.
Taking into account the emphasis some of the states laid on the non-legal
15 See Maresca, To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
16 See Scoble and Wiseberg, "Human Rights NGOs." Amnesty International has been of
essential importance for the present human rights concern, in particular in the West. In
Third Wodd countries the attitude toward Amnesty International is more ambiguous. The
mandate of the organization mainly concerns cIvil and political rights, particulady the
fate of political prisoners. Third Wodd countries accuse it of neglecting social and
economIc rights and collective rights. In the recent years, the organization has, however,
been more appreciated even in this part of the world.
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character of the Declaration, it may be assumed that had the present
significance and force of the Declaration been known during its drafting
process, the text would have been adopted in a much weaker version. It
was difficult to regulate its impact. When the text was adopted, the
Declaration acquired a li fe of its own. An internationally adopted text of
human rights which no voted against proved to have - despite its non-
binding character - enormous moral force. A statement by Belarmino
Austregesilo de Athayde, the Brazilian representative at the third session of
the General Assembly, touched upon some of the essential features of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
By making human rights international, the United Nations Charter had
placed up on States positive legal obligations; it was the greatest of the
victories achieved at the co st of the sacrifices made during the Second
Wodd War. 17
By the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the human rights references
in the UN Charter got their authoritative interpretation. This interpretation
is now a part of international customary law and constitutes the core of an
international consensus on human rights.
In the words of Louis Henkin, the idea of human rights is "perhaps the
only idea which is universally accepted." John Gerard Ruggie compares its
legitimacy to "the growing recognition of the validity of decolonialization
throughout the twentieth century." Of course, interpretation of particular
formulations of ten vary according to culture and national interests. Even
when agreement on interpretation obtains, practices does not always
conform to norms. Governments systematically and grossly violate human
rights. It is important to recognise that governments are sensitive to
criticism on this point. "Certain governments accused of such violations
have gone to considerable lengths to deny or to excuse their behaviour,
thereby implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the very rights they have
been abusing." Human rights have achieved something equivalent to a
moral hegemony. 18
Some observers go further and argue that human rights constitute an
international regime, which implies not only the existence of common
norms but a modification of structures and functions to implement them. A
persuasive case can ce made that among the many UN human rights
17 GAOR-TC 3, p. 54.
18 Henkn, "The International Bil of Rights," 18. Ruggie, "Human Rights and the Future
International Community," 96 and 100.
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standards today the Universal Declaration is the most broadly accepted. The
covenants have established stronger promotional activities and monitoring
procedures than the Declaration. With their norms and procedures, the UN
instruments and bodies dealing with human rights, the regional human
rights activity and the standards and efforts of the NGOs to promote human
rights, constitute at least a rudimentary form of an international human
rights regime.19
The political changes which took place in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 and
which have influenced most of the world, have transformed many of the
traditional human rights conflicts. The East-West ideological warfare in
which human rights were a weapon, is succeeded by a rather broad
consensus on the definition of human rights. However, violations of human
rights have assumed new forms, caused by lack of knowledge about what
human rights really are and lack of will to give human rights a superior
role in politics. At the same time, there are traces of a North-South division
in the interpretation of human rights; some Southern states emphasize
collective rights in opposition to the North' s concentration on individual
human rights. These differences are an important challenge to an
international consensus on human rights.
19 Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," Onuf and Peterson,
"Human Rights from International Regimes Perspective" and Ruggie, "Human Rights
and Future International Community" have used regime analysis in the human rights
area. These "human rights regimists" were criticized by Henderson, "Human Rights and
Regimes," arguing that their approach did not say anything new that cannot be said by
traditional concepts.
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Appendix 1
The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human byings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as
a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to pro mote the development of friendly relations
between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the
greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
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Now, therefore,
The General Assembly
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance, both among the peoples of the Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood.
ARTICLE 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or
under any other limitation of sovereign ty.
ARTICLE 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
ARTICLE 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade
shall be prohibited in all their forms.
ARTICLE 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
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IARTICLE 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law.
ARTICLE 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discriminatton to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement
to such discrimination.
ARTICLE 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.
ARTICLE 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arest, detention or exile.
ARTICLE 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
ARTICLE 11
1. Everyone charged with apenal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he
has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. N o one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute apenal offence, under national or
internationallaw, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal
offence was cointted.
ARTICLE 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.
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ARTICLE 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country including his own, and to
return to his country.
.. ARTICLE 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
ARTICLE 16
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They
are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.
ARTICLE 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
ARTICLE 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
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ARTICLE 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ide as through any media and regardless of
frontiers.
ARTICLE.20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
ARTICLE 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.
ARTICLE 22
Everyone , as a member of society, has the right to social security and is
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation
and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, socIal and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the
free development of his personality .
ARTICLE 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity,
and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of socIal protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection
of his interests.
ARTICLE 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
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ARTICLE 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary socIal services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
chIldren, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same socIal
protection.
ARTICLE 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory. technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis
of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human ri~hts and
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racIal or religious groups, and shall further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be
given to their children.
ARTICLE 27
1 Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author.
ARTICLE 28
Everyone is entitled to a socIal and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in this declaration can be fully realized.
ARTICLE 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.
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2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 30
N othing in this Dec1aration may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to eng age in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
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Appendix 2
Human rights references in the UN
Charter
The 'Charter of the United Nations has seven explicit references to human
rights, including the reference in the Preamble. This appendix presents the
actual articles and some articles which indirectly concern the human rights
issue.
The Preamble proclaims: "We, the peoples of the United Nations
determined. . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small. . . ."
Article 1 examined the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and
among the purposes are "(t)o achieve friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" and "(t)o achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinetion as to race, sex, language, or religion."
In the Chapter which deals with the General Assembly, Article 13 says:
"The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations
for the purpose of . . . assisting in the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinetion as to race, sex, language,
or religion."
The Chapter in the UN Charer dealing with the International Economic and
Social Cooperation opens with Article 55, which provides that "(w )ith a
view to the creation of conditions of stabIlity and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinetion as
to race, sex, language, or religion." This artic1e is the only one which also
had a human rights reference in its model in the Dumbarton Oaks
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Proposals. That suggestion sounds: "With a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions
of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and
promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Article 56 refers to the previous article, providing that "(a)ll Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
The part of the Charter dealing with the Economic and Social Council had
several references to human rights. Article 62 set out the Functions and
Powers of the Council: "It may make recommendations for the purpose of
promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all."
Article 64 concerns also the human rights issue without mentioning the
term: "The Economic and Social CouncIl . . . may make arrangements with
the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to
obtain reports on the steps taken to giv e effect to its own recommendations
and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by
the General Assembly."
Article 68 provides that "(t)he Economic and Social Council shall set up
commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human
rights, and such other coinssions as may be required for the performance
of its functions."
Article 71 deals with the human rights issue in an indirect way by
empowering the Council to "make suitable arrangements for consultation
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence."
The Chapter dealing with the Trusteeship System has two articles which
concern human rights, though only one of them refers to human rights.
Article 73 declares that "(m)embers of the United Nations which have or
assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are
paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by
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the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories,
and, to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned,
their political, economic, social, and educational advaneement, their just
treatment, and their protection against abuses."
Article 76 provides that "(t)he basic objectives of the trusteeship system.
. . shall be . . . to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,
and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world."
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Table 1
The chronology of the drafting process of the Declaration
1946 1947 1948
January General Assembly, Comm. on Status of
1 session, 1 par, Commission on Women, 2 session,
London, 19 Jan-3 Human Rights, New York, 5-19 Jan.
Februar. 1 session, New York, Sub-Comm. on Freed.
February ECOSOC, 1 sess ion, 27 Januar-10 on Info. and of the
London, 23 J an-18 Februar . Press, 2 session, New
Februar. York, 19 Jan.-3 Febr.
ECOSOC, 4 session, ECOSOC, 6 session,
March New York, 28 New York,
Februar-29 March. 2 February-11 March.
UN Conferance on
April Freedom of
Information, Geneva,
March/ ApriL.
Nuclear Commssion Sub-ComITssion on
May on Human Rights, Freedom of Info. Drafting Commttee on
New York, 29 April- and of the Press, Human Rights,
20 May. 1 session, New York, 2 session, New York,
19 May-4 June. 3-21 May.
June ECOSOC, 2 session, ComITssion on
New York, 25 May-21 Drafting Commttee on Human Rights,
June. Human Rights, 3 session, New York,
1 session, New York, 24 May-18 June.
July 9-25 June.
ECOSOC, 5 session, ECOSOC, 7 sess ion, 
August Humphrey director of New York, 19 July-16 Geneva, 19 July-28
Division on Human August. August.
Rights, 1 August.
September
ECOSOC, 3 session,
New York, 11 General Assembly, 3
October September-3 October. session, 21 September-
12 December.
Sub-ComITssion on
General Assembly, Prevention of Discr. General Assembly,
November 1 session, 2 part, and Protection of Third Commttee, 3
New York, Minorities, 1 session, session, 30 September-
24 October-12 Geneva, 24 November- 7 December.
December. 2 December.
December Commssion on
Human Rights, Universal Declaration
2 session, Geneva, of Human Rights
2-17 December. adopted 10 December .
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Table 2: The representatives of the drafting bodies of the Declaration
State/body CHR 1 DC L CHR 2 DC 2 CHR 3 TC/GA
Australia Hodgson Harry Hodgson Heyward Hood Hodgson
Hodgson Hood J ockel
Belgium Lebeau xx Dehousse xx Lebeau de Wiart, Lebeau
Dehousse
Byelorussia Kaminsky xx Stephanenko xx Stepanenko Kaminsky
Chile del Rio Santa Cruz Cruz-Coke Santa Cruz Larrain Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz Larrain
China Chang Chang C.H.Wu T,y'Wu Chang Chang
T.Y.Wu T.Y.Wu
Egypt Ebeid xx Loufti xx Loufti Bahgat Raafat
Franee Cassin Cassin Cassin Cassin Cassin Cassin
Ordonneau Ordonneau
India Metha xx Metha xx Metha Menon
Iran Chani xx Pourevaly xx Esfandiary
Lebanon Malik Malik Malik Malik Malik Malik
Azkoul
Panama Alfaro xx Amado xx Quijano Alfaro Quijano
Philippines Romulo xx Romulo xx Lopez Romulo Lopez
Lopez
Ukrainia xx Klekovkin xx Klekovkin Demchenko
Manuilsky
Ussr Tepliakov Koretsky Bogomolov Pavlov Pavlov Pavlov
Bogomolov
United
kingdom Dukes Wilson Dukeston Wilson Wilson Mayhew Davies
United states Roosevelt Roosevelt Roosevelt Roosvelt Roosevelt Roosevelt
Thorp
Uruguay Mora xx Victorica xx Mora Quadros
Ugon
Yugoslavia Ribnikar xx Ribnikar xx Vilfan BakarIc Vilfan
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